The Symposium was held on August 21st 1968, with the Faculty of Economics of Osaka University acting as a host. As our choice of the above topic indicates, we attempted to understand the development of Japanese capitalism, particularly its rapid growth after the Meiji period, by focusing on the ways in which evolving company enterprise made this growth possible. Illuminating this theme, first it would seem necessary to integrate our knowledge of family enterprise and co-operative business associations of the Tokugawa period and company enterprise of the Meiji period. A focus of enterprise history should be the relationship involved in the above development. It is a problem of the continuities and discontinuities of business enterprise. In the transitional period from feudalism to capitalism, what was discarded and what was retained? These questions demand attention. We know that the capital assets which had been accumulated in the Tokugawa period were socially integrated in the Meiji period. The company system-an institution imported from more advanced countries-had some role in the use of these resources. How the company organizations transformed these assets is also a matter of interest for us. This is a way to establish the role of company enterprise in the Meiji period industrialization. It is also certainly necessary that we understand the mechanism by which company enterprise fostered the social integration of capital. Our first report was given by Manabu Yunoki. He dealt with the Hyogo Company. The evolution-Domestic Products Association (Kokusan Kaisho)→ Hyogo Company (Hyogo Shosha)→Commercial Management and Enterprise Association (Shohoshi-Shohokaisho)→Kobe Exchange Company (Kobe Kawase Kaisha)-was traced. The movement of Nadagogo sake brewers' caapital into this company was also clearly shown. Yunoki's report strongly supports the view that the formation of company enterprise is an instance of the modernization from above. The second report by Kyuichi Takahashi examined the circumstances of the Hikone Finance Company (Hikone Yuzu Kaisha) and the Sanriku Produce Company (Sanriku Shosha). In the formation and management of these regional firms we see concrete examples of the growth of Tokugawa co-operative firms into Meiji co-porative enterprise and the modernization of regional produce companies into national banks. From Takahashi's report we see that he is at odds with Yunoki. It is his appraisal that the modernization came from below. The third report of Toshimitsu Imuta concentrated on the structure of joint stock companies around Meiji 20. Using data taken from Teikoku Tokei Nenkan. and Noshomusho Tokei Hyo, he elucidated the pattern of corporale enterprise. Such positive research made clear the mechanism by which funds had been supplied and capital procured. It also clarified quantitatively the role of the corporate framework in the modernization of the Japanese economy. Modernization examined from the vantage point of a particular firm is the subject of our fourth report given by Shigeaki Yasuoka. Until the establishment of the Mitsui Gomei Gaisha (unlimited partnership) in Meiji 42, the Mitsui interests were organized on a family basis. Yasuoka investigated how the operations of this family enterprise changed, and what character of capital and what style of management were passed along. For our Symposium Shuichi Yasuzawa, Yasukichi Yasuba and Toshimaru Harada acted as chairmen ; Hiroshi Shimbo acted as rapporteur for the discussion while Tadakatsu Inoue, Shinzo Kurita, and Masaji Arai commented on the reports.

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From the establishment of the Meiji government, industrial and commercial policy encouraged the promotion of domestic industry. The policy was called Shokusan-kogyo Seisaku. Its origin, however, is found in the end of the Tokugawa era. The first modern company in Japan was the Hyogo Company founded in 1867. This company was organized to trade with foreign countries in accordance with the opening of Hyogo harbor, in April 1867. For this purpose a western style company was thought appropriate by the shogunate. The members of the company were the big merchants in Osaka and the brewers from the Nada district. They invested their money in the company and we can think of it as a partnership. Moreover, paper money (Hyogo-fuda) was issued. This paper money was to finance the promotion of foreign trade. With the breakup of the Shogunate, the company disappealed. The new Meiji government looking for sources of revenue came to depend on the merchants and money exchangers of Kyoto, Osaka and Tokyo. The sources of revenue were called Kaikei-Motodate-Kin and financed various new economic activities through the Shoho-ji. In this manner the Shoho-ji planned to promote home production and regulate domestic industries. We can consider it an original form of the modern company or joint stock enterprise under government leadership.

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In order to grasp the relative roles of regional firms and the commercial capital of company enterprises, we try to study the continuities and discontinuities in the evolution of regional national banks from regional commercial firms. Concretely speaking, our investigation begins by focusing on the entrepreneurial activities of the Omi merchants. First, we may study companies from the attitude of the merchants by examining the details of the establishment of various regional firms and financial companies. These details are contained in copies of petitions made on behalf of the founding of the companies. The official attitude towards companies may be seen from studying the nature of those companies for whom authorization was not given. Next, it should be understood that the motivation for founding national banks was quite distinct from what was involved when groups on both the winning and losing side of the turmoil at the time of the Imperial Restauration set up regional firms. It is for this reason that we must study the nature of the relationship between regional commercial firms and regional national banks. Thirdly, on the face of things regional national banks may be classified as samurai banks, merchant banks, and joint samurai-merchant banks. Congruent with our interest in the relationship between regional commercial firms and these banks we must try to make clear the character of the entrepreneurial figures participating.

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In spite of the great role of business corporations in the economic growth of modern Japan, little attempt has been made to analyze quantitatively the structure of these corporations. In this report we try to analyze the control and financial structure of mid-Meiji business corporations utilizing data found in Nihon Teikoku Tokei Nenkan, Noshomu Tokei, Cinko Eigyo Hokoku and in the various company annual reports. Analyzing corporation statistics for 1889, we can discern four business types : 1.) small scale business with few investors; this type was common in traditional industries, e. g. manufacture of tobacco, soap, matches, soy, miso, lamps, and fans ; 2.) large scale operations with few investors ; these were the zaibatsu controlled industries, e. g. mining, ship-building, and foreign trade ; 3.) small scale business with many investors ; This type was found in agriculture, in particular in the reclamtion of waste-land, cultivation, sericulture, bamboo work and tea manufacture ; 4.) large scale business with many investors ; these predominated the non-zaibatsu modern industries, e. g. railways, shipping, cotton spinning, electric lighting and insurance. These four types suggest a dualistic structure among the business corporations. This in turn reflects the immaturity of Japanese capitalism in this period. The control structure of joint stock companies (a component of the fourth category) is next considered. Following Professor K. Yamaguchi's survey, we inquire into the control structure of cotton spinning companies in 1898. We find that holding ratios of the largest stockholders were under 10% in almost all companies. The companies whose largest ten stockholders' holding ratio was under 35% occupied over 70% of surveyed companies. Thus control by a majority holding was not typical at that time. In mid Meiji cotton spinning companies co-operational control by larger stockholders was the dominant form. The system of co-operational control had three elements : 1.) chief stock holders in one company belonging to different families and groups ; 2.) individual capitalists seeking diversified investmnent ;3.) a voting system which restricted large shareholder rights. Statistical data showing the capital composition of companies in the Meiji era are not readily available. We do have N. Takamura's survey showing the capital composition of 52 cotton spinning companies in 1898. This survey presented the following interesting figures : the average ratio of paid-in capital to total capital was 57.5%, the ratio of net worth to total capital was 67.8% and the ratio of debt (excluding trade debt) to total capital was 16.4%. For cotton spinning companies, net worth was the most important source of funds and debt (including bankers' loans) was not nearly so important as has been previously imagined. Similar results have been found for various companies in other industries (railways, shipping, and electric light). On the other hand, according to Ginko Eigyo Hokoku company shares to client composition of national bank loans was under 10% in 1890-96. This means companies did not depend directly on bankers' loans. Note, however, that 40% of national bank loans during this period has as their mortgage company stock. This suggests that many stockholders often invested with borrowed money and that joint stock companies therefore depended indirectly upon bankers' credit. Moreover, the central bank supplied money to commercial banks (including national banks) by discounting bills with mortgage (of course, including motgage on stocks). Commercial banks could not supply money to debtors without the central bank's credit because they were typically overloaned. In this manner central bank-commercial banks→stockholders→joint stock companies were stock issues by companies supported. The various structure characteristics of Meiji period corporations outlined above are

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While business companies in general started to adopt limited liability systems when the first Commercial Law was enforced in 1893, the joint stock company with limited liability in the strict sense did not materialize until the amendment of the commercial Law in 1899. Before then, however, the House of Mitsui had managed to introduce into its subsidiareis the substance of limited liability by making full use of the Family Registration Law. In this manner it tried to avoid unlimited responsibility for its subsidiaries. In contrast to Mitsui, other zaibatsu such as Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda, which had made the Concern form complete after Mitsui, later reformed their subsidiaries into joint stock companies primarily to get capital from outside their own families. After the first World War the development of the heavy and chemical industries required vast new capital resources beyond those which any single family could supply.

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In England there was a drastic secularisation of the poor relief system during the later reign of Elizabeth I. It embodied the two great codes of 1597 and 1601. The main features of English poor relief system were legally established by the statute of 1597. It was the first law regulating elaborately the statuory authority for compulsory poor rate, the system of setting the poor on work, and the administrative organization. The poor relief policy divided itself into (A) items for providing work for unemployed poors, (B) items for erecting and govering the House of Corrections, and (C) items for apprenticeship of parish children. The contents analysed in this study are as fellows; I]The problematic points of the 1957 law. II]the view on the increase of poor people. III]the poor relief policy of the absolute monarchy. -especially on the statute of 1597- The Elizabethan government intended to force all of the poor to work in its industrial programs, and the 1597 law was enacted as a part of the program. Therefore, this poor law system were destined to be destroyed in the Civil War, and concurrently the poor relief policy of absolute government also ended.

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