社会経済史学
Online ISSN : 2423-9283
Print ISSN : 0038-0113
ISSN-L : 0038-0113
37 巻, 5 号
選択された号の論文の8件中1~8を表示しています
  • 高瀬 弘一郎
    原稿種別: 本文
    1972 年 37 巻 5 号 p. 429-450,532
    発行日: 1972/02/20
    公開日: 2017/08/03
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    In order to clarify the character of the Itowappu system, which was established by the Edo Bakufu government in 1604 in relation to the Portuguese silk trade between Nagasaki and Makao, the Portuguese documents are as important as the Japanese, Dutch, or British records. However, the Portuguese traders, unlike the English and Dutch, left no record on their commercial activities in Japan. It is therefore the missionary documents which complement, to a certain degree, the lack of the Portuguese rccords. The Jesuit missionaries, from the outset of the Christian mission in Japan, shared the same interests with the Portuguese in the trade, since their work in Japan considerably depended on the income from the trade. In addition, the missionaries were in a position wherd they could obtain a thorough knowledge of the negotiation at Nagasaki, as they played an important part as an intermediary between Portuguese and Japanese merchants. By examining they church documents left by these missionaries, it is possible to clarify several points concerning the Itowappu system. (1) The immediate cause of the establishment of this system mentioned in Itowappu Yuisho Gaki (History of Itowappu), a Japanese document, is not to be trusted. (2) The Itowappu system was said to have following characteristics: (A) The Itowappu merchants (and the Bakufu) bought all of the silk from the Portuguese at a time; (B) They took advantage of the monopoly position in this transaction; (C) The Japanese buyers had the right to set the price. Among these characteristics, the wholesale system (A) was the Portuguese way of negotiation even before the establishment of the system. Therefore, it has nothing to do with the Itowappu system. As for the character (C), the church documents do not prove it. Tough the point (B) is important, it was a problem of distribution among Japanese merchants after the Portuguese had sold the silk. As a result, the missionaries were not interested in this matter, and the church documents tell us almost nothing about it. Yet, one of the points which are clarified by the above documents shows that the Nagasaki Bugyo held an important role in negotiating the pancada, the price of silk, with the Portuguese.
  • 平野 綏
    原稿種別: 本文
    1972 年 37 巻 5 号 p. 451-470,531
    発行日: 1972/02/20
    公開日: 2017/08/03
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    From the early thirties to the end of the Meiji period, the raw silk industry in Suwa district in Nagano Prefecture experienced a rapid growth, and the district grew to a sericultural area extending beyond the prefectural line, with a considerable number of manufacturing establishments. In this period, there were more than 25,000 raw silk makers, but most of them were small shops with primitive equipment employing less than 10 workers. In Meiji 38th, 62 percent of larger factories (with more than 10 workers) had less than 50 laborers each. Though new factories were established every year, a number of old ones were disappearing simultaneously. Thus, the total number of factories bid not show any remarkable increase. In the biginning of the Taisho period, the number of small raw silk producers increased greatly, especially around Suwa district, because of the heavy demand abroad for raw silk. In this period, we note the transformation of industry, in which large-scale factories with more than 300 workers were making great strides, while small shops were becoming subsidiary parts of the industry.
  • 松本 康正
    原稿種別: 本文
    1972 年 37 巻 5 号 p. 471-494,531-53
    発行日: 1972/02/20
    公開日: 2017/08/03
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    There are three factors making for urbanization which began with the Industrial Revolution. They are population growth, industrialization and the rise of the middle class. Sketches were made concerning some of these factors in Manchester during the Industrial Revolution : how they stimulated and determined the process of the urban growth of the town, and what the consequences were. The population of Manchester began to increase rapidly from around 1773, when a steam-driven factory had not yet been built. What brought about the population growth in this market town was the development of the cotton trade since the seventeenth century. The introduction of the factory system based on machinery, whose effect became to be felt strongly in the nineteenth century, increased the demand for labour. The population growth of the town, however, owed mainly to the immigration from surrounding rural districts, neighbouring countries and Ireland. The immigrants who swelled the industrial town were moved by the dream of a more prosperous way of life. And they brought to the town urbanism including anonymity and heterogeneity as a way of life. While the factory system forced the labourers and the townsmen into dissynchronization of work and life, education imposed time-discipline upon children, and these aspects of life have been socialized. Two main consequences of urban growth were the development of 'Urban Problems' and the pressure upon the old political system, the Court Leet. The rapid population increase outstripped the social overhead capital such as housing, streets, etc. The Court Leet's prime concern was not to deal with the deteriorated urban environment, but to keep the peace of the town. Both the townsmen and the Court Leet took that environment for granted as part of the normal pattern of urban life, so that no radical remedy was ever taken. In the last decades of the eighteenth century, on the other hand, industrialization and the increasing burden of taxation led to demands for political reform in Manchester. Apathy of the middle class towards the Court Leet was quickened into hostility against the manorial authorities. In consequence, the balance of power was completely changed in the first election based on the Reform Act of 1832, in which the middle class won overwelmingly against the old governing class. And also in the first election of the members of the Council in 1838 they gained a sweeping victory. Thus the subsequent course of politics in Manchester has come to be determined by the middle class.
  • 上野 喬
    原稿種別: 本文
    1972 年 37 巻 5 号 p. 495-517,530-52
    発行日: 1972/02/20
    公開日: 2017/08/03
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    In summing up the activities of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group in the thirties, we can point out their conservative characters on all fields. For instance the Gorup had taken a share of about 11 per cent in the world crude oil production constantly and had enjoyed a sound financial result in this hard decade. In this essay the author sketches a short economic and business history of the Group in terms of their cartel or cooperative movements in the thirties and wants to add a short supplement to the famous International Petroleum Cartel (1952). In the middle of the twenties the world economy had been growing year by year, but things changed gradually in the petroleum industry. Among many firms the Group was the quickest to see the writing on the wall, overproduction of crude oil, and to persuade cooperation to each other. By their effort the 'Achnacarry' or 'As is' Agreement of 1928, the spirit of the most comprehensive cartel agreement in this industry, was shown. The petroleum industry consists of crude oil production, reffining, transportation and marketing. As time went on the essence of the 'Achnacary' Agreement was spread over all these fields. Without this in their integrated fields, the international petroleum cartel could not attain their purpose.With this Agreement the Big Three-Standard - NJ, Anglo-Persian and the Group - tried to limit the competition in production (Middle East and Venezuela) and in marketing (Europe artd Asia). The depressing thirties were the time of development of petrochemical industry and the time of technocrats. In petrochemical field the Group was running the top, and in this field cartels or patents had played the most important roles. Moreover cartel movements were not limited in these firms, IG Farben, ICI and Du Pont also wanted to make international and inter-industry cooperations among one another. As for technocrats the Group owed much to them. By Kessler, Cohen, De Kok and Pijzel the Group succeeded to establish MEKOG in Holland and Shell Chemical in California. Last but not least, tanker transportation has been the most important means of carrying oil from producing to consuming countries, and the Group was the biggest tanker owner oil company at that time. But even for them it was essential to keep tanker freight rates as high as possible. In 1934, after the failure of the Tankskibscontralen of Norwegian, the International Tanker Owners Association was started, and it was entirely certain that if the Majors of oil companies had not entered in, this cartel, its success would have been doubtful. In this tanker pool the Kessler plan came into being at last.
  • 石坂 昭雄
    原稿種別: 本文
    1972 年 37 巻 5 号 p. 518-520
    発行日: 1972/02/20
    公開日: 2017/08/03
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  • 原田 聖二
    原稿種別: 本文
    1972 年 37 巻 5 号 p. 520-523
    発行日: 1972/02/20
    公開日: 2017/08/03
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  • 高橋 衛
    原稿種別: 本文
    1972 年 37 巻 5 号 p. 523-526
    発行日: 1972/02/20
    公開日: 2017/08/03
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  • 原稿種別: 文献目録等
    1972 年 37 巻 5 号 p. 529-532
    発行日: 1972/02/20
    公開日: 2017/08/03
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