The calibration of color monitors is an essential step for psychological experiments on color perception. For CRT displays, a procedure was established and standardized as the two-stage method of gamma correction, followed by linear color transformation. However, the standard method may not be appropriate for non-CRT displays. The present study has demonstrated that indeed the standard method was not applicable to some LCD (Liquid Crystal Display) and DLP (Digital Light Processing) display devices, which are now increasingly used in psychological or brain-imaging experiments. We therefore propose a new display calibration procedure which is based on least-square estimations. This method has a much broader range of applicability because it assumes only a piecewise linearity of the system and does not require any presumed model of the display properties. The proposed procedure, together with customizable gamma corrections, was integrated into a GUI-based calibration software which was written with MATLAB and called 'Mcalibrator'. The applicability and efficiency of our software to a wide range of displays, including LCD and DLP devices, was confirmed by comparing the calibration accuracy of our procedure with that of the standard two-stage method.
The differences between memories of enacted actions and imagined actions were investigated by using two kinds of source monitoring (SM) tasks. Experiment 1 involved an internal SM task in which the participants were instructed to perform, imagine, or vocalize the actions described in sentences. They were then given a recognition test, and if they recognized a sentence they were asked whether they had performed, imagined, or vocalized it. In Experiment 2 an external SM task was used and the action sentences were presented by either a male or female voice. The participants were instructed to perform, imagine, or vocalize each sentence, and then took a recognition test. If they recognized a sentence they were asked which voice presented it. The results showed that in the internal SM task (Exp. 1), there were fewer SM errors for the enacted condition than for the imagined condition. A difference was not found for these conditions in the external SM task (Exp. 2). These findings suggest that enactment, rather than imagining, facilitates internal but not external SM processing.
It has been reported that in reward serial learning rats can form an inter-item association between adjacent items and between remote items. In addition, by using a preceding series as discriminative cues they can discriminate a following series. These different types of association learning were examined in mice with three experiments of reward serial learning. In Experiments 1 and 2 the mice learned to form inter-item associations between adjacent items and between remote items. They responded differentially, according to their anticipation of a reward magnitude. In Experiment 3, however, despite considerable training, the mice failed to master series discrimination learning when two preceding series signaled a different subsequent series. These results suggest a basic ability of mice for item association learning but a restricted cognitive capacity to form a series chunk.
This research examined the patterns of evaluations by assessors of creative products. The evaluations were analyzed in terms of the relationship between the area of the idea search space (AISS) and the factors for evaluation of creativity specified in the Creative Product Analysis Matrix (Besemer & O'Quin, 1981). The idea search space is the hypothetical space for an information search in creative activities. The factors specified are novelty, elaboration and synthesis, and resolution. Using the Creative Product Semantic Scale (White & Smith, 2001), 60 assessors evaluated 40 drawings of imaginary creatures drawn by ordinary students. There was a high correlation between the rating for creativity and the novelty factor score. The novelty of the drawings affected the creativity rating given by the majority of the assessors. In addition, the AISS index predicted their ratings quite well. Contrary to this, a correlation was not found between creativity and novelty for the minority of the assessors. A clear variation of the concept of creativity was therefore apparent. Other elements, besides the AISS, that are relevant to the novelty are discussed.
It is generally believed that the main principle for the system for low level vision is so called bottom-up processing and it operates rather passively. It is not really true. The information processing for low-level vision is realized by interactions between the bottom-up and the top-down information flows. Especially, the sub-systems involved in size and depth perception functions only when proper assumptions or constraints are provided. These are good examples of active aspects of the low-level visual system. In regard of psychological realities, the kind of perception that involves more active processing, such as the perception of subjective contour with Kanizsa figure may have higher psychological reality or impact to us. This idea is yet a speculative hypothesis, but it is worth while to pursue.
We examined how we could describe the psychological reality of film. We defined "reality" from three different viewpoints: that of a film director, that of a film audience, and that of a researcher on image arts. Film audiences seem to use the term "reality" with the same meaning as the word "beauty". The audience doesn't necessarily compare the film experience to their experiences in the real world when they use the term. For film directors, reality is an artifact created in the minds of the audience. Most natural appearing events in a film are not recorded in the film studio in the way they are seen in the film. Film directors portray various events in a film in such a way that the audience perceives them as simply natural. Suzuki and Osada (2005 Perception, 34, (Suppl.), 139) studied the perceptual organization of serially presented motion-picture shots. Observers of motion-picture shots can perceive continuity or discontinuity in a series of shots when they watch films. A series of shots in which observers can perceive continuity will be perceptually organized as one single continuous event. On the other hand, series of shots in which observers perceive discontinuity are perceptually organized as several segregated events. We thought that the psychological reality of film is based on how events are perceived in a series of motion-picture shots. Audiences can perceive even impossible events as natural when shots of discontinuous movement are appropriately organized. Perceived event in film is often qualitatively changed by the way of observing when shots are discontinuous. We advocated the concept of perceptual organization of events in the construction of film reality. Our conclusion is that the psychological reality of film is a reality based on the perceptual organization that a series of shots induces, in other words it is an outcome of the interaction between expression and observation caused by editing the seriality motion-picture shots.
Artists can get space and time into a static pictorial scene. Although the pictorial scene is in many parts inconsistent with the physical properties of real scene, we doubtlessly feel the pictorial scene as having a reality. On the other hand, interestingly, we know the pictorial scene is not real. How can we overcome this coexistence of incompatible realities, physical and psychological realities? Here we review the studies investigating the memory displacement of objects with the motion lines that are one of techniques to depict the motion on a still image, and discuss that the efficacy of visual stimulation by the pictorial technique determines the dominance between physical and psychological realities: when the latter is dominated over the former, we get caught up in the picture.