In contrast to a swift, revolutionary and transforming event in cotton spinning, the transition from the domestic system to the factory system in cotton weaving during the British Industrial Revolution was a slow and staggered progress. It took more than half a century from the invention of the first power-driven machinery by Edmund Cartwright in 1785 to the final victory of mechanized weaving over hand weaving in the 1840's. The slowness of the transition from hand to power was due partly to imperfections in the powerloom itself, partly to improvements in the handloom, and partly to the excessive supply of labour recruits in the cotton weaving industry. Whereas the powerloom 'did not approximate to its modern form until 1840' (Briggs and Jordan), there were many attempts to improve the handloom either by removing from the weaver's responsibility the time-consuming preparatory processes of warping and dressing, or by performing the basic motions of throwing the shuttle or winding-on the cloth beam more efficiently. The improved handloom could either retain a virtual monopoly, or at least accounted for the greater part of the cloth produced in most weaving branches until 1825.The universal adoption of the powerloom was delayed, even after its technical superiority was assured, simply because handloom labour was so cheap and plentiful. As H. J. Habakkuk maintains, 'if Labour had been scare in England, the domestic system would have contracted more rapidly than it did'. Manufacturers were naturally reluctant to invest in an imperfect machine which might easily become outmoded and rapidly depreciate in value. Further, the master manufacturers had little incentive to adopt new methods so far as they were able to evade losses involved in the factory system (e. g., machine idle during the recession) simply by contracting the employment. Due to a lack of balance between the supply of labour and the demand for it in this non-skilled trade, the handloom weavers were unable to resist the wage reductions or under-employment. This situation was worsened after 1826 when the tide of investment turned its way : from the employment of cheap labour to the mechanized mass production. The handloom weavers in the 1830's formed a reserve army of labour which was able to find work only when the factories were fully occupied. The deterioration of their economic and social state was deepened. Although the number of handloom weavers had begun to decrease in southern (urban) Lancashire in the 1820's, a substantial number of them (including adult male) clung to their dead-end occupation for another or two decades in north-east (rural) Lancashire and some remote parts of England and Scotland. In the 1840's, only after (l) Kenworthy and Bullough's invention had terminated' a process of piecemeal improvements and half-solutions of the powerloom ' (Bythell) ; (2) the growth of overseas markets had provided a powerful incentive to adopt the power-driven machinery ; and (3) the economic growth had prepared employment opportunities for rural underemployed weavers and made it feasible for them to move to urban areas, the cotton handloom weavers eventually disappeared from the British industrial scene.

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The object of this article is to analyse the Railway Mania in the middle of the nineteenth century. Our main subject concentrates on clarifying George Hudson's activities, for he was a typical man in the railway world. He was often called the " Railway King ". From this study we arrive at the following conclusions. Firstly, the unprecedented extension of the railway line was caused by furious competition among the railway companies whose principal object existed in widening their "territory" without consideration of management requirements. Secondly, behind this competition there was the double account system peculiar to railway accountancy, which made it possible to continue the severe competition. Thirdly, lease policy frequently adopted by the leading companies guaranteeing high dividends to the subsidiary companies, made the large companies' affairs go from bad to worse. Lastly, in addition to the lease policy, overcapitalization by the issue of preference shares, thought-lessly issued, heavily burdened the companies from then onwards.

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This paper tries to investigate the process by which Tatsuno shoyu (soy sauce produced in Tatsuno district) and other local shoyu (e. g. Bizen shoyu) came to dominate the Kyoto market. By the Horeki Era the shoyu brewers of Kyoto and its suburbs had supplied people in Kyoto with syoyu called jizukuri shoyu. But in the later half of 18th century, the competitors with jizukuri syoyu came into the Kyoto market. Bizen shoyu was the first to come. And Tatsno shoyu followed it a little later. Why could these local shoyu come into the Kyoto Market? In theHoreki and An-ei Era the nominal price of shoyu in the Kyoto market was very high. And the relative price of shoyu in comparison with rice was also high. It seems that brewers of these local shoyu, who had supplied local market with shoyu, tried to come into the Kyoto market under impetus from such favourable conditions. But for the protection of jizukuri shoyu, the Tokugawa Shogunate did not admit these brewers to come into the Kyoto market. As a result of their strong and continuing requests, in the 8th year of An-ei (1779) the 21 groups of takoku shoyu tonya (organized mainly by merchants of Bizen shoyu) was admitted under the direct control of jizukuri shoyu tonya. In the Bunka Era, especially Tatsuno groups of tonya had a large share in the Kyoto market. The development of Tatsuno shoyu resulted from the improvement of quality (e. g. usukuchi shoyu) and the advancement of technique in brewing (e. g. called sahei-guruma). In contrast with the remarkable development of Tatsuno shoyu, the decline of jizukuri shoyu was distinguished. Such a movement in the metropolitan market made the economic policies of the Tokugawa Shogunate fruitless.

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Through both prewar and postwar days, many studies have been published about "the Bill of Credit Associations" which was brought before the Second Imperial Diet. Accoding to the new materials which I have collected recently, there is still room for further study on the following questions. (l) There are a variety of views about the reason for the presentation of this bill, including strengthening local autonomy, lightening farmers' debt, and preventing the occurrence of social problems. The last view, among the above three. seems the most reliable. In Japan, not like in Germany, the social problem could arise without the premise of tlae growth of the working class, The man who brought in the bill intended to introduce it in abvance especially as the preventive social policy, on the basis of the new historical school economics. His intention was to prevent differentiation of peasantry and to stop the gap between rich and poor from increasing. (2) It is doubtful whether Tosuke Hirata, the drafter of the bill, adhered to the principle of Credit Associations of Schulze system. In this connection, we must consider, besides the usual views, the influence from Roscher W. G. H., the former teacher of Hirata and Kohei Sugiyama who had emphasized the necessity of credit associations since the 23rd year of Meiji (1890) when he came home from Germany. (3) There is a view that this bill was the uncritical adoption from "Gesetz betreffend die Ereverbs-und Wirtschafts-genossenschaften (1889)". But the view is not right. Hirata accepted Roscher' s Wirtschaftsentwieklungsstufen-theorie and tried to find out the pattern in the German Association Law. And he groped for the concrete image of credit associations that Japan should adopt for the present. (4) At the end of 24th year of Meiji, criticisms from all quarters attacked this bill. But that of the Agricultural Institution alone has been taken up so far. This criticism is undoubtedly convincing so far as the organization and the form of associations are concerned. But there is a more important view as to whether associations can be settled and well developed. In fact, "Tokyo Economic Magazine" and the newspapers connected with the people's party commented that associations could not be established yet. For, as a matter of fact, the conditions of the growth of credit associations are not given until the government puts them to use as means of the social polisy so as to cope with the full scale social problem at the stage of monopoly capitalism.

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