The growing interest in the human body as a philosophical subject might be construed as an indication that the mind-body dualism developed by ancient Greek philosophy has already been abolished. However, I am sceptical about the apparent collapse of this dualism. I regard the Symposium held in May 2012 at Osaka University as the kind of Gigantomachia that appears in Plato's Sophist, — namely the debate between materialists and immaterialists, which Plato compares with the battle of the Olympian deities and the Titans. In this paper, I shall vindicate the reality of the soul and also illuminate what may have lain behind the mind-body dualism, focussing on the development of the Greek vision of the universe from Homer to Plato. Moreover, I shall reassess the Greek concept of the body observed in Homer and discuss what Socrates' body might have indicated in Aristophanes' Clouds, Plato's Symposium and the Phaedo. Finally I shall cast new light on the concept of the body derived from Plato's Timaeus and argue the de facto indestructibility of the body of the universe.

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Cet essai se propose d'éclaircir la structure élémentaire du corps humain à travers notre expérience fondamentale après le «3.11» : la Terre en tant qu'archeoriginaire et «le sol de notre expérience» se peut mouvoir. Cet expérience, n'est pas un simple fait quotidien, qui se répète dans l'histoire humaine et peut tomber dans l'oubli, mais une occasion privilégiée et inoubliable, qui nous permet d'éveiller notre condition primordiale de la vie humaine et nous force à penser philosophiquement le caractère à la fois fondamental et vulnàrable de trois sortes de positions existentielles basées sur la structure élémentaire du corps humain : la station verticale, la position horizontale et la position assise. C'est une tradition philosophique tenace concernant l'usage philosophique d'une série de métaphores autour de «la Terre» et la thématisation phénomenologique de «la main» qui cachent le caractère mouvant de la Terre et la vulnérabilité et la plasticité éventuelle de notre condition humaine.
L'expérience fondamentale de la vulnérabilité de notre condition humaine ne demande pas nécessairement le rétablissement de la foi en la Terre, mais pourrait ouvrir la voie à une nouvelle pensée authentiquement philosophique sur la «demeure» et une transformaton inexpérimentée de la structure élémentaire du corps humain.

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Is “my” body really my possession? Unraveling this problem leaves us with two questions: Whose body is it? Is the body a possession? We can rephrase these questions in the words of Gabriel Marcel, author of Being and Having, who asked “Do I have a body? Or am I a body?” These problems in the field of “bio-ethics”, be they at the level of principle or at the level of legal procedure, invariably involve questions of ownership. We must then once again return the facticity of our body to the border between “being” and “having”. At the same time, we must sever the link between the concept of “property”, which has long been viewed as self-evident, and that of “disposability”. The view that one not only owns one's body but, in addition, every last bit of that body is at one's disposal attests to the fact that we have been held captive by the gaze of self-ownership in modern society.

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Jean-Jacques Rousseau was the subject of scandal throughout most of his public life but more importantly, he was scandalized throughout his life. The offense he took at reality provides the motor of his theorizing. This is nowhere more evident than his Lettre á d'Alembert sur les Spectacles (Letter to Alembert on the Theater), 1758. In it he accuses d'Alembert of causing harm to the clergy of Geneva by accusing them heresy and of leading young people astray by encouraging the project of establishing a theater in Geneva. The two accusations are not unrelated but united through a concern about how one maintains a republican society. Rousseau is not bothered by the fact that clergy is heretical, he is bothered that this might become known and cause a disruption in society. The church of the time was the spectacle of Genevan society and Rousseau saw that it would not be able to compete with establishment of real theater.
But the problem goes deeper. The established church in Geneva was not in danger of overthrowing the order of society, but great literature, like Molière's play, The Misanthrope, still had that kind of revelatory power. Therefore, it too had to be expelled.

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L'affectivité et le sentiment sont des facteurs très importants pour le traité sur l'autre, surtout pour M. Sheler et M. Henry qui critiquent la constitution de l'autre par l'intentionnalité. Mais, considérant l'affectivité comme base de la communauté, ils rencontrent de graves difficultés : leurs arguments peuvent provoquer une perte de l'altérité puisqu'ils tiennent pour état suprême la concordance entre le moi et l'autre dans l'amour ou la sympathie.
Etant donné que Rousseau accorde de l'importance à la pitié, il ne peut pas éviter ces difficultés. En effet, Rousseau recherche la concordance affective, c'est-à-dire la «transparence». D'autre part, au fur et à mesure de la déchéance de la pitié, la satisfaction du moi dans le sentiment de l'être pèse lourd chez Rousseau. Ce passage vient de l'échec des relations transparentes. Mais cet échec, au contraire, pourrait suggérer l'altérité chez Rousseau puisqu'il montre une discordance entre le moi et l'autre.
Cet article a pour objet d'étudier l'altérité et la possibilité de l'hétéro-affection chez Rousseau. D'abord, nous allons voir en quoi consistent les relations idéales avec les autres chez Rousseau puis nous allons les placer dans le contexte des traités contemporains sur l'autre en consultant P. Audi et J. Derrida. Et enfin, nous allons examiner l'altérité et la possibilité de l'hétéro-affection dans Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques, livre dans lequel nous trouvons les relations idéales en question et leurs échecs.

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Libertarianism, as a theory of free will and voluntary action, presupposes the existence of free will and the possibility of agent causation, which is essentially different from event causation. Many contemporary physicalist-minded philosophers believe that agent causation is the most serious difficulty for the project of naturalizing libertarianism. From their point of view, the only possible causality is event causation, and the concept of agent causality is no less mysterious and incoherent than the concept of an agent. But this opinion arises through ignorance of the difference between causation and the physical processes which realize causal powers. As we can suppose that all mental abilities supervene upon brain processes, any kind of causation should be seen as supervening on some physical process.
There remains one more difficult problem. In the libertarian tradition the agent is thought to be a kind of “unmoved mover” or a special kind of cause, i.e. “causa sui (cause of itself)”. How is it possible to naturalize this mysterious cause ? To this hard problem I propose a solution: when physical systems (neural networks) are selfformed by an agent, they can realize that special kind of cause. Consequently it is possible to introduce the agent causality into the materialist framework without presupposing the existence of mysterious entities.

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Lorsque l'on réfléchit à l'individualité, on pense notamment à la singularité, et ce qui importe alors est la répétition de ce qui a été autrefois et l'aspect unique de cela même. Pour concevoir le concept de singularité, Deleuze le distingue de celui de particularité, qui est toujours une répétition basée sur une loi ou un principe universel. Mais la singularité, en tant que répétition dans le temps métaphysique de ce qui est infiniment répét> é, est la répétition porteuse d'une existence comme une chose ellemême unique.
Pour indiquer ces éléments, Deleuze parle d'un temps qui s'appuie sur l'éternel retour et 'un coup de dés' de Mallarmé.
Je rejoins ici la discussion par Kuki Shuzô de la contingence, en particulier par le biais de l'événementialité et de l'éternel retour.
Il s'agit là d'un problème métaphysique, mais l'individu de l'évolution dans la biologie actuelle, ou dans la société du risque, renvoie encore au problème de la responsabilité du fait qu'il ne peut être pensé que statistiquement.

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This paper is an essay in understanding death using the philosophy of Henri Bergson. It contains three parts. The first part is a reading of the critique of the idea of nothingness in L'Evolution créatrice. By interpreting Bergson's denial of nothingness as a denial of the nothingness of death, I argue that the philosophical investigation of the death of the living self must not be thought of as an ‘intuition of nothing’ or ‘annihilation of the existing self’. This argument implies that, to understand death, we must begin not with the ‘existing self’ but with the ‘living self = becoming self’, and the death of such a self must be thought of as ‘a halt in the process of becoming’, not as anything like a ‘falling into non-existence’. In the second part, I try to distill the state of the ‘living self = becoming self’ from the theory of body and pure memory in Matière et mémoire. In this way, the becoming self is understood as the node of an acting body and an evolving memory, and this implies that the joining of these is carried out according to Bergson's idea of ‘attention to life’. Based on the concepts above, in the final part, I demonstrate that the death of the living self is a halt in ‘attention to life’. Bergson's paper, “Le Souvenir du présent et la fausse reconnaissance“, is referred to in support of this conclusion.
In brief, what Bergson's philosophy of life reveals is that the living self is ‘the becoming self that is acting in the world by/in the body’, and its death is ‘a halt in becoming due to the disintegration of the body’. From this conclusion and the theory of Matière et mémoire, which argues that memory exists independently of the material world, it is strongly suggested that pure memory, as a trace of life, must remain after the death of the becoming self, as is also the case in the material world.

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As an important aspect of “the principle of charity,” Donald Davidson insists that the possession of thoughts cannot be separated from the interpretation of their contents. This claim is based on the triangulation model of communication, which combines semantic externalism with the argument against private language. On this model, it is argued that a grasp of the concept of objective truth is a prerequisite for possessing thoughts, and that it is only possible to acquire the concept through a particular historical context of interacting with other interpreters and the external world.
On the other hand, Stephen Stich thinks that the conceptual resource for having mental states can be more varied than Davidson describes. In order to show this, Stich postulates a map called “the causal/functional interpretation function” which connects mental states with their truth conditions. He emphasizes that the map is a product of historical contingency, and thus explains why there can be an intellectual space filled with alternative concepts that cannot be given semantic interpretations.
Thus, Davidson and Stich agree that the mind is the product of some historical contexts, but make different evaluations of their significance. In my view, Stich's argument does not give sufficient attention to the historical nature of the mind. It merely suggests that the mental domain can exist without the concept of truth, and remains silent about how the historical contexts underlie the emergence of the domain. However, as Davidson suggests, the mental features produced in a particular historical context of triangulation are fundamental to the concept of mind, and hence they cannot be eliminated without changing the subject. I shall argue that it is in this sense that communication is primal for the existence of the mind.

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This paper aims to elucidate various arguments for Cartesian skepticism, reveal their presuppositions, and examine their plausibility. Cartesian skepticism concerns knowledge of the external world in general. Even though there are different arguments for Cartesian skepticism, their differences are often neglected, resulting in serious confusions. By analysing the premises and presuppositions of each argument, I attempt to figure out whether and to what extent it is plausible.
The paper consists of seven sections. In Section 1, I introduce the problem of Cartesian skepticism. Then, from Sections 2 to 4, I review three different forms of the argument from ignorance, which appeal to different variants of the epistemic closure principle about knowledge. Among them, the standard closure principle is more plausible than the other two; one requires that S be logically omniscient, and one entails the notorious KK thesis that first-order knowledge requires second-order knowledge. The requirements these two closure principles impose on knowledge, then, are too strong. In Section 5, I discuss how versions of infallibilism are invoked in defending the first premise of the argument, viz., that S does not know that a skeptical hypothesis is false, of the argument from ignorance. On the other hand, some claim that the argument from underdetermination does not require infallibilism, and thereby undermines even fallible knowledge. In Section 6, however, I argue that it is hard to maintain that the argument from underdetermination fares well against fallible knowledge. The underdetermination principle, to which the argument appeals, is supported by premises at odds with fallibilism. In addition, the argument from underdetermination faces another problem: it presupposes that S's total evidence is restricted to sensory evidence, if it works against fallible knowledge at all. Since this presupposition is contentious, the argument from underdetermination against fallible knowledge needs more justification for its presuppositions, in order to get off the ground. Section 7 gives a summary of the paper.

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Der vierte und letzte Teil des Werks Also sprach Zarathustra (1885) von F. Nietzsche nimmt hinsichtlich seines Entstehungsprozesses eine besondere Position ein. Was ist überhaupt die raison d'être des vierten Teils, wenn die Thematisierung der ewigen Wiederkehr im dritten Teil doch hinreichend gelungen ist? Oder wird nicht der Zusammenbruch Zarathustras im Ganzen nachgewiesen, wenn die Verkündung des Wiederkunftsgedankens nicht selbst bis zum vierten Teil schon vollzogen ist? In einem nachgelassenen, „Sils-Maria, vom 26. August 1881” datierten Entwurf, der in die erste Entwicklungsphase der Idee von Zarathustras Überfall gehört, findet sich, neben dem Symbol der Wiederkunft, jedoch auch schon eine Zusammenstellung der vier Bücher (Teile). Von diesem Fragment als Ansatzpunkt ausgehend, geht dieser Aufsatz den nachgelassenen Entwürfen und Plänen zum vierten Teil nach, untersucht die Thematik des „Eselfest” bei den „höheren Menschen” und versucht auf diese Weise, Zarathustra IV neu zu bewerten.
Insofern die Entwürfe zur Tragödie von Empedokles, die vor und nach der Entstehung von Die Geburt der Tragödie (1872) entwickelt worden waren, als Vorform von Zarathustra angesehen werden können, ist zunächst zu vermuten, dass Nietzsche versucht hat, die Faktoren (d. h. Pest, Tod, Todtenfeier) der Empedokles-Tragödie nochmals in die Motive neuen Zarathustra-Dramas zu übertragen. Der vierte Teil, mit seinen diese Faktoren einschließenden Fragmenten, ist geplant worden, um die Aufgabenstellung zu entwickeln, wie die nihilistische Einwirkung von der Wiederkunft zu ertragen und somit die Versuchung (Mitleid) der „höheren Menschen” zu überwinden sei, und es ist darin die Erwartung ausgedrückt worden, ein Fest (Mitfreude) mit ihnen feiern zu dürfen. Während in Bezug auf jene Aufgabe die höchste Kraft präsentiert wird, mit der alles Leidende als ewig wiederholenswert zu empfinden ist, wird das närrische „Eselfest” mit dem Spiel des doppelsinnigen Symbols in Bezug auf diese Erwartung inszeniert. Endlich wird in Zarathustra IV die Formel der Bejahung in der Verkleidung eines Festes zum Programm gemacht, als Gegengewicht zum „Geist der Schwere” und über die Verkündung der zur Fabel gewordenen Wahrheit hinausgehend.

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It is generally thought that the motivation for an action can be explained in terms of a desire (or evaluative judgment) and a belief. It is not clear, however, what kind of explanation is the explanation of the motivation for an action. This paper takes up and considers the validity of two answers to this question from different perspectives: the causal theory of action and the anti-causal theory of action.
Construing practical reasoning as a simple practical syllogism, Donald Davidson argues that the motivation for an action can not be fully explained by the rationality of practical reasoning and needs to be explained by the causal relation between a beliefdesire pair and an action (the causal theory of action). Practical reasoning, however, can not be construed as a simple practical syllogism. An agent should be construed to start with a prima facie judgment about the desirability of an action and to work to reach an all-things-considered (ATC) judgment before reaching a conclusion in practical reasoning. Under such a construal, Davidson's argument that the rationality of practical reasoning can not fully explain the motivation for an action loses its validity (the anti-causal theory of action).
It appears prima facie, however, that the causal theory of action is required for explaining the motivation for an akratic action. An akratic action is a free action that is contrary to an ATC judgment about the most desirable action reached at the time of performing it, and it is thus generally considered that the motivation for an akratic action is not determined by practical rationality. Rather, it is more plausibly determined by causal powers of individual desires (or evaluative judgments).
Under the causal theory of action, however, an akratic action can not be construed as a free action since, under the theory, an akratic agent is a passive being who is at the mercy of the causal power of desires and hence does not have autonomy in the sense of a capacity to determine his/her motivation voluntarily, which is required for a free action. In order for an akratic action to qualify as a free action, it must be an action that is contrary to a comprehensive ATC judgment and, at the same time, arises because of a cognitive-condition-bound ATC judgment in favour of it. Furthermore, the motivation of an action, in general, must be explained by a practical rationality that includes cognitive-condition-bound ATC judgments (the anti-causal theory of action).

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Durch die neuen Gesammelten Werke und Vorlesungen können wir heute Hegels vielfältige Aktivitäten in seinen späteren Jahren im Detail verstehen. Diese neuen Auflagen machen es aber zugleich schwieriger, die Veränderungen und Vermehrungen in Bezug auf das gesamte philosophische System Hegels einheitlich zu erfassen. Warum bemühte Hegel sich kontinuierlich bis zu seinem Tode, sein System zu revidieren? Bedeutet das eine Niederlage der Hegelschen Philosophie gegen die immer weiter zunehmende Zahl von verschiedenen Meldungen und Erkenntnissen der empirischen Wissenschaften und der geschichtlichen Tatsachen?
In Bezug auf dieses Problem versucht mein Aufsatz, noch einmal das Hegels System am Leitfaden des Begriffs “Nachdenken” zu interpretieren. In dieser Arbeit wird gezeigt, dass das System, das Hegel in seinen späteren Jahren konzipiert hat, die Vielfalt der empirischen Kenntnisse aufnehmen, aber dennoch zugleich immanent und selbständig sein kann.
In seiner Berliner Periode (1818-1831) bringt Hegel seine eigene philosophische Aufgabe mit dem Wort “Nachdenken” zum Ausdruck. Seine theoretische Erörterung dieses spezifischen Denkens, das nicht rein und bloß, sondern immer “nach” etwas denkt, findet sich im “Vorbegriff” der zweiten und dritten Auflagen der Enzyklopadie, dessen Kapitel die Rolle einer Einleitung zur Darstellung des Systems spielt. Hegel diskutiert darin, dass, insofern das Denken, obwohl es sich in dem Feld des Emprischen bewege, ein Moment der “Beziehung auf sich selbst” besitze, dadurch es von seinen Einzelheiten und Zufälligkeiten befreit und zum allgemeinen Wissen erhoben werden könne.
Diese Erhebung durch das “Nachdenken” muss jedoch wegen ihres “Nach” - Charakters nicht in der reinen begrifflichen Sphäre, sondern gerade innerhalb der Arbeit an der Erfahrung vollzogen und bestätigt werden. Bei Betrachtung dieser Theorie können wir den paradoxen Satz: “das Aufnehmen des empirischen Inhalts ist die Sichentwicklung des Denkens” (in der “Einleitung” der revidierten Enzyklopädie), als das Fundament des ganzen Systems Hegels interpretieren. Indem Hegel das “Nachdenken” zur Methodenidee seines Systemaufbaus bestimmte, zeigte er schließlich, dass sein philosophisches System nur im Zusammenhang mit der Erfahrung offenbart.

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Levinas est un philosophe d'inspiration juive. Il est connu de tous que la source principale du judaïsme dans son oeuvre est le Talmud. Pourtant, à faire du Talmud l'unique référence des recherches d' inspiration juive de Levinas, on néglige le rôle important qu'a joué Maïmonide—le plus grand philosophe juif de la période médiévale—dans la formation de sa première philosophie.
La présence du «docteur de la Synagogue» dans l'un des écrits des années 30 du jeune Levinas s' explique elle-même par la relation intellectuelle féconde qu' il a entretenue avec son collègue Jacob Gordin. L'influence de ce dernier sur sa pensée apparaît évidente lorsque l'on compare, chez ces deux philosophes, les arguments qui font référence à leur lecture de Maïmonide: l'actualité de la pensée de Maïmonide au temps de la crise en Europe ou la singularité assez forte de sa pensée éthique au sein de l'aristotélisme médiéval par exemple. En outre, le rapport au Dieu qui individualise chaque homme, que Gordin a dégagé du Guide des égarés, se transforme en rapport d'autrui à l'homme chez Levinas.
Par ailleurs, sur ce plan éthique où l'on ne recourt jamais à la méthode de l'analogia entis, Gordin, lui, stimulé par le travail d'Etienne Gilson sur la «philosophie chretienne», semble avoir révé de la possibilité d'une «philosophie juive». L'élan de renouveau de cette philosophie fut donc transmis par Gordin à Levinas et constitua, il nous semble, le premier moteur de sa critique de la «philosophie occidentale» dont le développement atteindra son apogée dans Totalité et infini.

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Hume insists that the rules of justice are established by a convention, that is, ‘a general sense of common interest’, not by our ‘promise’ or ‘consent’ as the social contract theory advocates. Nonetheless, Hume's theory is sometimes regarded as a kind of social contract theory. Furthermore, Hume is often interpreted as a kind of utilitarian, since he says that utility is the chief foundation of justice.
One of the reasons why such interpretations arise, in my view, is that Hume uses the words ‘interest’ or ‘utility’ very ambiguously in his arguments. Because of this ambiguous usage, it is difficult for us to understand clearly the specific contents of such phrases as ‘common interest’, ‘public interest’, and ‘public utility’. As the result, the readers of Hume's works are put into confusion. In this paper, I attempt to clarify what Hume means by these terms in order to resolve this problem.
First, considering the relation of ‘common interest’ and ‘public interest’, I maintain that they are different kinds of interest. Second, I turn to consider what Hume means by ‘public interest’. In considering ‘public interest’, I draw attention to the distinction of societies which Hume makes: the distinction between a small society (such as the family) and a large one. Given this distinction, we will see that there are two kinds of ‘public interest’: one applicable to a small society and the other to a large one. Finally, I show that what Hume means by ‘public utility’ is not ‘public interest’ but ‘the common interest’ by which we human beings establish the rules of justice.

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In dieser Abhandlung wird die Idee der Weisheit in Kants Philosophie im Hinblick auf das Problem der Wissenschaftlichkeit der Philosophie betrachtet. Bekanntlich behauptet Kant, dass man niemals Philosophie, sondern „nur philosophieren“ lernen kann. Und die Philosophie „im echten Verstande“ ist für Kant mit der Idee der Weisheit eng verbunden, wie es sich auffallend in Jäsche Logik zeigt, und man es, bei aufmerksamer Prüfung, aus dem Hauptteil „Die Architektonik der reinen Vernunft“ in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft ersehen kann. Die Philosophie „nach dem Weltbegriffe“ verfolgt nämlich einen Zweck. Sie ist die Wissenschaft von den letzten Zwecken der menschlichen Vernunft. Und das Wissen, sich mit diesem letzten Zweck oder Endzweck abzugeben ist das, was Kant Weisheit nennt. Die Gegenüberstellung zwischen dem eigentlichen Philosophen als „Lehrer der Weisheit“ und dem Philosophen als „Vernunftkünstler“ nach dem Schulbegriff beruht auf dem Gegensatz zwischen der Weisheit für den Endzweck und der „Kunst“ für die beliebigen Zwecke.
Seit der vorkritischen Zeit wird von Kant das Wort „Weisheit“ einerseits für die göttliche Weisheit, welche die teleologische Einheit möglich mache, und anderseits für die menschliche Weisheit, die auf strenger Selbstprüfung beruhe, verwendet. Diese beiden Bilder der Weisheit bestimmen Kants Sicht der Philosophie in der kritischen Zeit stark. Auf der einen Seite wird die Weisheit als eine (regulative) „Idee“ dargestellt, welche die Systematisierung der Philosophie als Wissenschaft möglich mache. Und auf der anderen Seite wird die gründliche Vernunftkritik und Selbsterkenntnis gefordert, als der einzige menschliche Weg zur Weisheit und als „aller menschlichen Weisheit Anfang“. Das Bewusstsein vom Abstand zwischen göttlicher und menschlicher Weisheit und die Haltung der auf die Idee der Weisheit gerichteten menschlichen Selbsterkenntnis prägen sich, scheint es, daher tief in Kants „Philosophieren“ in der kritischen Zeit ein.

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In this paper I examine Hume's theory of meaning and abstraction. Although his doctrine of abstraction relies on his theory of meaning, his own conception of meaning is not necessarily the so-called “idea theory of meaning”, which supports the possibility of private language. On the contrary, he tries to defend a sort of use theory of meaning: the meaning of abstract terms must consist in our custom or disposition to use them in society and conversation. This idea is derived from his concept of ability, which depends on his conception of the resemblance and the uniformity of nature.
The aim of this paper is to show that we can interpret Hume's view of meaning as a use theory of meaning. To begin with, I criticize the traditional interpretation of Hume's theory of abstraction, which faces a substantial difficulty concerning the possibility of communication. Then, I clarify that he proposes in his Treatise the following two doctrines of abstraction: (1) two sorts of resemblance and (2) the principle of the uniformity of nature. These enable us to understand language by appealing to the ability to generalize the use of our abstract terms. Finally, I show that his theory of meaning does not only offer us a criterion for the correct use of abstract terms, but also a defensible foundation of communication.

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Discussions of “joint action” or “collective action” that have developed out of English-language works on action theory might be said to have arisen from the intuition that action alone and action in a group are distinctly different things. But is it really necessary to conceptually distinguish joint action from the action performed by individuals? If it is necessary, how should we characterize joint action? This paper seeks an answer to these fundamental questions.
In Section 1, I first argue that it is possible to define joint action as distinct from individual action. I then propose a definition of joint action in terms of the interdependency of action by multiple agents. In Section 2, noting that most existing theories of joint action describe it as an entanglement of each individual' s propositional attitude (intention, belief, etc.), I argue that we need to understand joint action not at the level of propositional attitude but, rather, at the level of action. In Section 3, I critically consider the idea that it is necessary to specifically characterize a group as an agent distinct from the individuals performing a joint action. Finally, in Section 4 I show that the scope of an action, as well as the scope of agents of joint actions, can be determined not a priori but only within the context of the particular event, and that the concept of joint action should be examined in association with ethical concepts such as “negligence”, “fault”, and “responsibility”.

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