So, if this is the way things are, the task before us is not simply a matter of demanding conviviality and arguing for social care and its various methods. In a society in which resentment and ill-will between nations worsens on a person by person level, we need to ask ourselves what position conviviality and social care has held within the long history of mankind. This paper takes for perspective the changes in the interactions between people and deities on the Japanese archipelago, and brings out some of the problems particular to the modern period that stand in the way of social care and a caring society. These days, all over the world, people are calling for multicultural conviviality and arguing for the importance of care in society. Take a look at society as it actually is, however, and we see mass-murder committed for no better reason than differences in ideology, creed, language or ethnicity; and we see seething enmity between nations over the possession of uninhabited islands. There was once a time when people thought that all problems would naturally be solved with the progress of reason and the development of society. In the mature Japanese society of today, however, class and income gaps widen, and on the internet there is an epidemic of malicious slander and hate campaigning. We live in an age in which development only seems to worsen social problems.

27 years of experience in the terminal-care and grief-care industry have brought it home to me that, in the scene of care, “humans are finite and imperfect.” In this extreme situation, coexisting with others and, especially, standing close with those who are in distress, are the most essential and significant factors in order for people to live well and healthily. Meanwhile, in the world of “terminal care” and “grief care”, where “death” is a vector, “spirituality” -related matters that go beyond human intelligence often become a very real topic of concern. In such cases, a care-giving scene may ultimately resemble what used to be the field of religion. In this paper, these matters will be described based on the author’s experience.

The English word “Care” is translated by a myriad of Japanese words depending on context. In this paper I would like to ask what is the essence of “Care” and I shall attempt to argue that it is related to our living with others and with birth, ageing, illness and death.

Birth, ageing, illness and death - these are Buddhist concepts for the four stages of suffering which human beings should trace in their lives. Rather than consider these directly, however, I want to discuss how the situation around these four types of suffering has changed in contemporary Japanese society, especially after the World War II and caused philosophical-ethical problems. Suffering in the original Buddhist ideas refered to the things that a human being cannot change at all, e.g. birth is a gift from the heaven and death is a calling from the heaven, whereas they are now medicalized and become what we are forced to decide to give birth or to die. Considering birth, ageing, illness and death in this new situation is my aim in the clinical philosophy of Care.

Birth, ageing, illness and death seem on the surface to be the phenomena applying to an individual person. On closer examination, however, they are at each stage actually occurrences that take place between persons and in relation to others. Consequently we can interpret living with birth, ageing, illness and death as a relationship of “Care”.

This article intends to illuminate the educational significance of two traditions that have their origin in ancient Greece. One is the tradition of paideia that attained its fullest expression in Plato’s Cave. The other is the rhetorical and humanistic tradition represented by figures such as Protagoras, Isocrates, Cicero, and Renaissance humanists.

The first and main part of the article consists of clarifying fundamental characteristics of the two traditions. Paideia is characterized by 1) a relationship with the transcendent, eternal, and divine principle, 2) a theory of human nature related to the divine principle, 3) an understanding of education as a travel to the genuine self, 4) curricula consisting of mathematical sciences and dialectics, and 5) a theory of art that has a strong educational and moral orientation. Characteristics of a rhetorical and humanistic education are: 1) public spiritedness, 2) deep sensitivity to language, and 3) multi-perspectival knowledge. In the course of history of education, the two traditions often interacted with each other and exerted a great influence on Western education.

In the second part, the article examines how the two traditions can respond to the challenge of postmodern philosophy by adapting “weak thought” (Vattimo).

In the final part, the article argues briefly that the two traditions ought to give up their anthropocentric stance in order to respond to the challenge of environmental crises.

The concept of “KYOYO Education” (which means liberal and general education in Japanese) is controversial. Colleges and Universities in Japan have experienced large-scale reforms since the 1990s up to now, and the renovation of liberal or general education in undergraduate colleges has been one of the most important issues. After World War II, the idea and system of general education were introduced to Japanese Colleges and Universities, but they did not accommodate themselves to the Japanese higher education system. The system of general education in Japanese undergraduate colleges was formally and legally abolished in 1991 and the “KYOYO Education” instead of general education made a dashing appearance on the higher education scene in its place. KYOYO is a unique Japanese concept - though one which has been influenced by Western educational ideas, for example, paideia (in Greek), humanitas or artes liberales (in Latin), Bildung (in German), or in English culture, liberal arts, liberal education and general education. Recently “KYOYO Education” is sometimes used as an interchangeable term for general education, though it is simultaneously believed that the concept means liberal education. This paper examines the concept of “KYOYO Education” in relation to the historical development of the two concepts of general education and liberal education in the United States.

Es ist bekannt, dass Heidegger seine eigene Ontologie durch die „Destruktion“ der traditionellen, besonders der aristotelischen Ontologie konstruiert hat und weiter, dass sich seine Anstrengungen der Aristoteles-Interpretation auf die kīnēsis (Bewegung) konzentriert haben.

Aristoteles bestimmt kīnēsis als „entelecheia des Möglichen als solchen“, oder „energeia atelēs“. Deswegen bemüht sich ein Großteil der bisherigen Forschung, zu beleuchten, wie Heidegger die Begriffe entelecheia („Vollkommenheit“), energeia („Wirklichkeit“), dynamis („Möglichkeit“), und telos („Ende“) ausgelegt hat. Gleichzeitig findet aber ein Wort in der kīnēsis-Bestimmung nur wenig Aufmerksamkeit: „als“ (hē). Dieses „als“ hat zweifellos insofern ein großes Gewicht, als Heidegger das „als“ für „die primäre Funktion des logos“ gehalten hat. Trotzdem besteht weiterhin das Problem unklar bleibt, wie er das „als“ in der kīnēsis-Bestimmung verstanden hat. Meine Abhandlung erörtert dieses Problem und versucht zu erhellen, auf welche Weise er die innere Beziehung zwischen kīnēsis und logos aufgefasst hat.

Die von Aristoteles bestimmte kīnēsis sagt nach Heidegger keineswegs etwas über die objektive Eigenschaft der Welt aus, sondern spricht vielmehr über die „Erscheinungsart“, oder die „Begegnisart“ der Welt zum Menschen. Einerseits kann die Welt jeweils sich zeigen als etwas, sofern der Mensch, der seinem Wesen nach sprechend ist, in der Welt lebt. Andererseits kann der Mensch etwas als etwas ansprechen, sofern die Welt jeweils als etwas erscheint. Dieses Entsprechen zwischen Menschen und Welt kann nur vermittels des „als“, d.h. des logos, entstehen. Auf den logos stützt sich diejenige kīnēsis, welche die „Begegnisart“ der Welt zum Menschen bedeutet.

Gerade deshalb hat Aristoteles gemäß Heideggers Interpretation das „als“ in seine kīnēsis-Bestimmung eingeschoben. Auf diese Weise ist es Aristoteles gelungen, das vom logos vermittelte Phänomen der Welt begrifflich zu verstehen. Seine Bestimmung von kīnēsis trifft genau diese durch den logos durchgedrungene Seinsweise der Welt. Kīnēsis ist also, nach Heideggers Auslegung, nichts anderes als ein phänomeno-logischer, onto-logischer Begriff.

In discussing the nature of laws of logic in the Prolegomena of the Logical Investigations, Husserl gives a passingly critical remark about a certain sort of anti-psychologism. He accuses some antipsychologists of misconceiving the laws of logic as essentially normative. This is a mistake, he claims, because logic is a system of norms of thinking or judging only in a deliberative sense; in its primal form, “pure” logic concerns descriptive laws that govern the relationship among propositions as ideal meaning-entities. Such a remark is in need of elucidation and evaluation, since it is widely and correctly acknowledged that the Prolegomena is devoted to the refutation of psychologism rather than anti-psychologism. In the present paper, the author argues for the following four claims: (I) Husserl’s criticism of antipsychologism is an integral part of his argument for pure logic. Since his argument against psychologism in and by itself leads only to the anti-psychologism in question, he is in need of a separate argument for the primarily descriptive and deliberatively normative nature of logic. (II) Husserl succeeds in giving a coherent and fine account of how laws of logic are primarily descriptive and deliberatively normative. (III) This account is not well motivated unless it is supplemented by the phenomenological analysis of cognition. (IV) Husserl does not succeed in providing such a supplementation in the second volume of the Logical Investigations, because he there excludes intentional objects from the domain of phenomenological descriptions. With those claims, the author concludes that Husserl’s so-called transcendental turn and the further development of his thought should be understood as attempts to overcome the incoherence of the Logical Investigations in order to save the largely Aristotelian conception of logic that lies behind the whole discussion.

„Transzendental“ ist die Erkenntnis von der Möglichkeit der Anwendung des Apriorischen auf die Erfahrung: das ist die gültige Bedeutung von Kants Terminus „transzendental“ und dieser Wortgebrauch hat von ihm seinen Ausgang genommen. Aber in den bisherigen Interpretationen wurde auch darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass in einigen Fällen die Verwendung von „transzendental“ in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft unter dem Einfluss von Tetens' Gebrauch von „transzendent“ steht (vor der Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781) war das Wort „transzendent“ das Synonym für „transzendental“).

Dieser Aufsatz versucht, die Beziehung zwischen dem Einfluss von Tetens und dem von Kant begonnenen Gebrauch von „transzendental“ durch eine eingehende Untersuchung von Tetens' Ueber die allgemeine speculativische Philosophie (1775) zu klären. So wird deutlich, dass Tetens die Theorie von dem Unterschied zwischen der sinnlichen Erkenntnis und der des Verstandes aus Kants Dissertation (1770) übernahm und daraufhin den neuen Ausdruck „die transzendente Philosophie“ als Ersatz für den unter den deutschen Schulmetaphysikern des 18. Jahrhunderts verbreiteten Terminus „Ontologie“ einführte. Zusammengefasst gebraucht er jenen Ausdruck, um darauf zu verweisen, dass man den Bereich der sogenannten „Ontologie“ von dem der anderen Wissenschaften unterscheiden muss.

Unter dieser Voraussetzung kann die Zweideutigkeit von Kants Terminus „transzendental“ auf folgende Weise verstanden werden: Zunächst fußt er auf Tetens' Gebrauch und nennt dasjenige transzendental, was die sogenannte „Ontologie“ behandelt. Mit Tetens ist er gleicher Meinung in dem Punkt, dass zwischen ihrem Feld und dem übrigen differenziert werden muss. Im Zusammenhang damit entsteht eine gültige Bedeutung von Kants Terminus „transzendental“, um die Erkenntnis zu bezeichnen, die den Unterschied möglich macht (d.h. die Erkenntnis von der Möglichkeit der Anwendung des Apriorischen auf die Erfahrung). Diese zwei Bedeutungen implizieren sich gegenseitig. Also besitzt Kants Terminus „transzendental“ immer eine doppelte Bedeutung, die den Einfluss von Tetens mit dem von Kants erstmaligen Gebrauch verbindet.

The aim of this paper is to elucidate the function of what Whitehead calls “propositions” by trying to place it in the broader context of his theory of perception and thereby to show that there are essential elements (= propositions) in that theory. A perceiving subject isn’t assumed in the “Philosophy of Organism”. Experience which results in perception from past data becomes and in a stage of “satisfaction” the perceiving subject becomes a reality. “Becoming” has precedence over “being”. The process from becoming to satisfaction is called an “actual entity”. An actual entity grasps data by “feeling” and leads itself to satisfaction. What is ordinarily called perception is quite intricate in Whitehead’s philosophy. This is because the becoming of an actual entity has several phases, where various constituents of experience arise and are integrated. Conscious perception is achieved in the last stage of this intricate process. Whitehead’s theory of perception is often explained by “symbolic reference”. But we aims to consider perception through the concept of “propositions”.

In becoming, propositions are essential for the formation of perception. Propositions are derived from a certain phase and become data for feeling. Propositions for Whitehead are not propositions as generally understood in logic. Whitehead’s propositions are based on facts, but, at the same time, they have the status of existence as a “potentiality” derived from facts. This paper aims to explain propositions and the theory of perception based on propositions by appealing to the concept of “theory-ladenness” proposed by N.R.Hanson. After a survey of Hanson’s theory of perception, this paper clarifies the significance of Whitehead’s theory of perception based on propositions.

Further, this paper considers the question “what are we perceiving?” through the theory of perception based on propositions. I argue that the perception which is formed through the phases of an actual entity’s becoming-process is really a simplification of fertile data. We form perception by abstraction from and simplification of fertile data.

Aristotle regards four syllogisms of the first-figure as not only valid but also perfect (Prior Analytics. I.4). In order to prove the ten syllogisms of the second-figure and the third-figure, he makes use of the four perfect syllogisms and the rules of conversion (Prior Analytics. I.5-6). He also gives the definition of a perfect syllogism in Prior Analytics I.1 as follows: A syllogism is perfect if it needs nothing beyond the things posited for the necessity to be evident. These facts seem to suggest that he takes the validity of perfect syllogisms to be self-evident and to have no need of proof.

However, what features of perfect syllogisms ensure that they are self-evident? Aristotle uses the dictum de omni et de nullo to explain the validity of perfect syllogisms (I.4). This dictum explains briefly the meaning of universal propositions (the major premises of perfect syllogisms). Modern interpretation of the is divided between orthodox and heterodox versions. The orthodox version views the as saying that the truth of universal propositions is determined by the extensional relations between the argument-terms. The heterodox version views the as saying that the truth of universal propositions is determined by the relations between the argumentterms and their subclasses.

In this paper, I investigate another interpretation of the dictum, which makes the perfect syllogism self-evident. I attempt to give a new view of the perfect syllogism, especially of the major premises. The universal propositions (major premises) should be understood by the accompanying relations between terms.

Through investigation of the perfect syllogism, it may become apparent that there is an affinity with some techniques and methods in Topics. Many concepts which are found in Topics are more developed in Prior Analytics. I argue that the perfect syllogism was established in Prior Analytics against the background of the thinking found in Topics.

The aim of this article is to consider the association between motor action and thinking via the internalization theory of the motor action, and to propose a novel idea about the mechanism of that association. According to Piaget’s internalization theory, which insists on the association between them, a mental image which is a lower cognitive core unit is composed of an internalized motor action, and an operation of thinking which is a higher cognitive core unit is composed of a systematic internalized motor action. The former of these components seems to be reasonable, but the latter does not, because the internalized motor action, i. e. motor representation is unsystematic.

However, related data suggest that a higher motor representation whose intrinsic attribute is abstraction emerges in the latter period of development, and is closely associated with higher spatial cognition. Therefore, we term the higher motor representation “abstract motor action (AMA)”, and characterize AMA as voluntary motoric operation on images. And functions of AMA in the higher spatial cognition are proposed to be the following:

1) Higher spatial representation is composed of AMA;

2) Process of AMA is equivalent to process of the operation of spatial thinking;

3) But AMA is unsystematic, therefore, it doesn’t formulate a system of the operation of spatial thinking, but it executes the operation of spatial thinking;

4) Space is a fundamental category of thinking, therefore, AMA may be involved in all kinds of the operations of thinking through the operation of spatial thinking.

Another means of the operation of spatial thinking is language. Then the next research task would be to clarify interrelations between AMA and language in the operation of spatial thinking.