The Journal of Research Institute for the History of Global Arms Transfer
Online ISSN : 2423-8546
Print ISSN : 2423-8538
ISSN-L : 2423-8538
Volume 2016, Issue 2
Displaying 1-7 of 7 articles from this issue
  • [in Japanese]
    2016 Volume 2016 Issue 2 Pages 1
    Published: July 25, 2016
    Released on J-STAGE: January 21, 2025
    JOURNAL OPEN ACCESS
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  • Prerequisites of the Nazi secret rearmament
    Michiteru Nagamine
    2016 Volume 2016 Issue 2 Pages 3-21
    Published: July 25, 2016
    Released on J-STAGE: January 21, 2025
    JOURNAL OPEN ACCESS
    Under the Treaty of Versailles, a number of severe restrictions were imposed on the German aircraft industry. However, after his seizure of power, Hitler secretly started massive Air Force construction and only after two years did he openly declare the construction, immediately showing off the air power at home and abroad.
     Three companies of the German aircraft industry, Junkers, Heinkel and Dornier, played a central role in the secret Milch plan of 1934–35 for the construction of the Luftwaffe (Air Force). Junkers produced the supplementary Bomber, Dornier produced the Bomber and Reconnaissance (long- and short-range) and Heinkel produced fighters, the Reconnaissance and the Dive bomber. At the time, under severe restrictions, how and why was it possible?
    1. At the end of the First World War, there were 77 aircraft companies with 65,000 employees. The demobilisation severely limited the possibility of survival for the German aircraft industry, and the Treaty of Versailles imposed a ban on production and exports. Still, under the severe conditions of 1919–33, about 15 companies produced approximately 3,000 planes. Most of them were civilian aircraft, because military aircraft had been strictly prohibited. But in practice, 365 military planes were produced.
    2. The German aircraft industry was highly developed during the First World War. Junkers F-13, which was developed in 1919, was all-metal and the most advanced airplane in the world. Many neutral countries and developing countries focused on obtaining German planes.focused on German planes. Immediately after the end of the war, Sweden, the Soviet Union, Japan, Poland and even the United States tried to get German airplanes.
    3. Heinkel was able to continue producing military aircraft in secret with the cooperation of Japanese friends who were on the control commission. Junkers established a factory in Fili near Moscow through secret German–Soviet military cooperation, and by 1925, had produced approximately 100 military planes. But no sufficient support from the Reichswehr could be obtained. Junkers invested in the A. B. Flygindustri in Limhamn (Schweden) and withdrew from Fili in heavy debt. Meanwhile, Dornier established factories for military planes in Italy and Switzerland.
    4. These companies were fiercely competitive at home and abroad and established many world records. Their planes made many expeditions around the world and contributed to airline expansion. They achieved a high level of technical complexity and set the standards for mass production.
    5. Hugo Junkers was a genuine, reliable Democrat. He was a member of the Deutsche Demokratische Partei and had Anti-Nazi ideology. He was expelled from his company, which had been completely nationalised during the secret rearmament.
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  • the failure of disarmament caused by the aviation problem during the interwar period
    Kaori Takada
    2016 Volume 2016 Issue 2 Pages 23-40
    Published: July 25, 2016
    Released on J-STAGE: January 21, 2025
    JOURNAL OPEN ACCESS
    Military and civil aviation have shared the same sky since the birth of aviation technology. According to Eugene Sochor in his 1991 book published, ‘the close links between civil and military aviation were well understood when governments were the principal actors in the early days of commercial aviation.’ This paper aims to clarify that commercial aviation in the interwar period enabled Germany to rapidly reestablish its air power by 1935. After its defeat in the First World War, Germany had been prohibited from maintaining its airpower and Air Force, with exception of the aircraft industry and commercial aviation. At that time, the U.S. delegation insisted that Germany could run its commercial aviation in its own territory. With its participation in the League of Nation, and the International Commission of Aerial Navigation (Commission Internationale de Navigation Aerienne), Germany started its commercial aviation with the establishment of Deutsche Lufthansa, A. G. (DLH) in 1926 expanding to China, and to Latin America. In the early 1920s, European countries such as France and Great Britain had considerable influence over Latin American aviation; however, German aviation was gaining ground. Civilians of German descent in Columbia established the national airline company with support from the German aviation industry. One of the oldest airline companies, Sociedad Colombo-Alemana de Transportes Aeros (SCADTA) started its flights around Columbia, the Isthmus of Panama, and the Caribbean Sea. DLH and SCADTA also founded an affiliated company, Syndicate Condor, and the company became the prominent airline in Brazil. For the purpose of protecting its prestige in Latin America, Pan American Airways (Pan Am) was established by one of the most prominent U. S. military aviation figures, Henry Hap Arnold, and then Juan Terry Trippe took over the company. In the early 1930s, German-owned airlines and Pan Am engaged in peaceful competition in Latin America. When Hitler obtained the political power, however the German government had tried to solidify politico-economic relationships with Latin American countries. At the same time, competition between DLH and Pan Am became more severe. The U.S. government also became aware of the latent threat of DLH as an air power, when German and Italian air forces intervened in the Spanish Civil War, and they conducted indiscriminate air strikes on the civilian population. In 1937, civilian aviation was switched to military air power. Germany legally developed its civil aviation in an era of disarmament, and rapidly established its Air Force with the personnel and airplanes that had been developed through civil aviation.
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  • With special reference to Greenwood & Batley Ltd. and Remington Arms-Union Metallic Cartridge Co.
    Sho Takayanagi
    2016 Volume 2016 Issue 2 Pages 41-66
    Published: July 25, 2016
    Released on J-STAGE: January 21, 2025
    JOURNAL OPEN ACCESS
    This study aims to reveal one part of the Allies’ munitions supply system during the First World War, focusing in particular on the supply of small arms ammunition from Great Britain and the United States to Russia. From the 1850s to the outbreak of war, the small arms and ammunition industry in Western nations had developed dramatically. The United States played a leading role among these nations, in inventing so called ‘the American system of manufacture’. Even Great Britain, which at one time enjoyed a position of a great industrial power, was forced to introduce the American system to her rifle and ammunition factories in the 1850s–60s. Through the experience of the Civil War, American arms companies had grown faster than European ones, and they expanded significantly to overseas markets until the turn of the century.
     In some cases, however, American arms and ammunition companies were found to be incapable of dealing with the munitions contracts obtained from the Allied powers in the early part of the First World War. While mass production of munitions was the first priority in every belligerent country, the United States remained neutral until 1917 and was thought to be a great source of arms and ammunition for the needs of Great Britain, France and Russia. The war saw an enormous surge in the consumption of ammunition, particularly shells, and a greater use of machine guns than in pre-war period also required larger quantities of small arms ammunition.
     Early in the war, as one part of her strategic program, the British government decided to provide military assistance to Russia by way of purchasing various kinds of munitions from the Unites States. Small arms ammunition was one of the principal supply goods to Russia, and the Remington Arms-Union Metallic Cartridge Co. received the largest order in 1915. However, the Remington could not fulfil the order, and the British government made the decision in late 1916 to cancel the contract, expecting that an emerging British munitions maker would replace the American firm. From 1917, Greenwood & Batley Ltd., one of the ‘controlled establishments’ selected by the British Ministry of Munitions, assumed the supply of small arms ammunition for Russia and produced good results within some months. The differences between the Remington and Greenwood & Batley factories are the focus of this paper.
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  • Key issues at the First Conference of States Parties and thereafter
    Tamara Enomoto
    2016 Volume 2016 Issue 2 Pages 67-84
    Published: July 25, 2016
    Released on J-STAGE: January 21, 2025
    JOURNAL OPEN ACCESS
    The 1990s onwards has seen a proliferation of initiatives to develop regional and/or international instruments for conventional arms control. From transfer control and marking mechanisms to security sector reform and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, a multiple of measures have flourished to address the uncontrolled circulation and misuse of conventional arms. Among them were the efforts to agree to a legally-binding document establishing common criteria for assessing arms transfer licenses. After a series of negotiations, the efforts culminated on 2 April 2013 with the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) at the United Nations General Assembly. The First Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (CSP1) was held in Mexico in August 2015, and the Second Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (CSP2) is scheduled to take place in Switzerland in August 2016.
     While research is abundant on the negotiation processes of conventional arms control agreements since the 1990s and the roles of governmental and non-governmental actors in the negotiations, there is a striking absence of research on the implications of post-adoption processes and the roles of a wide range of actors in these processes. Nevertheless, issues such as the rules of procedure for the Conferences of States Parties (CSP), the Secretariat’s logistical and budgetary arrangements and ATT’s reporting mechanisms have been under heated debate during the treaty’s post-adoption processes, precisely because they seem to affect the treaty’s effectiveness and transparency.
     This article seeks to analyse the key issues at the CSP1 and thereafter, namely, the rules of procedure, the role and budget of the Secretariat, reporting mechanisms, and possible violations of the treaty by States Parties, and to indicate which controversies are likely to be major at the CSP2. As one of the participants of the CSP process of the ATT, the author hopes to record this historic moment and to provide the basis for policy debates ahead of the upcoming CSP2 as well as for the future research on, and evaluation of, this process.
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  • [in Japanese]
    2016 Volume 2016 Issue 2 Pages 85-89
    Published: July 25, 2016
    Released on J-STAGE: January 21, 2025
    JOURNAL OPEN ACCESS
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  • [in Japanese]
    2016 Volume 2016 Issue 2 Pages 91-95
    Published: July 25, 2016
    Released on J-STAGE: January 21, 2025
    JOURNAL OPEN ACCESS
    Download PDF (1057K)
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