French colonial expansion in the 19th century was characterized by the fact that a majority of metropolitan people did not pay any attention to the overseas activities while a small number of groups—missionnaries, merchants and navy officers—were devoted to developing the economic, political and military activities beyond the sea.
French colonization depended in principle on the activities of navy officers. It is said that French Cochinchine, for example, was an “Admiral colony”. In this historical context, we should examine the structure of navy administrative system in order to understand better the nature of French colonization. We take Cochinchine as an example.
Since 1875, depending on the treaty of Saigon of 1874, France opened the delegation at Hué, capital of Nguyen Dynasty of Vietnam. A navy officer was appointed chargé d'affaires of Hué under the direction of Governor General of Cochinchine. Administrative hierarchy in the Ministry of Marine and Colonies as follows: Minister of Marine and Colonies —Governor General of Cochinchine— chargé d'affaires of Hué. But in practice, chargé d'affaires had the informations on Vietnam more accurate and abundant than any other person. Therefore, the decision-making on Vietnamese politics relied mainly on the informations given by chargé d'affaires of Hué. In this sense, chargé d'affaires played a very important role to make decisions on Vietnam.
Paul Philastre (1837-1902), a navy officer, was appointed chargé d'affaires of Hué in 1876. He worked very energetically in this post for three years, addressing many interesting reports to Governor General of Cochinchine.
Philastre was famous for his erudition of Vietnamese and Chinese languages. He translated “Code Gia Long” into French and published it in 1874. He expressed his sympathy for Vietnamese civilization and was in, good terms with Vietnamese Mandarin. He observed prudently what happened in the Court of Hué. Even though he was disappointed with Emperor Tu Duc, he asserted that France should never do the military intervention in Vietnam. His sympathy, his good relationship and his antimilitary proposition caused strong reactions of interventionists against him. Finally he resigned office in July, 1879.
His reports, conserved at the Archives Nationales, Depot de la Section d'Outre-Mer at Aix-en-Provence in France, contain lots of lucid observations and sociological analysis on the Vietnamese situations at that time. By utilizing them, we could make clear the political structure and socio-economical situation in the 1870's under the reign of Nguyen Dynasty in vietnam.

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In the first section, the author reviews decisions and draft plans made by the Japanese authorities from 1936 to 1940, with a special attention to the documents in September 1940. By so doing, he analyzes the policy makers' intentions and various internal and external conditions which determined the Japanese economic plan toward Indochina.
The second section is a part of the discussion how the Japanese tried to carry out this plan. First, they started negotiations with the French in September 1940 and concluded economic agreements in May 1941, which enabled Japan to obtain necessary natural resources and to break the decades-long French monopoly system of Indochina's economy. Second, Japan sent a large-scale investigation team to gather first-hand information and establish future plans concerning the Indochinese economy.
In the concluding section, the author emphasizes that the Japanese actual economic activities toward Indochina essentially aimed to obtain necessary resources and funds without paying enough returns. Japan did not and could not carry out many of future plans proposed by the above-mentioned research mission. In other words, Japanese actual investments tended to focus on commercial and transportation sectors and not to sufficiently go to mining and industrial sectors. This fact demonstrates that Japan concentrated her economic efforts on the mere acquisition of necessary resources which the French and Indochinese produced with their own finances and labours. At the same time, the Japanese tried to import goods from Indochina without spending foreign currency. For that purpose, however, the 1941 agreements turned out soon to be insufficient and, therefore, in January 1943, Japan introduced another financial arrangement. It is noteworthy that this new arrangement was not only applied to the liquidation of trades. It also functioned to be a system of loans in piastres which the Japanese staying in Indochina needed for their military and non-military purpose. With this system they could get huge amount of piastres without substantial returns. To conclude, those Japanese economic activities invited dreadful inflation in the Indochinese society.

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Abaca (Manila Hemp) became the most important cordage fiber in the mid-nineteenth century. The United States and the United Kingdom together took 70 to 90 percent of the total exports raw abaca, comprising 20 to 30 percent or more of the total value of exports from the Philippines until 1880. The Philippines came to enjoy a natural monopoly of abaca production. In the nineteenth century the Bikol region of southern Luzon was the main abaca producing center. However, the Bikol abaca planters did not succeed in becoming efficient enough to meet the demand of the modern world economy. The abaca producers in the Bikol region were, on the whole, too small-scale and too poor to become politically powerful, and gradually declined.
Shortly after the United States assumed control of the Philippines in 1898, Americans became involved in the abaca industry and chose the Davao Gulf region of southeastern Mindanao as a prime producing center because of its ideal geographical and climatic conditions. However, American and European investment in the enterprise peaked in 1910 and then declined as a result of chronic shortage of labor and capital. On the other hand, the Japanese abaca planters in Davao were to prove the most efficient growers, succeeding where Europeans had failed. They were able to enjoy the benefits of favorable colonial legislation designed to protect the interests of the American cordage industry which was concerned to ensure a steady supply of cheap, high quality hemp from the Philippines.
The abaca industry brought a measure of prosperity to Filipino abaca cultivators, strippers, and landowners. However, the abaca industry was controlled by the foreigners as planters, traders, and cordage manufacturers, who left no room for Filipinos to join them. Filipinos were dependent on the foreigners in their own lands. After the abaca industry faltered and virtually collapsed in the years between World War I and World War II in the Bikol region, and after World War II in the Davao Gulf region, the Filipinos were left on a level of poverty from which they have not recovered.

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