哲学
Online ISSN : 1884-2380
Print ISSN : 0387-3358
ISSN-L : 0387-3358
2019 巻, 70 号
選択された号の論文の21件中1~21を表示しています
大会シンポジウム「人工知能・ロボットの哲学」
  • 村上 祐子, 小山 虎
    2019 年 2019 巻 70 号 p. 7-13
    発行日: 2019/04/01
    公開日: 2019/04/18
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 浅田 稔
    2019 年 2019 巻 70 号 p. 14-34
    発行日: 2019/04/01
    公開日: 2019/04/18
    ジャーナル フリー

    In this article, I propose a working hypothesis that the nervous system of pain sensation is a key component to shape robots’ (artificial systems’) conscious minds through the developmental process of empathy, morality, and ethics based on the MNS that promotes the emergence of concept of self (and others). First, the limitation of the current progress of AI focusing on deep learning is pointed out from a viewpoint of the emergence of consciousness. Next, the outline of ideological background on issues of mind in a broad sense is shown. Then, cognitive developmental robotics (CDR) is introduced with two important concepts; physical embodiment and social interaction both of which help to shape conscious minds. Following the working hypothesis, existing studies of CDR are briefly introduced and missing issues are indicated. Finally, an issue how robots (artificial systems) could be moral agents is shown.

  • 言語理解という観点から
    川添 愛
    2019 年 2019 巻 70 号 p. 35-50
    発行日: 2019/04/01
    公開日: 2019/04/18
    ジャーナル フリー

    This paper describes some basic concepts recent trends in AI and natural language processing (NLP), as background knowledge to discuss the relationship between AI and philosophy. The driving force of the current AI boom is machine learning (ML), which has also been the mainstream technology in NLP since 1990s.

    Although the problem of data shortage is a major barrier for ML, a lot of efforts have been made to obtain high accuracy while reducing the labor of data collection.

    However, recent achievements in ML and NLP do not directly lead to the AI which “understands” human languages. ML is neither foolproof nor versatile, and even with the future development of learning algorithms, it may not be easy to reduce human efforts to guarantee the “well-definedness” of tasks, which is a prerequisite for ML. There are also extremely difficult tasks such as understanding of ‘speaker’s intention’, which needs complex inference with various types of knowledge.

    There is no doubt that AI technology will continue to develop, and will bring about major changes in human society. In order to lead AI research to the right direction, philosophy should play a major role as a “guide.” Especially, I expect philosophers to reconsider/refine basic concepts such as “understanding” and “intelligence” based on the collaboration with AI researchers.

  • ハイデガー・ヨーナス・粘菌
    森岡 正博
    2019 年 2019 巻 70 号 p. 51-68
    発行日: 2019/04/01
    公開日: 2019/04/18
    ジャーナル フリー

    The frame problem has considered to be one of the most difficult philosophical problems for artificial intelligence to overcome. In this paper, two recent arguments on this topic are discussed. The one is “Heideggerian AI,” which was proposed by the philosopher Hubert Dreyfus, and the other is “Metabolic AI,” which was argued by Tom Froese and Tom Zimke, inspired by Hans Jonas’s philosophy of biology. And finally, the true slime mold computer made by Toshiyuki Nakagaki and Ryo Kobayashi is discussed from the perspective of philosophy of artificial intelligence. I conclude that a future bio-computer system that will be made up of bacteria whose cells are enhanced by artificial nano-computers might solve the frame problem at its fundamental level.

学協会シンポジウム「生命とは何か?」
  • 松田 毅
    2019 年 2019 巻 70 号 p. 69-72
    発行日: 2019/04/01
    公開日: 2019/04/18
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 米虫 正巳
    2019 年 2019 巻 70 号 p. 73-90
    発行日: 2019/04/01
    公開日: 2019/04/18
    ジャーナル フリー

    La philosophie peut-elle répondre à la question : « qu’est-ce que la vie ? » Ne serait-ce pas plutôt à la biologie de s’y appliquer puisque cette question est au fondement de ses recherches actuelles ?

    Mais que la philosophie doit-elle faire ? Examinons deux épistémologues français des sciences de la vie : Georges Canguilhem et Gilbert Simondon. Notre argument se développe en trois moments : 1) on explique deux concepts concernant la vie : la « normativité biologique » chez Canguilhem et l’« individuation vitale » chez Simondon ; 2) une fois fixée leur identité conceptuelle, on comprend qu’il est possible de considérer la vie du vivant comme événementiel, c’est-à-dire en instituant sa propre norme ou en s’individuant soi-même ; 3) précisant la manière dont trois biologistes français contemporains, Henri Atlan, Alain Prochiantz, Michel Morange traitent Canguilhem ou Simondon, on remarque que les concepts dont nous sommes redevables à ces deux derniers, correspondent à la définition biologique de la vie et servent à la compréhention de l’essence, de la nature ou du sens de la vie dans la biologie contemporaine.

    Bref et pour conclure, tandis que les sciences de la vie répondent à la question « qu’est-ce que la vie ? » en en donnant les définitions, la philosophie quant à elle crée les concepts par lesquels on peut comprendre le sens de la vie.

  • 澤井 哲
    2019 年 2019 巻 70 号 p. 91-105
    発行日: 2019/04/01
    公開日: 2019/04/18
    ジャーナル フリー

    In this essay, I will first describe what constitutes a model in natural science both in the physical and biological disciplines and give a brief overview on its relationship to constructive experimental approaches. Interesting parallels are noted in the key defining inventions and models starting from Voltaic for the early exploration into electrophysiological mechanisms behind muscle contraction, Lillie’s ironwire for nerve impulse conductance, Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction for feedback regulation in the Krebs cycle. The were not meant to faithfully reproduce the intended phenomena as a whole, however sucesstully captured the very essence of nonlinear dynamics as we know them today. Drawing from the basic concepts that eventually emerged from these studies, the present day natural science awaits further exploration into the constraints and geometries in high dimensional systems.

    The present day natural science is witnessing closer encounter to their unique dynamic properties or life ‘process’ at the cellular level such as cell growth and cell deformation, but how close are we from understanding such complex phenomena?

    The new challenge may require further inteination of machine and nature that drives synthesis of classic hypothesis-driven approach with data-driven quantification.

  • 「生命とは何か」という問いそれ自体を問いながら
    山田 有希子
    2019 年 2019 巻 70 号 p. 106-122
    発行日: 2019/04/01
    公開日: 2019/04/18
    ジャーナル フリー

    In dem Deutschen Idealimus, besonders in dessen “Naturphilosophie”, wurden aktive Diskussionen über “Leben” oder “Organismus” entwickelt. Aber bis heute haben sie selten im Vordergrund gestanden. Denn vom Standpunkt der modernen Biologie oder der Biowissenschaften aus, werden sie wahrscheinlich für veraltet oder “spekulativ” gehalten.

    Es war Hegel, der im deutschen Idealismus den Begriff “Leben” unmittelbar und thematisch argumentierte. Bekanntlich ist es die Metapher mit Embryo (das organische Ganze), die das gesamte Hegels System erklärt. Und der Begriff “Leben” wird nicht nur in die “Naturphilosophie” sondern auch in die “Logik”, die scheinbar keine direkte Beziehug auf denselben Begriff hat, aufgenommen.

    Die Logik ist die Grundlage für Hegels System, und im letzten Kapitel “Idee” wird das Leben als eine Idee behandelt. Ferner versucht Hegel die Idee “Leben” mit dem Begriff des Widerspruchs positiv zu begreifen, obgleich Kant eben diesen Widerspruch zu vermeiden versuchte. Mit dem Widerspruch erhalt das Leben in Bezug auf den “(menschlichen) Geist” einen höheren Sinn als “Natur”.

    Einfach ausgedrückt, hat die Frage nach dem Leben eine widersprüchliche Struktur, dass die Frage selbst die Antwort (das Wesen des menschlichen Lebens) ist. Wir leben jetzt und hier gerade fragend, was unseres Leben ist. Hegel versuchte nicht nur das Leben zu verstehen und erklären, wie es ist, sondern auch es zu begreifen, was es ist, während er den Unterschied zwischen dem Leben von Tieren und Pflanzen (Organismus) und dem menschlichen “Geist”, und deren Beziehung (die Schwierigkeiten, beide zu teilen) betrachtete. In diesem Beitrag denken wir darüber nach, was Leben ist, hauptsächlich durch Hegelisches Denken gegen Kantisches. Damit können wir uns nach der Frage selbst, was das Leben ist, fragen.

     

    Die Inhaltsübersicht ist wie folgt.

    1. Kants Theorie des Organismus (1)Analogon der Kunst (2)Analogon des Lebens (3) von Geist zu Leben - vom Geist gegen Materie zum Leben gegen Materie

    2. Hegels Theorie des Lebens (1)A. lebendiges Individuum B. lebendiger Prozess (2) C. Gattung (3) der Tod des Individuums als das Leben des Geistes

    3. Die Frage nach unserer Frage selbst: Was ist das Leben?

第77回大会報告
応募論文
  • アーレント『アウグスティヌスの愛の概念』における独立の概念
    阿部 里加
    2019 年 2019 巻 70 号 p. 129-144
    発行日: 2019/04/01
    公開日: 2019/04/18
    ジャーナル フリー

    Im Liebesbegriff bei Augustin, in dem Arendt die Struktur der Nächstenliebe im Christentum philosophisch analysiert, unterscheidet sie zwischen amor mundi und dilectio mundi (beide „die Liebe zur Welt“). Darüberhinaus versucht Arendt zu zeigen, dass der Mensch wie ein Fremder existiert, während er in dieser Welt ist, gleichzeitig jedoch auch nicht existent ist. Dieser Widerspruch wird durch den Begriff der Isoliertheit, im Zusammenhang mit denen der sibi sufficere (Autarkie), der dilectio (Liebe) und des uti (Gebrauchs), expliziert.

    Der Begriff der Isolierung impliziert sowohl die Unabhängigkeit von der Welt als auch von Gott und findet seinen Ursprung im griechischen sibi sufficere (αυτάρκει) sowie in den Begriffen ordinata dilectio (geordnete Liebe) und uti. Das sibi sufficere lässt den Menschen die irdische Welt vermeiden, weil es die absolute Abwesenheit von Bedürftigkeit und die völlige Freiheit von anderen bedeutet. Auf der Grundlage der ordo amor (Liebesordnung) hat ordinata dilectio ihren Ursprung in Gott und im „eigenen Ich-selbst“ und führt bei der diligere invicem (gegenseitigen Liebe) unter den Christen zur Indirektheit. Diese Indirektheit hebt die gegenseitige Angewiesenheit der Menschen radikal auf: Die Beziehung zwischen dem Menschen und der Welt zum uti. Folglich liebt der Mensch sowohl seinen Nächsten als auch andere als ein Objekt des uti. Weiterhin führt die ordinata dilectio auch zwischen dem Menschen und zwischen Gott zur Indirektheit. Nach Arendts Interpretation ist es möglich, dass der Mensch bei Augustinus räumlich „Vor Gott“ (coram Deo) und durch die Objektivität außerhalb der Welt steht.

    Im Hinblick auf die Konzepte ordinata dilectio und uti nach Augustinus bedeutet somit die Isolierung eine Weltentfremdung und deutet auf eine Vorbedingung der christlichen Nächstenliebe hin. Außerdem verweist die Isolierung nicht auf die Versöhnung mit der Welt, sondern eher auf die Ablehnung und die Entfremdung von der Welt. Deshalb erklärt Arendt: „Aus der Weltentfremdung an sich entsteht neben der alten societas auch ein ihr gegensätzliches neues Miteinander und Füreinander“. Ohne eine Isolierung von der Welt kann der Mensch keine wahre Verbindung mit seinen Mitmenschen sowie kein neues vita socialis (soziales Leben) aufbauen.

  • 飯泉 佑介
    2019 年 2019 巻 70 号 p. 145-159
    発行日: 2019/04/01
    公開日: 2019/04/18
    ジャーナル フリー

    In this paper, I raise a fundamental question about Hegelian philosophy: why did Hegel change the systematical position of The Phenomenology of Spirit? I also try to answer that question by considering the work’s philosophical task. Contrary to the dominant interpretation in contemporary studies of Hegel’s work, I emphasize that the Phenomenology’s task is to justify the genesis of his philosophy as a “System of Science” by describing the historical development of the Spirit. This interpretation foregrounds Hegel’s ambivalent view of the foundation of philosophy, which relates to its historical condition, but which occurs “here and now”.

    Hegel published the Phenomenology in 1807 under the title “System of Science: First Part: The Phenomenology of Spirit” but he soon excluded it from the whole system. Instead, “The Science of Logic” became the first section. There are now two major perspectives on this disputed point. One is based on the object of the Phenomenology, i.e., Consciousness. The other focuses on the significance of its role or task to “introduce non-scientific consciousness into Science.” Although the former neglects the characteristics of a systematic philosophy, the latter is insufficient for explaining the reason for the change Hegel made. So, considering Hegel’s idea of the “Need of Philosophy” in his early Jena period, I point out that the most important task of the Phenomenology must be to describe the movement of the Spirit, which realizes itself historically and knows itself in Science. My analysis of the Religion chapter and the Absolute Knowing chapter in the Phenomenology also makes the crucial point of this development clear; the Spirit, which develops in historical time and which, at last, knows itself as ahistorical absolute Knowing, “annihilates” time. This is why it would be possible to describe its historical development only once as presented in the Phenomenology, and why Hegel has no option but to exclude it from his philosophical system.

  • 判断の無意味さに関する一考察
    岡崎 秀二郎
    2019 年 2019 巻 70 号 p. 160-175
    発行日: 2019/04/01
    公開日: 2019/04/18
    ジャーナル フリー

    The aim of this article is to reinterpret the roles of infinite judgements in Hegel’s Science of Logic. If one tries to understand his account of this topic consistently, s/he will be faced with a huge problem: why did Hegel divide infinite judgements into two types, positive and negative? In the history of traditional logic, infinite judgements have usually been expressed in some negative forms that seem to represent something ridiculous and senseless. However, Hegel insists that there is also a positive type of infinite judgement in the form of tautological propositions.

    In this paper, I approach this problem mainly by tracing the following two possible roots of Hegel’s idea of infinite judgements in a positive form. One is Hegel’s own younger idea about singular judgement in the Jena System (1804/5). Hegel thought that this type of judgement corresponds to infinite judgements in that both finally abolish the “subsumption” relationship between the terms in a judgement. The other possible root is an idea that came from Ploucquet, who had taught logic in Tübingen until just before Hegel started studying there. Ploucquet’s important idea is that logic should be treated as a kind of mathematical calculation on the basis of identifying the extensions of the subject and the predicate of a judgement. Hegel thought this idea also led to the equalization of the conceptual difference between the terms in a judgement.

    In the light of these remarks, I put forth the hypothesis that Ploucquet’s idea led Hegel to rethink judgement types in the form of tautological propositions and to create a new perspective on them which was opposed to mathematical views of logic. In conclusion, I argue that a positive type of infinite judgement can also have a truly positive role in Hegel’s theory of judgments and that it should be understood to be positive in Hegel’s sense of “the negation of negation”.

  • 哲学の始源をめぐるデリダのヘーゲル読解
    小原 拓磨
    2019 年 2019 巻 70 号 p. 176-189
    発行日: 2019/04/01
    公開日: 2019/04/18
    ジャーナル フリー

    Cette étude traite de la lecture de Hegel par Derrida dans son Glas, considéré comme un point d’arrivée chez lui, en particulier la question de la « négativité » comme source de la philosophie. La négativité du « travail » (Arbeit) est une composante essentielle de l’hégélianisme et représente la métaphysique occidentale, tandis que Derrida recherche la négativité qui ne sert pas la dialectique au contraire du travail. Celle-ci s’appelle « négativité abstraite » et est déterminée comme un nonsens dans l’hégélianisme. Derrida la poursuit dans l’origine de la philosophie hégélienne après avoir confirmé qu’elle est une source tourmentante, parce que c’est la division de soi à travers elle qui conditionne la relation de soi, commencement de la philosophie.

    Le commencement et la fin se structurent circulairement dans le système hégélien, l’origine est le résultat. Derrida met donc en question la dernière relève, le moment du passage de la religion absolue au savoir absolu, et il la lit d’après l’interprétation phénoménologique de la Trinité par Hegel parce que l’unité entre le Père universel et le Fils particulier est justement le meilleur modèle pour la dernière réconciliation dans son système. Cette réconciliation entre les deux s’accomplit finalement avec la mort du Fils. La mort de Dieu ou la mort d’un autre qui s’appelle Jésus joue un rôle définitif à l’état latent à l’origine de la philosophie et Hegel écrit que cette mort est la « négativité abstraite ». Ainsi il apparait que la négativité que Derrida recherche est la mort de Jésus.

    Or Hegel introjecte cette mort dans son système en lui donnant du sens. Il ne faut pas que la mort du Christ soit insignifiante ou non-sens ― c’est précisément la cause de toutes onto-théo-logies. Donner un sens à la mort du Christ, être en deuil du Christ, par conséquent, c’est là l’ontologie spéculative de Hegel et la métaphysique traditionnelle en tant qu’onto-théo-logie.

  • 川島 彬
    2019 年 2019 巻 70 号 p. 191-204
    発行日: 2019/04/01
    公開日: 2019/04/18
    ジャーナル フリー

    In this paper, I provide an interpretation of ‘the Form of the Good’ and ‘the unhypothesized principle’ in Plato’s Republic, VI-VII.

    Regarding the ‘Form of the Good,’ I first consider what is meant by the fact that Plato speaks of ‘the Good,’ on the one hand, usually as one Form among others and, on the other hand, at Republic, 509b7-9 as a special ‘Form’ that transcends the other Forms. I argue that these two ways of speaking of the Good should not represent two different items (pace Fujisawa) but rather two aspects of the same item.

    The Form of the Good is the cause of good things being good, just as the Form X is the cause of x things being x. And, for Plato, for something to be good is for its components to be unified. Now, the totality of Forms is something good, and this is made good by the Good, which unifies the system of Forms (this unification is what the Good does as the special, transcending ‘Form’).

    ‘The unhypothesized principle’, which the dialectician grasps at the end of ‘the upward path’, is, in my view, the system of Forms (and not, as many suppose, the Good itself). In the upward path, the dialectician subsumes a given Form under a more general Form and then subsumes this under an even more general Form, so that the whole system of Forms is both the endpoint of this procedure and the starting point (archē) for the downward path. This system is an especially good thing, showing, I suggest, the highest unity; grasping this system helps one to understand how unification in general comes about, which understanding, in turn, promotes the understanding of the Good.

  • アリストテレス『分析論後書』第2巻第11章を手がかりに
    酒井 健太朗
    2019 年 2019 巻 70 号 p. 205-219
    発行日: 2019/04/01
    公開日: 2019/04/18
    ジャーナル フリー

    Aristotle’s APo. claims that scientific knowledge requires a cause serving as the middle term in the demonstration. APo. II 11 considers how the well-known “four causes” should be understood in the theory of demonstration. What is key is the relation of the final cause to the other three causes. This paper discusses how the theory of demonstration handles these causes by considering their status and interrelation.

    Aristotle examines the four causes from the perspective of the major and minor terms in a demonstration. The grounding cause states the essence of the minor term, and the essential and efficient causes state the essence of the major term. However, there are difficulties in considering the final cause. For, in the example of being healthy, illustrating the final cause involves two demonstrations. In the first demonstration, the middle term (food not staying on the surface) explains the essence of the major term (being healthy). In the second demonstration, however, the middle term (being healthy) does not explain the essence of the major term (food not staying on the surface) or the minor term (walking after dinner). In order to answer this problem, we have to mention two points: First, the final cause appears last in generation but arises first as the initial point of the explanation; secondly, the final cause explains the processes to the end as for the end. By considering these facts, I show that the second demonstration explains the major term and the minor term by the middle term from the viewpoint of temporal order that the first demonstration establishes.

    This paper argues that APo. II 11 divides the four causes into the final cause and the other three causes and claims that the second demonstration includes “hypothetical necessity”. Consequently, this paper shows that Aristotle aims to exclude chance from a demonstration having the final cause as the middle term by introducing hypothetical necessity.

  • フッサール初期時間論の再検討
    佐藤 大介
    2019 年 2019 巻 70 号 p. 220-234
    発行日: 2019/04/01
    公開日: 2019/04/18
    ジャーナル フリー

    Are we able to capture just the working consciousness by reflection?

    Several Husserl researchers to date have answered no to this question. This is serious for Husserl phenomenology. This is because Husserl phenomenology is an academic discipline to analyze the workings of consciousness, using reflection as the basic method. If it is impossible to capture just the working consciousness by reflection, the phenomenological approach will leave unknown the most crucial data. In this way, the problem of the discrepancy between the method and purpose of Husserl phenomenology has been repeatedly pointed out and widely shared in Husserl research since Klaus Held was first discussed. This problem is “the problem of reflection”.

    However, as some of the previous studies have acknowledged, Husserl himself does not explicitly address the problem of reflection. This seems strange. It is extremely natural to ask whether or not it is possible to capture just the working consciousness by reflection since it is the methodological core of Husserl phenomenology. So did Husserl adopt it as the basic method for phenomenology without carefully examining it? Given the fact that Husserl dealt with phenomenological methods thematically many times, that is hard to believe.

    Rather, I suppose that Husserl phenomenology has an argument that answers yes to the above question. In this paper, unlike many previous studies, I discuss Husserl’s early theory of time up to the early 1910’s, not the late theory of the 1930’s. Because there seems to be something overlooked or misunderstood in the opinion of the previous studies on Husserl’s early theory of time. They consider that just a working consciousness can be captured only by a subsequent reflection. However, Husserl insists that the working consciousness is captured by reflection now. In this case “now” is not a momentary “now”, but a “wide range” now.

  • 分析と総合の観点から
    寺嶋 雅彦
    2019 年 2019 巻 70 号 p. 235-249
    発行日: 2019/04/01
    公開日: 2019/04/18
    ジャーナル フリー

    G.W. Leibniz (1646-1716) worked on a method of universal analysis and synthesis from the late 1670s to the middle 1680s. At that time, he argued that medical method was “the true method of describing a machine” that examined the human body and “the method of treating illnesses” from both the analytic and synthetic points of view. The aim of this paper is to articulate the universal analysis and synthesis method and then clarify Leibniz’s medical method from both the analytic and synthetic points of view.

    In section I, I present two reasons why Leibniz focused on medicine. Internally, Leibniz tried to perfect the mind through understanding and control over the body. Externally, he did not view contemporary medicine as sufficient. In section II, I examine some essential points of the universal analysis and synthesis method. According to Leibniz, analysis is a heuristic art that begins with a problem or effect and then arrives at a principle, cause or reason. On the contrary, synthesis reverses the analytic process beginning with a principle, cause or reason and then arriving at its use or application. In section III, I define “the true method of describing a machine.” Leibniz considered the reduction from function to vessel, humors or spirits in the analytic process. In the synthetic process, he presented a hypothetical model of the human body as “a hydraulico-pneumatico-pyrobolic machine.” In section IV, I clarify Leibniz’s “method of treating illnesses.” Leibniz used the analytic process to reduce symptoms to a simple illness. In the synthetic process, he assumed that medical professionals should combine cause, cure and symptoms. Finally, I show that Leibniz’s ideal medical method was to combine the analytic method with theory and the synthetic method with experience or praxis.

  • 意味論的観点から
    本間 裕之
    2019 年 2019 巻 70 号 p. 250-265
    発行日: 2019/04/01
    公開日: 2019/04/18
    ジャーナル フリー

    Almost all interpreters agree that the formal distinction (distinctio formalis) of Duns Scotus is located between formalities/entities/realities. This concept is characterized as a “mediate distinction” between the real distinction (distinctio realis), which exists without intellect, and the distinction of reason (distinctio rationis), which is produced only by the activity of the intellect. According to Scotus, the formal distinction has both a real basis and a relationship to intellect. These characterizations do not provide a complete exposition of formal distinction; rather, they raise questions about the nature of formality: what is its ontological status, and how formal distinction relates to intellect. Major interpreters, such as Maurice Grajewski, Allan Wolter, and Michel Jordan, have not provided clear answers to these questions.

    The main purpose of the present article is to respond to these questions by describing the system of formal distinction in the thought of Scotus. First, we consider Scotus’s motivation to introduce this distinction by analyzing his answer to the question “Whether this proposition ‘man is animal’ is true?” His aim in this question of his Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge, if we adopt the language of current analytical philosophy, is to put forward a truthmaker theory. And this interpretation is further elucidated in his (probably) late work, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis.

    Second, depending on this understanding, we describe formal distinction using the mathematical idea of homomorphism. In Scotus’s thinking, the homomorphic map φ, which preserves the structure of propositions, can be possibly defined as follows: φ: CM (where C is the logical or intentional domain and M is the metaphysical or existential one). We call this map φ the analytical map. This mathematical model suggests a distinct formulation of formal distinction. Let c, c1, and c2 be concepts, R1 and R2 be relations between concepts, f, f1, and f2 be formalities, and R1′ and R2′ be relations between formalities. There then exists an analytical mapping such that φ(cR1c1) = fR1f1 and φ(cR2c2)= fR2f2; the distinction, then, between f1 and f2 is a formal distinction. This interpretation provides a foundation for Wolter’s idea that formality is an objective basis for a concept produced by intellect.

  • 和辻倫理学におけるカント受容
    山蔦 真之
    2019 年 2019 巻 70 号 p. 266-279
    発行日: 2019/04/01
    公開日: 2019/04/18
    ジャーナル フリー

    One of the key thinkers who influenced the Ethics of Watsuji Tetsuro is undoubtedly Kant. As a representative figure of Modern European Philosophy, Kant was referred to in many places in Watsuji’s Opus, both positively and negatively. However, Watsuji’s estimation of Kant changes as his thinking develops. In “Person and Humanity” (1931) Watsuji criticizes the individualistic tendency in Kantian ethics and tries to develop from its concept of “humanity” an intersubjective ethics, in Watsuji’s own term, the “Ethics of betweenness”. In the article “Ethics” (1931) which is the prototype of “Ethics as the Study of Human Beings” (1934), Watsuji praises Kantian philosophy because it traces human existence in its “aprioristic” condition. The “Ethics of betweenness”, though it begins with empirical observation of human relationships, must also go into the “apriority” of human beings. In these works Watsuji grapples seriously with Kantian ethics and tries to develop his own Ethics from it.

    This close connection to Kantian ethics is, however, erased in the later version “Ethics as the Study of Human Beings”. In this work Watsuji no longer refers to the “apriorism” of the “Ethics of betweenness” and defines its method differently. Its main task is now to correct the individualistic view of Modern European Philosophy, and this can be achieved through the empirical studies of human relationships as in sociology or anthropology, which Watsuji often uses in his major work “Ethics” (1937, 42, 49). The concreteness of these empirical observations is by itself a sufficient critique of the abstract nature of Modern European Philosophy including Kant. With this change, however, Watsuji did not overcome European modernity, but rather avoided from serious confrontation with it, which is actually needed for a true overcoming.

feedback
Top