Interest in the First World War among the Japanese people was relatively mild during that conflict. In contrast, the Japanese ruling classes perceived the war with shock and a deepening sense of crisis. Thus, party politicians, military officers and bureaucrats had to adjust their interests to prepare for Japan to conduct the sort of “total war” that they observed in WWI. However, they failed to reach a consensus about the total war system, and this conflict continued until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Even afterward, they were never able to construct a Japanese model of the total war system. The primary reason for this failure was the existence of multiple layers of authority in the Japanese state and the inability of the nation’s elite groups to mutually adjust their own vested interests. In doing so, they put their own particular interests above the needs of the state and the people. In other words, it was the state structure of Japan, with its multiple powerful stakeholders, that comprised the main obstacle to the construction of a total war system. In this article, I will outline the conflicts that accompanied discussions of the creation of a total war system, arguing that these conflicts were at the very core of Japan’s essence as a state. I will conclude that the Japanese model of a total war system was highly deficient, particularly in comparison with those of Europe and the United States.
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