Berlin's studies on the history of ideas have been the focus of severe criticism recently. I argue that this is due to the lack of discussion on his “existentialist view of history.” This Crocean view mediates his study of history and his liberal political philosophy on the one hand, and implies that Berlin's books on Romanticism — especially those on J. G. Hamann — reflect his intellectual path, his political concern and his own identity as a Jew, on the other. Although Berlin was sensitive to nationalism, he affirmed Zionism. The Crocean view enables us to make sense of his paradoxical attitude.
For Locke, the problems of economy were closely related with the government. He thought that the economic prosperity of England was realized by ‘ordering’ trade. Trade consisted of two fields; one was manufacture, and the other navigation and commerce. And what rotated ‘the wheel’ of trade was money. It was required that landholder, broker (merchant and moneyed-man), and labor took their own part as a component in the circulation of trade. He did not intend to defend their particular interests, but thought about totally the problem of trade in terms of pursuing the public good.
Both utility and sympathy are the key concepts in Hume's and Smith's theory of justice. Whereas Hume and Smith hold the same view that the rules of justice have utility, their accounts differ in terms of the role of utility and sympathy. In this paper, after the careful analysis of Hume's and Smith's arguments, I would like to propose the following interpretation. Hume explains the evolution of the rules of justice and justifies them based on utility; so sympathy only plays a secondary role in explaining the moral approbation of justice as a virtue. But in Smith's theory it is sympathy that is used to explain the evolution and the enforcement of the rules of justice, and utility plays a part in justification of some kind of punishment and evaluation of laws and social policies.
This paper reassesses Locke's theory of ideas with that of Boyle for a background, and argues as follows. Initially, ‘cosmical quality’ is essential for Boyle's corpuscular philosophy, since it manifests radical interactions in the world. Secondly, Locke's theory of qualities in which ideas take a leading part conceals this insight, yet he accepts it. Thirdly, Boyle treats ideas as the principle of the metaphysical and mathematical reasoning in his book about limits of reason. Finally, ideas in Locke are not the principle of the history of matter of fact in the world, and Locke consciously treats these ideas as the principle of the morality.