In contemporary political controversies occurring in Myanmar, “National Politics” and “Party Politics” are frequently used both by the military government and prodemocracy forces.
The first part of this article analyizes the utilisation of these two terms; which have been used by the State and Order Restoration Council (and now its successor, the State Peace and Developement Council) in order to legitimize military intervention in Myanmar politics. Through this analysis, this author makes the following three points.
First, the military leaders insist that national politics are distinctry different from party politics. For them, while party politics primarily pursues the interests of one party, national politics pursues national causes which are Myanmar's true national interests going beyond those of each party. Secondly, military leaders believe that the real embodiment of national politics has been only the military since national independance. Finally, military leaders believe that the content of national causes should be determined by military leaders only.
This article views such beliefs by military leaders as not only a rebuttal to criticism leveled against them by pro-democracy forces, but also a revelation of the historical formation of their structure of conciousness. Thus, the latter part of this article focuses on the prosess of the military's dichotomization of politics and argues that the period of General Ne Win's Caretaker Government of 1958-59 was vitally important in forming this polemic.

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The LUPUS Series is a serial Indonesian pop novel which has enjoyed great popularity since the mid-1980's, especially among urban middle class teenagers. The series, which is the only million-seller in the history of the Indonesian publishing industry, takes the form of collections of episodes in the life of a Jakartan high school boy, Lupus, and his friends. This paper attempt to analyze LUPUS, with particular attention to its text and to its mid-80's popularity, in order to demonstrate its value as an important document of the emerging “anak hasil pembangunan” (literally, “children of development policy”, a term describing the younger generation that was born and grew up during, and who benefitted economically from, the Soeharto's regime, who was called the “Father of Development”)
Lupus and his friends are not presented as typical heroes, as is the case of other major Indonesian pop novels; instead, they are set forth as common urban middle class youth who naturally enjoy an environment which provides them with endless opportunities to sample newproducts or access new information that would hitherto have been unavailable to them.
The series exhibits an unprecedented style, the unique features of which deeply involve the reader in the text. First and foremost, the series is written in the colloquial slang of Jakartan youth, this is thecase not only for the dialogue, but also for the narration. The result is direct contact with readers, so that they are made to feel that they are not just simply reading, but also “hearing” the story, thus readers are drawn into the novel, and get involved as participants in the events.
The other unique feature of LUPUS is the intentional and public identification of the author, Hilman, with his creation, Lupus, infusingthe novel with something of a sense of reality in the minds of its readers.
Historically, the “anak hasil pembangunan”, having spent their formative years under the control of Soeharto's regime, have had less opportunity to find their identity in the socio-political context; in this sense, they differ from the previous generations.
On the other hand, this younger generation came to find itself in a role which identified its members in the socio-economic context, primarily as potential consumers; that is, targets of expanding commercialism and globalization. The character of this generation came to be identified not in terms of their socio-political role, but rather in the context of their particular youth culture, a culture born from economic development and totally exclusive of those who cannot meet the socio-economic requirements for membership.
LUPUS reflects precisely the ambivalence inherent in the condition of the “anak hasil pembangunan”, and has attracted their attention, resulting in an increased consciousness of self image not bound to the socio-political context.
It can also be argued that the popularity of LUPUS, which is rivaled by no other Indonesian print entertainment of the New Order period, provided this generation with a sense of belonging to the “imagined community”, and made up for the absence of shared experience on a national scale.

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The Paris Talks on the Vietnam War were begun as “two party” talks between Hanoi and Washington on May 1968, were expanded to “four party” talks with participation by the NLF and Saigon in January 1969. Afterward, the Paris Agreement was concluded on January 1973. Moreover, the greatest point of controversy in the negotiations was how to solve the “military issue” (withdrawal of U. S. troop) and the “political issue” (future regime in South Vietnam). The Paris Agreement had a separate solution for each by the initiative of Hanoi and Washington. Some students have indicated that Hanoi intended to achieve a comprehensive solution, while Washington preferred separate solutions for the two issues. This article is an attempt to reconsider these research to date, and to define the Diplomatic Struggle of the VLP for “Peace” during the “fighting while negotiating” period, through examining the Paris “Private Meetings” (1968 and 1969) between Hanoi and Washington.
The official “two party” talks had been fruitless by reason of each party's uncompromising insistence from the beginning. Then, the private meetings began in June 1968 and became the substantial “negotiation table”. They were held by request from Washington; however, Hanoi had supposed the “behind-the-scene” talks plan as a measure to settle the disputes. Washington demanded Saigon's participation, while Hanoi demanded the NLF join in the official talks at the private meetings. Eventually, President Johnson made a statement that the bombing of North would be stopped, thus starting “expanded” talks by the “four parties” in October 1968. The VLP's diplomatic struggle had achieved itsaims 1) to obtain a concession from Washington in connection with U. S. Presidential election in November; 2) to attain a bombing halt as “one step” to solving the “military issue”; and 3) to attain a international recognition of the NLF as a “break point” in the “political issue” in 1968.
The official “four party” talks had also been fruitless due to the same reasons as the previous talks. Therefore, the private “two party” meetings between Hanoi and Washington in May and August 1969 became the substantial “negotiation table”. The May meeting was especially important since Washington supposed private “four party” meetings, while Hanoi insisted on private “two party” ones. Moreover, the VLP had not advanced the “political issue” as priority one since January, before starting of the official “four party” talks. Accordingly, Hanoi had dealt with it by negative position to negotiate the solution of the “political issue” at the private “four party” meetings which would be joined by the the NLF. The VLP's diplomatic struggle aimed 1) to settle the “military issue” with Washington as the top priority; and 2) to prolong the “political issue” including the NLF as “party concerned” in 1969.
Later, the Le Duc Tho-Kissinger Secret Talks as “two party” between Hanoi and Washington began in January 1970. The negotiating process at the private meetings (1968 and 1969), however, had been a “foreground”' for the solution of the Paris Agreement, in the VLP's diplomatic struggle.

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This article discussed on the problem of nation building in the Philippines at the time of its becoming an independent nation, focusing on the creation of a Philippine national language.
In 1934, a Constitutional Convention was held in Manila and attended by 202 delegates representing every region of the Philippine Islands, in order to draft a charter which would form the foundation of coming nationhood. A common national language had been aspired to even in the early period of American colonial rule. However, there was little consensus among the Philippine people about what would be the national language, thus leaving the 1934 Convention to tackle the matter. The discussion on the national language turned out to be one of the most entangled ones. In this article, the author analyzes the discussion in depth, using the proceedings of the Convention. Her conclusions are as follows.
In the 1930's, there had emerged an educated class in the Philippines, which was linked together through English and Spanish. The delegates came mostly from this educated-bilingual class. They had many characteristics in common, such as school life in Manila and political affiliation.
However, once the language question was taken up, it was very difficult for them to reach a consensus. Intense debates took place between those who favored Tagalog and those who did not. The crucial issue was what kind of language could best express the uniqueness or “national soul” of the Philippine people.
After heated discussions, the suggestion that Tagalog be made the national language was defeated, because the majority of the delegates were convinced that the uniqueness of the Philippine people could never be fully expressed through only one language, and by excluding other native languages. So, finally, another suggestion that a national language be created by way of amalgamation of all Philippine native languages was adopted. This meant that the delegates had understood that the future national language should incorporate the diversity of the cultures pertaining to each region into one “distinctly Filipino” culture. However, on the last day of the convention, the creation of a national language based on only one of the existing native languages was adopted as constitutional provision without sufficient discussion, and the language question remained a source of conflict long after the Independence.

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This article is an attempt to use settlement reports in order to clarify what kind of land tenure was introduced by the British colonial government and what conflict it brought about in Upper Burma. There is little research on cultural conflict between Burmese society and the British colonial government regarding law and social order. Because the most of the existing research on the economic history of colonial Burma focuses on exploitation of the Lower Burma delta, which had been very thinly populated jungle before the colonial period, the author intends to contribute to our knowledge about social transformation from kingdom to colonial society by focusing on Upper Burma, which had been the center of population and economics in pre-colonial times.
The British colonial government's Upper Burma Land and Revenue Regulation of 1889 provided two kinds of tenure by which people could hold land: one was state land; the other non-state land. State land meant land belonging to or at the disposal of the government and consisted of (a) land hitherto termed royal land under direct control of the king, (b) land which had been held on condition of rendering public service, (c) island and alluvial formations in rivers, and so on. In sum, state land was intended to correspond to royal land. On the other hand, non-state land was all the land other than state land.
Land tenure was formally declared by the settlement officers during settlement operations; but the settlement officers met some difficulties, for cultivators in Upper Burma often made claims against their declarations. As a result, in settlement operations, discretion of the settlement officers were widely admitted. The settlement officers often reported that if they had observed the Regulation of 1889, they should have declared state land, but did not so.
In sum, the British government did not only translate the royal land of pre-colonial times into state land, but also forced the new land tenure system on Upper Burma, where people had lived for centuries. The author concludes that there was a conflict between the concept of Burmese land tenure and that of British colonial government.

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