This paper intends to show, initially, that God as the Creator has significant functions in Harrington's preoccupations, altnough articulated differently from the religious enthusiasts amongst his contemporaries, and, then, that His relation with human beings influences to the constitutional arrangements of Harrington: the Bicameral System composed of the Senate Proposing and the Congregation Resolving. Through them, it demonstrated the positive aspects of his religious Component to be defined as a secularly articulated religiosity, and concluded that the understanding of Harrington's religious assumptions pursuing Freedom to Authority was indispensable in order to evaluate comprehensively his thought as a whole.
In Restoration England, John Evelyn (1620-1706) published, corresponding to the Royal command (King Charles II), Fumifugium, or the Inconvenience of the Aer and Smoke of London Dissipated (1661), now widely appreciated as the first comprehensive monograph on the air pollution. Through his assiduous commitments towards medicine, chemistry, and horticulture, he identified systematically and appropriately the sources and harmful effects of the pollution problems, in no way inferior to the present level of scientific investigations. In this paper, the text itself is analysed fully with some comments, while contextualised into the intellectual milieux of the mid-seventeenth century.
This paper analyzes Hume's distinction between knowledge and probability in his Treatise. Many scholars believe that this distinction corresponds to the relationship between analytic and synthetic, a priori and a posteriori. However, if we direct our attintion to the concept of resemblance that Hume places in the category of knowledge, this correspondence is harder to see. The fact is, what distinguishes knowledge from probability is whether it is possible to imagine the negative case or not. This distinction is basically psychological but also includes other factors. This paper notes the knowledge of resemblance is equivalent to Wittgenstein's world-picture propositions.
This article focuses on sell-ownership and articulates it. Libertarians insist that my person is my property, and I have exclusive rights to determine the course of its use and disposal, and further to enjoy full income gained by its use. But self-ownership is an obscure conception inasmuch as the very concept of person and the legal concept of property in themselves allow for varied interpretations. Through examining what a person is, and by noting our abilities, I divide them into two concepts, which may be called ‘intrinsic ability’ and ‘extrinsic one’. According to this division, in order to redefine self-ownership, I argue that we claim only the ‘right to integrity of person’ to the intrinsic ability, and ‘control right and restricted income right’ to extrinsic ability.