東南アジア -歴史と文化-
Online ISSN : 1883-7557
Print ISSN : 0386-9040
ISSN-L : 0386-9040
1981 巻, 10 号
選択された号の論文の12件中1~12を表示しています
  • 戦争と和平: 1766~1790
    鈴木 中正
    1981 年 1981 巻 10 号 p. 3-16
    発行日: 1981/06/30
    公開日: 2010/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    Because the Chinese Ch'ing Dynasty deemed Burma a troublemaker in the Southeastern border area of the province of Yunnan, it sent four successive expeditions to Burma during the years from 1766 to 1790. The Shan states on the borders had long been sending tribute to the Burmese court of Ava but the practice was disrupted due to the disorder in Burma caused by the dynastic alternation of the mid-eighteenth century. The newly established Konbaung dynasty claimed their right to collect tribute from the Shan states and while carring on a campaign in Ayuthaya, Siam (1764-67). The Ch'ing emperor thought it necessary to punish and expel the marauders at their borders. The Ch'ing at the zenith of its power mobilized all its resources to chastise Burma but the new dynasty in Burma made every effort to withstand the invaders.
    The last Ch'ing expeditionary army evacuated Burma at the end of 1769, after concluding a truce agreement on reciprocal restitution of the war captives and surrenders. The Ch'en-lung emperor, however, never consented to turn over the princes of the Shan states who had surrendered to the Ch'ing side, thus putting the border area in a state of severe tension. But a rebellion occured in the province of Sze-ch'uan in 1771 diverting the emperor's concern from Burma and his resentment was gradually dissipated.
    For the purpose of normalizing relations with the Ch'ing, Burma attempted to negotiate twice, in 1772 and in 1777. Their effort, however, was in vain because the Ch'ing emperor continued to demand from Burma, unilateral restitution of war captives. Among the Shan rulers on the borders, however, there emerged a move to normalize the relations between their two powerful neighbors in order to bring about trade relations which profitted the border states. In 1787, the prince of Keng Ma, a Shan state on the Yunnan side, sent a friendship mission to Burma disguised as a Ch'ing court mission: Burma sent a return mission to Peking in 1788. This brought the two countries' relations nearly to completion. In 1790, the prince of Bhamo on the Burmese side, sent a mission to Peking on his own initiative, unnoticed by the court of Burma. Thus the long disrupted Sino-Burmese relations came to be normalized despite the fact that the Ch'ing court declared Burma as its vassal state and Burma had no intention of accepting such a status
  • 岩本 裕
    1981 年 1981 巻 10 号 p. 17-38
    発行日: 1981/06/30
    公開日: 2010/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    On the full account of the author's opinion on this problem, please see the Proceedings of the International Symposium on Chandi Borobudur, Tokyo 1981, in which the author deals with the following points in details:
    1) The ancestors of the Sailendra royal line were in a leadership position among the Old Malay speaking population in some colony of Srivijaya in Java.
    2) Though originally Sivaites, under the widespread Buddhist influence from Srivijaya, their native land, they converted to Buddhism.
    3) Under the economic development of Srivijaya, they came to dominate over the area west of Central Java. This country in the west of Java was called Ho-ling in the Chinese sources. (As there were no kingdom in Java except Sailendra and Mataram in those days, we have no choice but to identify Holing with Sailendra, because the Buddhism had floulished in either country).
    4) In the mid-eighth century, they advanced eastward to Central Java and pressured the Mataram kingdom.
    5) As a symbol of the dynasty's devotion to Buddhism, they built candi Borobudur to the southwest of the capital, and the date of beginning of its construction was ca. 780 A. D.
    6) There arose discord for the suzerainty over Java among the members of the Sailendra royal line during the construction work of candi Borobudur, probably in the second quarter of the 9th century.
    7) Samaragravira was defeated in this war, and he escaped then to Srivijaya, becoming the king of that country.
    8) By the latter half of the 9th century, the suzerainty over Java had passed completely into the hands of the Mataram kings.
  • 食糧獲得のための戦略
    田淵 幸親
    1981 年 1981 巻 10 号 p. 39-68
    発行日: 1981/06/30
    公開日: 2010/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    In September 1940, the Japanese troops moved into the northern part of Indochina. In July of the following year, they advanced into the southern part of Indochina. This region provided the central granary with a large quantity of rice for export. Japan's colonial policy in Indochina had lied in putting the region under its control.
    Before this invasion, since July 1939, Japan had suffered from a serious shortage of food caused by the sudden decline of Korea's rice export to Japan, due mainly to bad harvest. On the otherhand, the outbreak of World War II had caused serious economic damage to Indochina and settled it a politically isolated. Indochina had been trying for some time to find country other than France to which it could export rice.
    Finally, through negotiations, Japan succeeded in establishing economic relations with Indochina. In May 1941, Japan forced France to sign several conventions (CONVENTION FRANCO-JAPONAISE D'ETABLISSEMENT ET DE NAVIGATION RELATIVE A L'INDOCHINE FRANÇAISE and ACCORD FRANCO-JAPONAIS RELATIF AU REGIME DOUANIER, AUX ECHANGES COMMERCIAUX ET A LEURS MODALITES DE REGLEMENT ENTRE L'INDOCHINE ET LE JAPON) which would make Indochina economically dependent on Japan. It was, so to speak, “an exchange clearing system.” This system guaranteed that a large quantity of rice should be exported to Japan without any interference. Therefore, Japan was free to import the resources of Indochina. In the Southeast Asian countries under Japan's dominion, this system based on the conventions was the first colonial policy adopted by Japan.
    This system, the adoption of the “exchange clearing system”, was a means of serving the Japan's interests and subordinating Indochina to her needs.
    Now we know “Con nguòi chi có thê tu mình lùa doi mình, chú không bao gió lùa dôi duoc lich sú” (Nguyên Khánh Toàn, “Vê nguyên nhân phát sinh Cuôc Chiên Tranh Thê Giói Thú Hai, ” NGHIÊN CÚU LICH SÙ, sô 189, Hà Nôi, 1979, tr., 6.).
  • 日本軍政期のジャワにおけるイスラム宣撫工作について
    倉沢 愛子
    1981 年 1981 巻 10 号 p. 69-121
    発行日: 1981/06/30
    公開日: 2010/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 明初平〓工作の諸相と土着対応
    喜田 幹生
    1981 年 1981 巻 10 号 p. 122-141
    発行日: 1981/06/30
    公開日: 2010/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    Chi-mi policy, usually called t'u-ssu, was a system which the Ming Court applied to the local tribes in the south and the south-west, the policy contained some elements which brought revolt of the native tribes contrary to its intention. Speaking on the part of the native tribes, this meant that how to respond to these chi-mi works was one of the important elements which would determine their own fate. In this discussion I verified this proposition through stating what kind of chi-mi works the Ming Court successively executed in a run of revolts of Pai-i Lu ch'uan-man.
    What-we-call the Lu ch'uan revolt broke out in 1385 soon after the military expedition of Chuan you t'e, but an internal troubles in Lu Lu ch'uan brought it to a temporary conclusion. Using this opportunity the Ming Court took measures such as the establishment of the fu and chou around Lu ch'uan, the appointment of t'u-ssu officials, the Partition of the old t'u-ssu domain, the promotion to hsuan wei shih ssu and other such activities (the natives new submission in Yung Yue). For all that Lu ch'uan rose in revolt again in 1436 and extended their power from the south-west to the middle of present Yun nan. In order to suppress them Wang chi made three military expeditions (the three military expeditions of Wang chi), the process of which I stated in the main text. As a result Pai-i Lu ch'uan man was almost annihilated. After that trading with Burma by way of Meng yang t'u-ssu came to be stressed. During the so-called military expeditions of Wang chi the Ming Court dealt with native tribes with conbinations of measures depending on time and situation: it repeatedly tried to pacify the region by offering rewards and imperial gifts to the region around Lu ch'uanman, a powerful t'u-ssu domain; bestowing benefits of exemption of tributary silver and gold to the other influential t'u-ssu who had called for co-operation at the time of expeditions; distributing Sün chien ssu while attempting to devide up t'u-ssu domains; provoking mutual confrontation and killing; and finally established new t'u-ssu at the main points of revolts. They also checked the formation of alliances and growth of t'u-ssu and native tribes who were on the rise. As a result, native tribes were restrained and thrown into confusion and they could accomplish no more than aimless movement and activity. I assume whichever tribe was the object of government activities, the measures applied were not fundamentally different. It is natural, however that there were variations and special actions in accordance with region, situation, time and especially the degree of submission of local peoples. As we know the border of Yun nan is a not land with endemic desease and unfavourable geographic and economic conditions. We may say it owes mainly to there varied Chi-mi works by the Ming that inspite of these conditions rebellions movements were settled as in the case of Pai-i Lu ch'uan-man.
  • 19世紀末から20世紀初めにかけての東トラジャ族の事例を中心として
    弘末 雅士
    1981 年 1981 巻 10 号 p. 142-173
    発行日: 1981/06/30
    公開日: 2010/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
    At the end of the 19th century, the self-sufficient economy of the Eastern Toraja Society was disintegrating under the influence of commercial trade at Tomini Bay. Social stratification among the members of the village took place and many fell into debt.
    In this situation, the village chief had to redeem the villagers' debts and at the same time maintain law and order in the village despite frequent contact with the outside world. It was this period when Christian missionaries started to work. To respond to the above mentioned problems, the chiefs approached the missionary who was sent from Dutch Missionary Society and was on close terms with a Chinese merchant at Poso. In due course, missionary schools were opened at such villages as Panta, Tomasa, Buyumbayo, and othors. Headmen of the villages expected the schools to reconstruct the social order.
    In 1901, the Dutch government abandoned it's policy of non-intervention and after 1905-1907, Eastern Toraja was put under its direct rule. Various policies such as head tax, wet-rice cultivation and moving to the lowland were introduced through chiefs. It was these headmen who supported the Dutch rule. On matter of missionary work, the church as a result, did not dare to oppose the chiefs. At first, the missionaries did not prohibit the polygamy of the chief and other social custom with the exception of headhunting.
    Moreover, in these undertain situations tadu or prophets attracted many people who were dissatisfied with existing state of things. Then in 1902 and 1908, large religious movements called mevapi arose. The participants of the movements attempted to escape existing circumstances by concentration on heavenly release.
    While these religious movements arose, the young generation which had graduated from school attempted to participate in commercial trade and plant coffee or coconuts. Under the support of those who were on the rise, the church was entitled to recetive independent authority. Ultimately, in 1910 the church attacked the traditional customs which went against Christianity and prohibited Toraja christians from mowurake, molobo and motengke.
    But when the new order was established, the Dutch govermnent returned the authority, which was taken away form the headmen during the first few years, to the active hands. Consequently, It was difficult for church to gain independence over the headmen.
  • 伊東 照司
    1981 年 1981 巻 10 号 p. 174-178
    発行日: 1981/06/30
    公開日: 2010/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 永野 善子
    1981 年 1981 巻 10 号 p. 178-185
    発行日: 1981/06/30
    公開日: 2010/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 永積 昭
    1981 年 1981 巻 10 号 p. 185-189
    発行日: 1981/06/30
    公開日: 2010/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 岩武 照彦
    1981 年 1981 巻 10 号 p. 189-191
    発行日: 1981/06/30
    公開日: 2010/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 1981 年 1981 巻 10 号 p. 192-199
    発行日: 1981/06/30
    公開日: 2010/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 伊東 照司, 和田 正彦
    1981 年 1981 巻 10 号 p. 200-213
    発行日: 1981/06/30
    公開日: 2010/03/16
    ジャーナル フリー
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