This paper aims to analyze the mortality crises in the Setouchi region that occurred in the late Edo period. While it is clear that a great number of deaths, or so-called mortality crises, occurred in the late Edo period due to famine and disease, little is known about the characteristics of the mortality crises, such as the patterns of mortality according to sex, age, and seasonal cycle. As a case study of mortality crises, I investigated the temple death register (kako-cho), in the village of Kurose. In sum, the major characteristics of the mortality crises are as follows: 1) Eleven mortality crisis years occurred in 1772-1867. Mortality crises occurred frequently in the Setouchi region, even though it was one of the most developed regions of Japan, after the Kinki region. 2) In recent studies, the impact of the Tempo famine is regarded as relatively small, from the perspective of population dynamics. Although the Tempo famine was only one of the mortality crisis years, however, the impact it had on communities was severe. The Tempo famine was apparently different from other crisis years because of the high rate of adult mortality. In other crisis years, the impact on communities was limited, from the point view of the number of deaths and the age pattern of mortality. 3) All mortality crisis years in Kurose village involved disease epidemics, and the characteristics of the epidemics determined the characteristics of the mortality crisis, for instance, regarding the pattern of age, month, or sex of deaths. In addition, child mortality was always high. Therefore, if the epidemic spread to adults, the impact of the mortality crisis was considerably more severe. 4) The mortality pattern in the late Edo period is characterized by the great number of deaths of children, and this trend was observed in all mortality crisis years. I should emphasize that the number of deaths of children had a great impact on the total number of deaths in the late Edo period.

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After the Industrial Revolution, mid-19th century Britain experienced such serious air pollution due to the smoke generated by the combustion of coal used for industries that it required some form of social response. Scholars have argued that only humanitarian landlords pushed for the enactment of the Smoke Prohibition Bill of 1844, and that the Bill was thwarted by the general resistance of industrial capitalists, who believed in Laissez-faire ideals. This paper, however, will throw light on factory owners' participation in smoke regulation, and follow the process in which the Bill was rejected, not by the confrontation between landowners and industrialists, but by differences of factory owners' interests with regards to the regulation. In mid-19th century Britain air pollution was recognized in most manufacturing towns as something that damaged not only rich proprietors' real estate and properties, but also town laborers' health. Moreover, even many textile factory owners who caused the smoke nuisance were aware of the damage to their own business and properties. In response to such awareness, many landlords and humanitarian politicians, seeking relief for laborers, became promoters for nationwide smoke control. However, some industrialists in connection with the textile industry also played an important role in the promotion of smoke control. Moreover, smoke prevention technologies at that time, which not only could reduce smoke but also save fuel, enabled state interference that wouldn't go against the profit principle of manufacturers. And, the national importance of saving coal was also emphasized, as coal had been recognized as a limited and precious national wealth. Consequently, a strict smoke regulation bill drafted by a large cotton mill owner was presented to Parliament by a humanitarian landlord. The bill, however, was weakened by the disparity in financial strength between large and minor manufacturers, and was rejected due to the conflict of interest between textile factory owners and iron masters or collieries, for whom fuel saving, one of the grounds of the smoke prevention regulation, could not be easily implemented. Nationwide smoke regulation, therefore, suffered a setback due to the confrontation between industrialists. The disclosure of such problems, however, was important in that it made future Parliament turn to steadier measures, taking full consideration of the differences between industries and regions.

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Between 1893 and 1913, the currency system of the Straits Settlements was transformed from one based on the silver standard to one based on the gold-exchange standard, and became part of the international gold standard framework, which had London as its center. In 1903, following the recommendation of the final report of the Currency Committee chaired by D. Barbour, the Straits Settlements Government abandoned the silver standard. Three years later, it fixed the Straits dollar at a higher-than-previous rate of 2s 4d(2 shillings, 4 pence) per dollar, to guarantee that the currency in circulation would not be disturbed by the rise of silver prices. Thus, a new system, based on the gold-exchange standard, was created. In 1899 the Straits Settlements Government began issuing government notes, which were immediately accepted and circulated. By 1910 they constituted about one half of all currencies in circulation, while the circulation of the silver dollar inside the Settlements sharply declined. By shortly before 1913, the majority of currencies in circulation were government notes and subsidiary coins. The currency system of the Straits Settlements was not only implemented in the areas legally decreed to utilize it, such as the Federated Malay States and the State of Johor, but was also informally adopted in areas closely connected to the colony, such as the rest of Malay Peninsula, East Sumatra and the southern part of Siam. The colony's silver coins had traditionally circulated widely in these areas, although neither government notes nor gold coins, which were circulated within the colony, were readily accepted there. The newly minted 1903 Straits dollar was also widely accepted in these surrounding areas. However, in response to the international fluctuations of silver prices, the Government decided to fix the Straits dollar at a higher rate in 1906. At the same time, it decided to debase the silver content of the Straits coin by 25 per cent, in order to prevent the coins from being melted down for ingot. As a result, the new Straits silver dollar became unacceptable as the currency in the surrounding areas. Instead, their own currencies came to be used, and the Straits silver dollar rapidly disappeared from these areas. Concurrently, the silver dollar was replaced by government notes inside the colony. The currency system in South-east Asia as a whole thus came to be reorganized, in accordance with territorial boundaries.

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The process of moving from land reform to collectivization is a fundamental part of the social formation of rural socialism in Post-War East Germany. Analyzing only the political process in Berlin produces an incomplete picture, particularly when thinking about the diversity of collectivization in villages. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the process of restructuring the villages in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern between 1945-1961. Above all, it focuses on 1) the rural social structure, which differs between new and old farmer villages, 2) the problems of rural refugees from the eastern territories, and 3) conflicts around buildings, such as barns and houses, within the villages. First, in the new farmer village, where land reform had actually lead to social chaos, collectivization was one of the measures used to resolve this situation. In analyzing the case of Kreis Bad Doberan, we find two different paths to forming LPGs (Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaften) in the 1950s. In the case of Diedrichshagen, a former milker's group, a minority in the village, founded an LPG for the purpose of reconstructing their former dairy farms. For that they intended to retain the material resources of the village such as barns. However, they failed in this attempt due to the effects of the June 17, 1953 Uprising, and this resulted in the dissolution of the LPG. On the other hand, Althof offers a successful example of an LPG, as they developed their organization to protect against the effects of June 17 Uprising. Althofs status as a model collective farm enabled it to succeed in obtaining capital funds for building a new modern barn. Second, in the old farmer village, in addition to the influx of refugees, the policy against "Grossbauern" in 1952-1953 had a significant impact on the social structure. It is important that others in the village agreed to the purge of "Grossbauern". The Hohenfelde LPG founded in 1953 by the group of new refugee farmers was based on the rich material resources of a broken-down "Grossbauern". Taking the village farm (OLB) in 1955 caused the expansion of the LPG and the change of its inner structure, associated with the appearance of new rural technocrats outside the village. The family members of "Grossbauern" who remained in the village adapted to this situation through marriage, joining the LPG, and taking jobs in the MTS.

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