哲学

歴史意識の東西

阿部謹也

2005 年 2005 巻 56 号 p. 4-21,1
発行日: 2005/04/01
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2005.4

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Der Beitrag hat das Ziel, das Problem des Geschichtsbewuβtseins im Vergleich zwischen Europa und Japan herauszuarbeiten. Nach E. H. Car entstand die Geschichts-wissenschaft in Europa durch das Erwecken des menschlichen Bewuβtseins, wodurch ein Bruch mit dem Natürlichen auftrat. Eine solche Betrachtungsweise vertraten Jacob Burckhardt und G. W. Hegel. Diese Geschichtsauffassung läβt sich bis auf das Mittelal-ter zurückverfolgen und beinhaltet die These, dass die Entfaltung der menschlichen Ver-nunft die Grundlage der Geschichtlichkeit bilde. Heute neigt man dazu, das Wesentliche der Geschichte darinzu sehen, durch Erforschung der historischen Tatsachen die geschichtlichen Mythen zu durchbrechen. Ein geschichtlicher Mythos ist eine unbegrün-dete Erklärung der historischen Ereignisse und Verläufe. Zum Beispiel ist die Behaup-tung, "Wenn die Nase Kleopatras nicht so schön gewesen wäre, wäre die Geschichte an-ders verlaufen", ein solcher Mythos. So betrachtet das europäische Konzept der Geschichte die Entfaltung der menschlichen Vernunft als wesentliche Grundlage der His-torizität. Im Vergleich dazu entstand die Historizitsät in Japan aus der tiefgehenden Auseinandersetzung mit der Natur. Dieses Geschichtsbewustsein kommt in japanischen "seken" zum Ausdruck, das das gesellschaftliche Handeln in der japanischen Gesellschaft paradigmatisch bestimmt. Durch die enge Beziehung zur Natur untersceidet sich das Geschichtsbewuβtsein in Japan grundlegend von der europäischen Kultur. Durch die Analyse dieses japanischen Geschichtsbewuβtseins werden Bedeutung und Problematik der Magie im Kontext des Gabe-Gegengabeverhältnisses ausgearbeitet.

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予備考察

鹿島徹

2005 年 2005 巻 56 号 p. 22-41,2
発行日: 2005/04/01
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2005.22

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Bei dieser Abhandlung handelt es sich um vorbereitende Überlegungen für Diskus-sionen im geplanten Symposium. Nach der Zusammenfassung von Herrn Kinya ABEs Analyse der „Seken (japanischer Mitwelt)" and dem Versuch eines Weiterdenkens an-hand des Begriffs „Miuchi (die Seinigen)" sind auf drei Grundprobleme urn das Thema „Geschichte" hinzuweisen, die sich aus jener Analyse herausnehmen lassen: 1) Diskriminierungen in der gegenwärtigen japanischen Gesellschaft, die in deren Geschichte wurzeln, 2) Wirkungen der „Seken" in der gegenwärtig stattfindenden Globalisierung, and 3) Diskrepanz zwischen wissenschaftlichen Begriffen europäischer Herkunft ei-nerseits and deco altäglichen Lebensgef ihl andererseits. Um eine in unserern Leben ge-gründete Konzeption der „Rekishi (Geschichte)" neu zu formulieren, versuche ich die Struktur des „In-Geschichten-Seins" als faktischen Lebensvollzugs des Menschen zu ana-lysieren : Wir finden uns immer schon inmitten der Erzählungen der Herkunft unseres Daseins ; in sie geworfen and sie zu wiederholend haben wir aber bereits Möglichkeit, uns davon zu distanzieren and erzählte „Fakten" selber neu zu untersuchen, um eventuell Spuren von bisher versteckten Begebenheiten in Blick zu nehmen and daraus ein neues Bild der Vergangenheit zu entwerfen. In dieser dreifachen Bewegtheit, i. e. Erzählung der Herkunft, Untersuchung von „Fakten" and Sammlung von Spuren besteht also m. E. das Wesen der „Rekishi".

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歴史認識における因果と確率

一ノ瀬正樹

2005 年 2005 巻 56 号 p. 42-62,3
発行日: 2005/04/01
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2005.42

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The past is nowhere, but it is implied in our understanding of the world. We have to take into account these two fundamental characteristics of the past, i.e. absence and im-plicitness, in order to clarify historical knowledge, as history must be a part of the past highlighted by linguistic description. In this article I investigate the nature of historical knowledge by taking implicitness of the past to be causation between the past and our present state, and interpreting absence of the past as bringing about a probabilistic character of historical knowledge.
After briefly examining the controversy about the reality of the past, I scrutinize the covering law model of historical causal explanation through considering its probabilistic form. In particular I mention the problem of how to apply Bayesian Conditionalisation to historical causal explanations. However, Bayesian theory is involved in serious difficulties like the problem of old evidence. This suggests that our choice of context must be ques-tioned, which calls the narrative theory of history into discussion. I argue that narrative theory will introduce backward causation from narration to past events, and that the theory will still imply a probabilistic contingent status of the past. Finally I take up the question of why we narrate our history, and I assert that a sense.of crisis causally motivates us to narrate it. As the sense of crisis itself is a sort of historical knowledge as well as the resultant narration, the probabilistic and contingent character extends throughout our historical knowledge.

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国民国家と人権

碓井敏正

2005 年 2005 巻 56 号 p. 65-81,4
発行日: 2005/04/01
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2005.65

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In Japan, human rights are in crisis due to the compulsory participation in national flag and national anthem, especially in schools. Human rights are weak before the state, because they are justified only through the recognition of nation-state. Outside the nation-state, human rights are meaningless, so to make human rights universal and real, it is ne-sessary to expand the political community beyond the nation-state. However, this subject is not easy, because the power of nationalism as a state-consciousness is very strong even in democratic states. This was shown by American people at the time of the 9.1 Incident.
In order to overcome nationalism, firstly it is necessary to separate community from state. It is because as the communitarian says there is an important factor in community to prevent nationalism and totalitarianism by placing individuals in community. We have to give a cosmopolitan character to community-situated individuals. Such reality is increasing through the reinforcement of economic mutual dependence at the global level.
Globalization is making new orders and new communities, subdividing nation-states and old formes of communities. It also presents new world-wide problems such as the disparity of wealth and environmental issues.
We have to establish a new order and idea of global justice which can resolve such is-sues. Only by confronting these problems, can we make human rights universal.

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無力における責任:「人権」の手前へ

杉村靖彦

2005 年 2005 巻 56 号 p. 82-97,4
発行日: 2005/04/01
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2005.82

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L'idée des droits de l'homme fonctionnait depuis sa naissance comme principe de la résistance à partir duquel on lutte contre les figures variées de l'injustice. Pouvons-nous toutefois recourir encore au même principe, compte tenu du fait que nous sommes dans la situation où le mal semble se rendre invisible à mesure qu'il se maximalise ?
L'hyperbolisation de la responsabilité chez certains philosophes de notre époque peut servir pour aborder cette question. Car, loin d'être l'extention de la capacité de prendre ses responsabilités sur soi qui puisse correspondre à celle des droits de l'homme au 20^e siècle, cette hyperbolisation me semble devoir être considérée comme réaction au mal extrême contaminant toute sorte de pouvoir. Il s'agit done de la résistance qui n'invoque aucune modalité de capacité. Dans la recherche de la possibilité de telle résistance, cette étude examine succesivement «l'attention créatrice» chez Simone Weil et «la responsabilité infinie» chez Emmanuel Lévinas. C'est une tentative de poursuivre «en-decà» des droits de l' homme une première contestation essentiellement faible mais indéniable à l'injustifiable presque absolu.

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動的言語観

二十世紀言語哲学の一帰結と新展開

山田友幸

2005 年 2005 巻 56 号 p. 98-112,5
発行日: 2005/04/01
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2005.98

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If we are to take the notion of speech act seriously, we must be able to treat speech acts as acts. But speech acts pose at least two serious problems for the standard formal approach to the philosophy of language developed in the twentieth century. First, some illocutionary acts such as commands, requests, promises, and so on are not the kind of things of which the issue of truth or falsity arises. Their contents cannot be identified with propositions or truth conditions. Second, most illocutionary acts seem to change situ-ations. Nevertheless, works based on the formal approach have been mainly concerned with various static aspects of the system of thoughts or propositions. In this paper, I will describe the basic idea of a general theory of content for illocutionary acts which general-izes Austin's theory of truth. I will also consider, as a case study, how the dynamic changes that commands bring about can be captured in a form of logic similar to the update logic of public announcements developed recently.

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表現の意味、真理条件、解釈の関係をめぐって

言語哲学の回顧と展望

西山佑司

2005 年 2005 巻 56 号 p. 113-129,6
発行日: 2005/04/01
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2005.113

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The present paper considers the adequacy of an essential assumption in the philosophy of language in the twentieth century, which is that linguistic meaning is to be understood in referential/logical terms and that semantics is inherently truth conditional. Frege origi-nated this assumption. He defined Sinn (sense) as the determiner of Bedeutung (reference) . In contrast, linguistic semantics developed within the framework of the generative theory of grammar has no commitment to Frege's reference determining definition of sense. It defines sense as the determiner of sense properties and relations such as ambiguity, synonymy, analyticity, and entailment. Quine's argument that these sense properties and relations cannot be made objective sense of is critically reviewed.
We claim that linguistic semantics is not truth conditional. Truth conditions are to be assigned to the proposition expressed by an utterance, which is captured by the theory of utterance interpretation, i.e., inferential pragmatics.
Particular attention is paid to Yamada's argument that the content of illocutionary acts such as commands, promises, and the like cannot be identified with propositions. We claim that Yamada's argument is not convincing. We also comment on his idea of a general theory of content for illocutionary acts which generalizes Austin's theory of truth.

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過去の確定性

伊佐敷隆弘

2005 年 2005 巻 56 号 p. 130-141,6
発行日: 2005/04/01
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2005.130

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We can't affect what happened. We can't change the past and the past doesn't change itself.
The contents of my expectation may vary according to my actions in the present, but the contents of my memory don't.
Thing-individuals endure through time, and they can change and vanish and even regenerate. On the other hand, event-individuals, once they emerge, don't change or vanish or regenerate.
The contents of memory include reference to an event-individual. That is the reason why they don't vary according to actions in the present. The source of the fixedness of the past consists in the existence of event-individuals. And their existence, therefore also the fixedness of the past, largely depends on our referring to them.

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歪められたコギト

第三省察冒頭への批判的註釈

岩佐宣明

2005 年 2005 巻 56 号 p. 142-154,7
発行日: 2005/04/01
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2005.142

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Le premier principe de la philosophic cartésienne est le Cogito ; le but dernier est de fonder un rationalisme mathématique. Mais precisément, quel lien y a-t-il entre le principe et le but? Conduits par cette question, nous tentons une analyse critique du premier pas décisif par lequel Descartes se dirige du Cogito à l'établissement de son rationalisme. En pratique, notre réflexion porte sur le début de la Troisième Méditation où il examine à nouveau en quoi consiste la certitude du Cogito. On voit d'abord, en suivant le fil du texte, que 1'explication donnée par Descartes concernant la certitude du Cogito, qui en ré-duit la base à une connaissance claire et distincte, peut fournir un prétexte pour ramener le Cogito même sous la menace du Dieu trompeur. Il se confirme ensuite que, malgré de diverses tentatives de commentateurs ou l'excuse de Descartes lui-même, cette explication apporte en effet une confusion indissoluble clans sa philosophic. En dernier lieu, après av-oir montré pourquoi Descartes tient à une explication aussi risquée au point de vue du rôle qu'elle joue dans son projet philosophique, nous concluons que, afin de rendre le Cogito convenable a son but, Descartes a été obligé de déformer la certitude avec laquelle it l'avait découvert pour la premiére fois.

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内的特性の存在論的位置

ジェイムズ「経験」概念の検討を通じて

冲永宜司

2005 年 2005 巻 56 号 p. 157-169,8
発行日: 2005/04/01
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2005.157

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Where is the ontological location of an intrinsical quality which is felt without mediation? In this paper, we examine the possibility of regarding this quality as an intermediate and indefinable reality which cannot be subsumed under our ordinary concept of consciousness nor under material function. And we attempt this through an examination of the concept of "experience" proposed by William James. The reason why this quality has no concrete position in a materialistic framework is found in our cognitive premise which is objective from the beginning. On the other hand, as in the case of "experience", we are compelled to regard this quality as something ineffable and too near to grasp. Because this quality is neither objectiue nor subjective.
Thus, this quality is essentially not attained without our becoming identical with it. Concerning this, some insist that the essence of subjectivity necessarily continues to slip out from external grasping or that the essence of mind is closured from our native cognitive abilities. Thus they regard this reality as something beyond objective understanding but having a certain status of its own. And this apparently contradictory peculiarity is ultimately not refutable.
The existence of will or meaning can also be deduced from the reality of this fundamental quality. Moreover, the ground of this reality is to be found in the ontological right of subjective directness which can only be grasped from within. And this directness justi-fies itself in the fact that the cause of it is not to be sought out. On the contrary, we are to inguire the fur ther cavse of an objective reality, whenever we think we have arrived at the core of the reality. But we can avoid this difficulty by regarding reality as something not objective and in definable.

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「力への意志」の系譜学的編成と存在論的問題

勝道興

2005 年 2005 巻 56 号 p. 170-181,9
発行日: 2005/04/01
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2005.170

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Die Kritische Gesamtausgabe, herausgegeben von Colli und Montinari (Walter de Gruyter), verleugnet zwar hier und heute entschieden die Existent eines systematischen Buchs, des sogenannten Willen zur Macht, das Nietzsche selbst geplant hat. Aber dessen Lehre vom Willen zur Macht ist ein grundsätzliches Denken, das eine Frage in Bezug auf die Welt und das Dasein aufwirft und uns immer noch auf these Frage stößt. Diese Abhandlung beschäftigt sich zuerst mit der Genealogie, die eine wichtige Rolle in der Ausgestaltung dieser Lehre spielt, und setzt sich daraufhin mit einem ontologischen Problem auseinander.
Zuerst wird in Anlehnung an eine Abhandlung Foucaults Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie fur das Leben und Genealogie der Moral behandelt, in denen das geschichtliche Leben als Spiel und Dispositiv verschiedener Kräfte am Leitfaben des Leibes ausgelegt wird, und dadurch die genealogische Formation vom Wellen zur Macht verdeutlicht. In einer Bemerkung zu den nachgelassenen Fragmenten aus der Nach-Zarathustra-Periode lenkt Miiller-Lautar die Aufmerksamkeit auf die Pluralität des Willens zur Macht, wohingegen Heidegger eine ontologische Interpretation vorlegt, nach der der Wille zur Macht dasjenige metaphysische Prinzip ist, das in der höchsten Beziehung mit der ewige Wiederkunft die Anwesenheit des Identischen vollbringe. Um das ontologische Problem, bezüglich dessen sich zwischen den beiden eine Kluft auftut, zu durchdenken, müssen wirden Bereich eines Fragments betreten, in dem zugleich Eins und "Vieles" aufgezeichnet wird, und die Ontologie als eine Art Wellen-Spiel vorlegen, das sich auf die qualitative Differenz von Machtquantum aufbaut.

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訂正とお詫び

2005 年 2005 巻 56 号 p. 181
発行日: 2005年
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2005.56_181

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思考と政治

アレントの判断論

亀喜信

2005 年 2005 巻 56 号 p. 182-193,10
発行日: 2005/04/01
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2005.182

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La sphère publique, d'après Hannah Arendt, est fondée sur la pluralité et la liberté des hommes qui la partagent. Les hommes y apparaissent par des actions et des paroles, dont le sens propre est jugé par ceux qui partagent la même sphère. La sphère publique, c'est l'espace d'apparition, où le jugement politique a pour objet le sens de ce qui apparaît de particulier dans cette sphère : événement, action, parole, etc. On porte un jugement politique sur le sens propre du particulier sans le subordonner à une règle donnée. La validité de ce jugement dépend de la représentation des perspectives des autres, sans laquelle le jugement ne pourrait pas se faire comprendre par eux. Le jugement politique lui-même est jugé par ceux qui partagent la sphère publique ; cette réciprocité le défend de tomber dans le subjectivisme. Il supporte la sphère publique parce qu'il donne une réalité à l'individualité de l'homme et qu'il est fondé sur la représentation des autres. La sphère publique, supportée par le jugement politique, nous permet d'abord de vivre ensemble sans retomber dans la domination totalitaire et, ensuite, de résister à l'atomisation et à l'uniformisation de la société moderne.

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クザーヌスにおける「絶対的同一者」の概念

佐藤直子

2005 年 2005 巻 56 号 p. 194-206,11
発行日: 2005/04/01
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2005.194

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Though in the biblical text used by Cusanus (1 Cor. 12:11, Vulgata) God is named "unum et idem", Cusanus differentiates between unity and identity. This is because in Neo-Platonism, especially in Proklos, "idem" or "identitas" is given a lower ontological status than "unum" or "unitas". However, Cusanus thinks that "pure unum" or "pure unitas" is necessarily "pure idem" or "pure identitas". Hence, he developed the concept of "idem absolutum" as a new name of God, which is superior to the Neo-Platonic concept of "idem".
In Cusanus, the structure of "identitas" is intrinsically connected with his speculation on the Trinity. "Identitas" results from the mind's self-cognition, and God's self-cognition is precisely "identificatio". But, since God's mind by knowing himself conceives also the finite beings to be created, "identification" is also the principle of creation. Since, however, it is impossible that a plurality of "idem absolutum" exists, and since, further, God accomplishes only this self-cognition or "identificatio", "assimilatio" of the creatures is caused secondarily, based on God's "identificatio". From this "assimilatio", all of creation emerges in the form of limited identities, i. e. "the same (idem) for itself, different (diversum) towards others". Such a concept of "assimilatio" is often used in Cusanus' epistemology. For him, "assimilatio" is the fundamental principle of activity of the human mind, too. Therefore, it is by the manifestation of "idem absolutum" in the human mind that it can grasp the variety of created beings in their differences. This indicates that the concept of "idem absolutum", representing God's inner structure, is not only an ontological, but also an epistemological principle.

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真理と生

スピノザの知識論再考

柴田健志

2005 年 2005 巻 56 号 p. 207-221,11
発行日: 2005/04/01
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2005.207

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L'articulation des genres de connaissance dans l'Ethique a été souvent discutée et on reconnaît l'interprétation deleuzienne à sa manière toute originale. Mais un examen précis des textes nous empêche de 1'accepter. Quel rapport s'établit-il entre le premier et le deuxième genre? Deleuze y découvre une transition du premier au deuxième genre et à cette transition it donne une signification pratique. Comment peut-on arriver au deuxième genre, c'est-à-dire former des idées adéquates, étant condamné à n'avoir que des idées inadéquates? Selon Deleuze, telle est la question pratique par excellence qu'implique la théorie spinoziste de la connaissance et elle est résolue par la théorie des notions communes. Or, est-ce qu'il y a une telle transition? Evidemment non puisque la proposition 3 de la troisième partie de l'Ethique dit franchement que des idees adéquates et des idées inadéquates coexistent dans un esprit humain. Alors, la question se pose de toute autre facon : quelle est la signification de cette coexistence? C'est que des idées adéquates peuvent s'engendrer à côté des idées inadéquates et une vie toute autre que la vie courante qui se ramènèa l'enchaînement des idées inadéqueates, c'est-à-dire dans l'imagination, est possible. Dès lots, le rôle théorique des notions communes ne consiste pas à fonder la pratique, mais plutôt à démontrer la présence du vrai et donc la possibilité de se mettre d'emblée à la vie intellectuelle.

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『国家』第五巻475e3-480a13におけるプラトンの二世界論

高木酉子

2005 年 2005 巻 56 号 p. 222-233,12
発行日: 2005/04/01
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2005.222

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By way of averting the two worlds interpretation at 475e3-480a13 in the Republic, which takes Plato as asserting that 'there is no knowledge of sensibles but only of Forms, and no belief about Forms but only about sensibles', Gail Fine attempts to maintain that "what is" should be regarded as collective truths pertaining to sensibles as well as to the Forms. According to this interpretation the distinctive asset of knowledge consists in its ability to always, hence infallibly, produce true propositions relating to whatever objects. Besides questioning Fine's interpretation of "infallibility" as the definitive characteristic of knowledge, we shall see that upon her interpretation the assertion at 477b3-11 (that knowledge and belief, being different powers, accordingly are set over different things) is to the main argument not so much a required premise as a redundant remark concerning a consequential feature of a person with knowledge.
Furthermore, Fine's interpretation does not and by reason of irrelevance from its viewpoint cannot take adequate notice of Plato's use of phainesthai in contrast to einai at a decisive point in the argument where Socrates presumably points out the ontological defects of "the many beautifuls" -normally understood as referring to the sensibles, or "what is and is not" for the correlative of "belief' -in contrast to "the beautiful itself'. Here, Fine faces the task of giving a convincing explanation for the shift in the reading of esti from a contextually and grammatically natural predicative reading at 479b9-10 ("Is (esti) any one of the manys what someone says it is, anymore than it is not (ouk estin) what he says it is?") to the veridical reading she returns to at 479d3-5.

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曖昧性と斉合性

長澤英俊

2005 年 2005 巻 56 号 p. 234-244,13
発行日: 2005/04/01
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2005.234

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Dummett and Wright doubt the coherence of vague predicates. Dummett claims that the rules for such predicates are themselves inconsistent. Wright takes the sorites paradox to constitute a great difficulty for the view that a user of a vague term follows a rule. Wittgenstein says that rules can be created or modified, if they need to be. Here is a clue to solve the problem of the coherence of vague predicates. But cannot we explain their consistency without recourse to the idea of following a rule? Davidson's theory of inter-pretation sheds light on the question. For, according to Davidson, our linguistic activity presupposes that we should treat an interpretee as a rational being who has a lot of true beliefs about the world. This approach opens up the possibility of thinking of vagueness as a semantic matter. The meaning of a vague predicate depends on the situation in which it is used. But, even if the situation is determined, another kind of indeterminacy (which I think is semantic) remains. Hence the sorites paradox. Epistemicism holds that vagueness comes from ignorance (which I think is also semantic). Does vagueness as semantic indeterminacy or ignorance imply the renunciation of bivalence? Not necessarily. As indeterminacy of translation is compatible with bivalence, so is semantic indeterminacy or ignorance.

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抽象的記号システムと意味理論

原塑

2005 年 2005 巻 56 号 p. 245-256,14
発行日: 2005/04/01
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2005.245

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According to a principle of analytic philosophy and of cognitive science since the decline of behaviorism, amodal symbols must be used in representation systems implemented by the nervous systems of higher organisms. Amodal symbols don't carry any intrinsic content in themselves, and are arbitrarily related to represented properties. Philosophers and cognitive scientists are therefore obliged to explain what it is for symbols to have content, and how symbols obtain their contents. Meaning theories, in which these necessary explanations should be given, are needed urgently. There are many proposals for meaning theories, but astonishingly, they are all based on the same general idea that can be called the theory of use. According to this theory, semantic relations between symbols and represented properties come about by application of symbols to their target properties, and are fixed by use of the symbols as representatives of these properties in representation systems. From the theory of use follow, however, serious theoretical problems-eliminative materialism in semantic holism and the problem of direct transduction in semantic atomism. These problems show that the amodality of mental symbols is not a good starting place for theorizing about mental representation in a natural way.

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固定指示の問題と真理論的意味論

福井謙一

2005 年 2005 巻 56 号 p. 257-269,15
発行日: 2005/04/01
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2005.257

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One of the objections to Kripke's thesis that proper names in natural language are rigid designators is that the alleged evidence for their rigidity can be explained, consistently with the assumption that they are nonrigid designators, by postulating a certain convention concerning the scope of names in modal contexts. In reply to this, Kripke argued that the rigidity of names is exhibited in the'truth conditions' of sentences involving names but no modal operators. The notion of truth conditions presupposed by Kripke is the one defined in terms of the special concept of truth employed in possible world semantics. There is, however, a different notion of truth conditions, defined in terms of the concept of truth figuring in T-sentences. From the Davidsonian, truth-theoretic viewpoint, this latter notion of truth conditions is methodologically more basic, and the defender of the truth-theoretic viewpoint might therefore reject Kripke's reply to the above objection, questioning the methodological relevance of his appeal to truth conditions. But within a broadly truth-theoretic framework incorporating Kaplan's ideas for dealing with indexicality, it is possible to augment Kripke's reply in such a way as to appeal ultimately to the truth-theoretically basic notion of truth conditions. Kripke's rigidity thesis thus survives the truth-theoretic challenge.

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認識論的転回の地平を求めて

ハイデガーとカント『純粋理性批判』

横地徳広

2005 年 2005 巻 56 号 p. 270-282,16
発行日: 2005/04/01
公開日: 2009/07/23

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2005.270

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In «Den Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie», besonders in der These der neuzeitlichen Ontologie, versucht Heidegger eine ontologische Interpretation von Kants «Kritik der reinen Vernuft», die ein der neuzeitlichen Erkenntnistheorie eigenes Denken durchfuhrt. Diese Interpretation zeigt daß die Vorhandenheit der ontologische Horizont der "er-kenntnistheoretischen Wende" (R. Roty) ist, die eine Vollendung der Begriffsbildung des "Subjekt/Objekt-Schemas" in «Kritik der reinen Vernuft» bedeutet. Die Vorhandenheit enthalt die traditonellen Seinsbegriffe, konkret gesagt, <subjectum>, <essentia> und <existentia>. Es macht these erkenntnistheoretische Wende möglich, daß die Seinssinne des Subjekts and Objekts nach diesen traditonellen Seinsbegriffen gebildet werden.Was ist nun die konkrete Beziehung zwischen dern "Subjekt/Objekt-Schema" and diesen traditonellen Seinsbegriffen?
Nach Heideggers ontologischer Interpretation von «Kritik der reinen Vernuft» ist erstens die <essentia> des Objekts eine mathematische Kategorie der "Realität", und die <existentia> des Objekts ist eine dynamische Kategorie des "Daseins" oder der "Wirklichkeit". Zweitens ist die <essentia> des Subjekts, d. i. des theoretischen Ichs "das eigentliche subjectum" im miterschließenden Urteil, das das Wissen urn das subjektive Ich and den äußeren Gegenstand enthält. In diesem miterschließenden Urteil, <existet> das theoretische Ich als das eigentliche <subjectum>. Diese Bildung der Seinssinne des subjektiven Ichs and des objektiven Gegenstands nach den traditonellen Seinsbegriffen wird deutlich gezeigt in der "transzendentalen Dedukution der reinen Verstandesbegriffe", die "die ur-sprüngliche synthetische Einheit der Apperzeption" erklärt. So ist eben these "transzen-dentale Dedukution der reinen Verstandesbegriffe" der Ort, wo Heidegger den konkreten Umstand der erkenntnistheoretischen Wende begreifen kann.

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