Journal of Public Policy Studies
Online ISSN : 2434-5180
Print ISSN : 2186-5868
Volume 14
Displaying 1-17 of 17 articles from this issue
Preface
Special Issue: Nuclear Power Policy after Fukushima
  • [in Japanese]
    2014 Volume 14 Pages 4-5
    Published: December 20, 2014
    Released on J-STAGE: June 08, 2019
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • Kōsuke ŌYAMA
    2014 Volume 14 Pages 6-23
    Published: December 20, 2014
    Released on J-STAGE: June 08, 2019
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS

    TThis article considers why the Fukushima Daiichi No.1-4 plants reached to the severe accident by comparing with other plants where were also attacked by big tsunami, such as the Tōkyō Electric Power Company(TEPCO)’s No.5-6 plants and the Fukushima Daini, the Tōhoku Electric Power Company’s Onagawa and the Japan Atomic Power Company’s Tōkai Daini. It examined some nuclear accident investigation reports and verified the hypothesis that as a primary factor, the TEPCO had been a trial calculation of over ten meters height of tsunami before 3.11 but did not take the effective anti-tsunami measures for a management reason and as a secondary factor, the Nuclear Safety Commission and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency were captured by electric power companies and could not regulate them effectively, then the Fukushima Daiichi No.1-4 plants reached to the severe accident. If the TEPCO took some cheap and effective anti-tsunami measures such as sealing water of or raising up switchboards, the Fukushima Daiichi No.1-4 plants might not have reached to the severe accident and if the regulatory authorities realized independence, professionalism and transparency from electric power companies, they might have regulated to make the TEPCO taken those anti-tsunami measures effectively.

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  • Masayuki HORIO
    2014 Volume 14 Pages 24-36
    Published: December 20, 2014
    Released on J-STAGE: June 08, 2019
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS

    After discussing, as the basis of analyzing the present issues, the definition of the essence of technology as the ‘mechanism of production power’, the importance of defining ‘appropriate technology’ in the modern high-tech society as fair and region friendly one and the concept of ‘social technology’ as the mechanism of social equipment, I clarify that 1) the meaning of democracy on technology lies not in the ordinary ones such as reconciliation of interests through the rule of majority but rather in the social process of real monitoring and control over existing technical systems and that 2) constructing a democratic platform is one of the keys to avoid significant risks of severe accidents in the management of a big and complicated assembly of plant systems such as a nuclear power station where it should be quite hard to monitor its conditions in detail without the collaboration of workers of all levels. I further stress that the most important things are to build up citizens’ and local governments’ capacities, not to put too much expectations on the role of scientists and experts, to establish a public participation platform with sufficient independence and to design the state’s nuclear governance in the context of international strategy.

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  • Yasunori SONE
    2014 Volume 14 Pages 37-50
    Published: December 20, 2014
    Released on J-STAGE: June 08, 2019
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS

    The National Deliberative Poll on Energy and Environmental Policy was conducted in August 4-5, 2012. James Fishkin described it as “the first Deliberative Poll® (DP) anywhere in the world that was commissioned by a government to get input on a subject of national importance before a national decision”.

    This paper focuses on three aspects of Deliberative Polling in the policy making process. 1) Why the government adopted it as a tool of public consultation in the formal decision making process, 2) what were the poll results, and 3) how the government used it for their policy decisions.

    Interestingly, the poll shows us that the 285 randomly selected participants became more informed and changed their views on certain policy options. The public finally supported the zero nuclear option and concern for safety as a first criterion. It also shows that the public could not find any reliable authority to judge important key respects. It seems to be an “anomie” situation where there is no trust at all even in the nuclear specialists.

    After an ad hoc committee of specialists examined public consultation results such as from deliberative polls, public comments, town-meetings, and public opinion polls by media, the Advisory Council on Energy and Environment recommended the policy proposal “zero nuclear power by 2030s along with strong commitments to energy conservation and renewable energy”. The Cabinet finally made a decision according to the recommendation.

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  • Hiroshi TAKAHASHI
    2014 Volume 14 Pages 51-64
    Published: December 20, 2014
    Released on J-STAGE: June 08, 2019
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS

    This paper analyzes the process of Japan’s energy policy after “March 11” from the standpoint of the hypothesis that power market liberalization restricts nuclear power development. In major advanced countries, power market liberalization starting from 1990s has often caused the constrained development of nuclear power stations which require huge initial investment and carry high risk. In contrast, nuclear power had been developed steadily in Japan, while market liberalizationwas limited.

    This situation was so dramatically changed after March 11 that DPJ government made a political decision of nuclear phase-out in 2012 in parallel with market liberalization. However, the new LDP government has once again returned back to the promotion of nuclear power, while advancing the market liberalization. The seemingly contradictory combination of nuclear power policy and market liberalization was driven by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. METI is now strategically trying to directly intervene the nuclear power businesses for their continuation as well as to discretionally manage the market competition based on re-regulation.

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  • Ken’ichi OSHIMA, Masafumi YOKEMOTO
    2014 Volume 14 Pages 65-77
    Published: December 20, 2014
    Released on J-STAGE: June 08, 2019
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS

    Starting in 2016, electric power retail and production were totally liberalized, and regulated rates are to be abolished between 2018 and 2020. Regulated rates have until now stabilized the operations of electric utilities, but their discontinuance will probably make it increasingly difficult for the electric utilities, which operate nuclear plants, to themselves undertake the business risks associated with nuclear power.

    The government has therefore developed the following three risk-mitigation measures: (1) Provide policy measures which mitigate the business risks of nuclear power, (2) take measures by which the government shares the risks of reprocessing operations, and (3) reduce the risk of bearing nuclear accidents costs by, for example, reviewing the system for nuclear power damage compensation. In this paper we conceive this suite of measures as “business conditions enhancement doctrine,” and sketch an overall picture of it.

    The purpose of business conditions enhancement doctrine is to create policy measures that mitigate the risks and costs of nuclear plant operators, and make the citizens and electric power consumers (as well as future accident victims) shoulder them, in order to maintain nuclear power even after completely reforming the electric power system.

    Is it worthwhile to continue nuclear power operations while creating a series of special policy measures such as those described in this paper? Is it alright to relieve nuclear power operators of risks and costs, and shift them to the citizens and electric power consumers? It is necessary to revisit these questions when shaping post-accident nuclear power policy.

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  • Fumito TOMOOKA
    2014 Volume 14 Pages 78-85
    Published: December 20, 2014
    Released on J-STAGE: June 08, 2019
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS

    This paper aims to discuss the nuclear regulation in Japan focusing on the governmental framework for that purpose. It has changed dramatically since the nuclear power disaster Fukushima nuclear power plant caused by the gigantic earth Quake, which hit the premise on 11th March 2011. The change can be epitomized as from “advice committee” type to “executive committee” type (ministers strongly supported by bureaucrats), which requires the final decision to be made by the experienced members. The discussion in this paper deals with those changes from three legal points of view below.

    First: brief review of the history of former nuclear regulatory organization. Japanese nuclear safety regulation was based on “double check system,” run by two actors, namely the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency under the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (now Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) on the one hand AND the former Nuclear Safety Committee on the other.

    Second: to see the way of keeping neutrality of newly founded regulatory organization. Main topic is to see how Nuclear Regulatory Agency and its secretariat work.

    Third: to see the issues revealed after the newly found regulatory organization has started and to review how many-sided standpoints needed in the safety regulation are responded.

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  • Shigeru TAKAHASHI
    2014 Volume 14 Pages 86-98
    Published: December 20, 2014
    Released on J-STAGE: June 08, 2019
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS

    Based on the experience of the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster in 2011, the Japanese Government will soon begin to reexamine the provisions of the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage. In my opinion, it would be desirable to incorporate the following provisions into the Act.

    First of all, I believe it would be appropriate to maintain the framework of the current Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, but add a provision confirming the power of parliament to enact a special law for state compensation in the event of a nuclear power plant disaster. As to whether there should be a provision limiting the liability of nuclear power plant operators or not, I remain opposed to the introduction of a uniform provision. However, a provision could be included confirming the fact that the legislature has power to enact a new law limiting the liability of nuclear power plants operators after the occurrence of an accident, taking into account the particular circumstances of such accident.

    Secondly, a new provision should state clearly that the Bankruptcy Law, Corporate Rehabilitation Law, and Corporate Reorganization Law can be applied to the payment of nuclear damages by a power plant operator who causes an accident.

    Thirdly, the various kinds of government aid available could be expanded and specified. For example, the inclusion of a provision establishing that grants of subsidies, enforcement of area rehabilitation projects, and such for the benefit of residents, enterprises, and municipalities in affected areas are permissible as “measures for recovery of damage” should also be considered.

    Fourthly, the organizational relationship between the Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation and its independent subcommittees for enforcement of reconciliation procedures should be settled as a matter of law.

    Finally, it is also important to state clearly that the guidelines of the Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation are flexible and exemptions may be granted in some situations.

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  • Yukari TAKAMURA
    2014 Volume 14 Pages 99-108
    Published: December 20, 2014
    Released on J-STAGE: June 08, 2019
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS

    Access to information has now become an essential component of fundamental human rights such as right to life and right to health. International norms related to nuclear activities developed in the framework of IAEA do not contain mandatory rules that guarantee access to information of those likely to be affected by these activities.

    Striking developments in enhancement of access to environmental information have recently been observed. Among others, 1998 Aarhus Convention obliges States to guarantee access to environmental information very extensively as well as to collect and disseminate environmental information. The Convention also explicitly provides for State’s obligation to guarantee access to environmental information in the event of any imminent threat to human health or the environment. On the other hand, more importance has been placed on access to information under international human rights treaties, among others the European Convention on Human Rights. According to the case law developed by the European Court of Human Rights under the European Convention, States have the positive obligation to take preventive measures to protect individuals likely to be affected when there’s a real and imminent threat in order to protect their right to life and their right to respect for private and family life. It should be noted that the European Court has placed special importance on access to information among preventive measures to be taken by States.

    Experiences we had in the course of accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant suggest that Japan should take necessary measures to sufficiently guarantee access to information in emergency situation and establish a scheme for collecting and disseminating relevant information for such purpose; that it is also essential to establish a legal regime in which, in the context of privatization of public service, information held not only by public authorities but also by private entities performing public service should be collected and made available to the public. In order to provide better protection of people against risks which involve scientific uncertainty and which might be materialized after a lapse of long time, such as risk of radioactivity, it is necessary to establish a legal regime reflecting the most recentinternational developments of access to information.

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Articles
  • Toshihiro ICHISE
    2014 Volume 14 Pages 109-124
    Published: December 20, 2014
    Released on J-STAGE: June 08, 2019
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS

    This paper examines the promotion structure of local police headquarters to clarify the policy for the encouragement of skill formation using personnel data from a large-scale local police headquarters with more than 10,000 employees. The findings from the empirical analysis using personnel data and an inquiring survey of police bureaucrats are as follows: There are signs of first track effects for the promotion to rank of Commissioner (general manager), so that individuals promoted faster earlier on are more likely to advance to the highest available rank, i.e., a government official (the local police affairs official). Furthermore the individuals promoted a little later are offered a chance to get promoted to Superintendent (a head of the police station) or Chief Inspector (a section manager of the police station), while many other police officers are offered future prospects for the promotion to Inspector (an assistant manager). These results can be interpreted that the personnel policy gives all police officers incentive to skill formation. This means that the promotion mechanism of the municipal police is designed to stimulate all non-career police officers to make greater efforts and carries the selection system for getting the most out of their human resources.

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