During World War II, Japanese companies pursued the development of synthetic fibers as substitutes for such natural fibers as cotton and wool. A well-known case is polyvinyl alcohol (PVA) fiber, industrialized after the war under the brand name Vinylon by Jurashiki Rayon (Kuraray) and Dai-Nippon Cotton Spinning. This paper considers the case of Kanebian, another variety of PVA fiberm produced by Kanegafuchi Cotton Spinning (Kanebo). Kanebian's development was advanced almost concurrently with that of Vinylon but ultimately was suspended, though its realization was close at hand. The reasons why Kuraray succeeded in industrializing Vinylon and establishing its own market lie in its shift from "negative substitution" - the goal of compensating for a shortage of natural fibers -- to "positive substitution," which brought out and commercialized the peculiar attributes and attractions of synthetic fibers as substitutes for natural fibers. This process was the necessary condition for the survival of wartime substitute fibers in the postwar environment. After the war Kanebo made the reconstruction of natural fibers its highest priority, thereby delaying the development of synthetic fibers and widening the gap with Kuraray's progress. The two fibers had reached similar levels of development by the end of the war. But Kanebo's management was negative about Kanebian's prospects because of its defects in quality and cost and therefore was cool toward its further development. Kanebo's engineers worked to address these weaknesses as they emerged in the postwar years, and sought out optimum markets while watching Vinylon's progress closely. Their unrelernting effort and confidence in Kanebian's potential did not sway management's assessment of the product, however, and ultimately Kanebo discontinued the development of Kanebian. The decision to suspend development seems at first glance to have been mistaken given Kuraray's success. It has its own validity and rationality, however, when we take into consideration Kanebo's founding and principal business which was cotton spinning, the postwar recovery of the cotton spinning industry, Kanebian's technical properties and its potential, and the limited support from industrial policy at the time. This article explains this assertion in detail by studying the process from development to suspension, and considers it as an aspect of the shift from "negative" to "positive substitution."

View full abstract

The British government set out art education policies when it established the School of Design in London in 1837. The aim of the School of Design was to diffuse the "arts of design" to manufacturers. Since before the School of Desing was established, the idea has been promoted principally by the Royal Academy of Arts in London as useful for the public. This thesis examines the history of the idea of promoting the "arts of design" and analyses why the need for a policy of art education was insisted on in early 19th century England and what kind of role people thought the government should take in art education. This paper clarifies the following three points. First, in 1830s Britain, "taste" did not mean each person's own preference, but rather the ability to judge or assess beauty. The art of design was based on this ability. In this sense, the establishment of the School of Design did not represent an "interference" with individual preference but rather an effort to teach a standard of beauty that had already been set by the Royal Academy. Second, the government's role in promoting the arts of design was as an intermediary between the experts on beauty and the people working in manufacturing. Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, this role was described as part of a liberalization effort. The logic was explained as follows: that though English workmen have a great desire to acquire ability in the arts of design, they have no school; that the government has in this sense been impeding the manufacturing class from learning the arts of design; and that this barrier must be removed. By this logic, the role required of the government was as an intermediary between the professionals in the arts of design and those in manufacturing. Third, art education policy developed in tandem with the free trade movement of the time. The 1820s saw the abolition of the prohibition on silk imports, and people feared that Britain's silk trade would be destroyed. An alternative to protection was needed. The result was the establishment of a governmental school of design along the lines of those already existing in some other European countries such as France, Bavaria, and Switzerland.

View full abstract