巻号一覧
41 巻, 1 号
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田代 和生原稿種別: 本文
1975 年 41 巻 1 号 p. 1-19,104-103
発行日: 1975/05/10
公開日: 2017/07/22
ジャーナル オープンアクセスTsushima (対馬), an island situated between Kyushu and south-eastern Korea, was governed by the So (宗) family throughout the Tokugawa period. Tsushima had monopoly rights to operate Japan's trade with Korea. The "official" trade, of fixed quantity and content, was managed directly by the government of Tsushima-han. For most of the seventeenth century both the the government of Tsushima-han and the privileged merchants in Tsushima who engaged in "unofficial" trade there operated "Japanese Factory" called Wakan (和館) in Pusan as well. Tsushima's chief export was silver, and the imports raw silk and ginseng. The silver export was even greater than that from Nagasaki in the period studied. The author's quantitative content analysis of the trade has been published elsewhere; here she concentrates on the institutional aspects of the trade, particularly the role and functions of motokatayu (元方役), the trade manager in the wakan from 1684 to 1711. Prior to 1684 the bulk of the "unofficial" trade was handled by Tsushima merchants on their own account, while the government of Tsushima-han was able to retain only a small amount of the "unofficial" trade for its own profit. In 1683 Tsushima-han established motokatayaku to manage the entire "unofficial" trade for the sake of han's profit, relegating the merchants to salaried positions. The group of motokatayaku was staffed by five to ten privileged merchants, who served by rotation for terms of about ten years. These officers were responsible for negotiating prices with Korean merchants, making exports (mostly in Japanese silver), and collecting the Korean goods. During the period studied here, the annual export of silver reached as high as 3,000 kan (1 kan 3.75kg). The silver used in the Korean trade was in the form of ingots called chogin (丁銀) of guaranteed purity, which were issued by the Tokugawa shogunate and circulated as money in Japan. In an effort to profit from recoinage, the shogunate debased the chogin from 80% pure to 64% in 1695, and further to 20% in 1711. The sudden devalutation shook Korean confidence in Japanese silver currency, and Korean merchants became less interested in participating in the trade. Until this time Korea had been re-refining the silver obtained from Japan, re-exporting it to China in payments for Chinese raw silk, much of which Korea in turn exported to Japan. Such integration of Japan into an international market suggests the need for a thorough re-examination of the concept of Tokugawa "isolation".抄録全体を表示PDF形式でダウンロード (1772K) -
永尾 正剛原稿種別: 本文
1975 年 41 巻 1 号 p. 20-47,103-102
発行日: 1975/05/10
公開日: 2017/07/22
ジャーナル オープンアクセスAs the transactions in rice by means of Kome-kitte (米切手) increased in volume, the year 1730 -the 15th year of Kyoho (享保)- saw the establishment of Dojima-Komekaisho (堂島米会所) in Osaka, which was a kome-kitte exchange. Rice transactions by kitte presupposing future delivery of spot rice inevitably led to issues of kamai-kitte (過米切手) which meant issuing of the kitte exceeding the amount of rice actually in being, and entered in books accounts of a great deal of otsunenmai (越年米) which meant the arrear of the delivery of spot rice till the next year. Otsunenmai was already seen to amount to a million hyo (俵) in the Kyoho era, and it rose to three million hyo by the Bunka (文化) era. The issues of Kamai-kitte were partly intended to solve financial difficulties of han (藩), fief governments, but the overissues of kome-kitte caused a vicious cycle of fall of the price of rice and a bottleneck of sales of kuramai (蔵米) which was rice sold by han at their own storehouses in Osaka, Edo, etc.. Finally there were cases of karamai-kitte (空米切手) where lawsuits were instituted for failure of delivery of spot rice. This article attemts to investigate the solution of the bottleneck of the sales of kuramai in Osaka rice market, taking Kurume-han as an example. More specifically, analysis is made of the relation between Tetsuya (手津屋), a countrytown merchant in Kurume-han, and the han government, and of business activities of Tetsuya. The government of Kurume-han, in 1809 -the sixth year of the Bunka era- carried out reorganization of the administrative structure, curtailing the scale of the staff and cutting down the number of officials, to find a way out of deficit finance by reduction of personnel expenses. In line with this policy, Tetsuya engaged in collecting land tax from the villages in the vicinity of Tanushimarumachi (田主丸町) where their head shop was located, while in Osaka they undertook to buy and resell kome-kitte issued by the government of Kurume-han for the purpose of supporting their market price. Also they laid in a stock of and resold tatemonomai (建物米), standard rice for fixing the price of rice. But this policy of Kurume-han which permitted continuation of excessive issues of Kome-kitte while making Tetsuya buy them to support the price and resell them, far from finding the way out of difficulties, drove the government into a tighter corner; for it did not fundamentally aim to check the overissues of kome-kitte through the activities of Tetsuya, but it only tried to prevent proceeds of sales of kome-kitte from falling by means of financial relationship between the han government and Tetsuya, with Tetsuya temporarily accepting the han government securities.抄録全体を表示PDF形式でダウンロード (2551K) -
有馬 達郎原稿種別: 本文
1975 年 41 巻 1 号 p. 48-58,102-101
発行日: 1975/05/10
公開日: 2017/07/22
ジャーナル オープンアクセスLenin argued on the Russian iron industry in the seventh chapter of his great work, Razvitie Kapitalizma v Rossii, as follows; the very serfdom that helped the Urals to rise to its prosperity when European capitalism was in its initial period was the very cause of the Urals' decline when capitalism was in its heyday. Emphasizing the stagnation of the iron industry he gave Russian pig-iron output in the eighteenth century; 6.5 million poods for 1718 and 9.5 million poods for 1767. We can find, however, quite different figures of output in S.G. Strumilin's Istoriia Chernoi Metallurgii v SSSR (Moscow, 1954) which gave the most reliable statistics of pig-iron production; 566,000 poods for 1718 and about 5 million poods for 1767. Lenin cited the output for 1718 from A.V. Semenov's Izuchenie Istoricheskikh Svedenii o Rossiiskoi Vneshnei Torgovle i Promyshlennosti (St. Petersburg, 1859) and Semenov got it from I.I. Golikov's Deianiia Petra Velikogo (Moscow, 1789). And when we read the questioned page of Golikov's book carefully, it becomes undoubtedly clear that 1718 was a misprint for 1778, that is to say 6.5 million poods represented the output for 1778. Lenin also cited the output for 1767 from Semenov's book mentioned above. The conspicuous difference of the output for the same year between Lenin and Strumilin was caused by Semenov's miscalculation. Both Yatsunsky and Strumilin, the notable Soviet historians, argued enthusiastically how many Russian and Soviet historians had cited these wrong outputs since publication of Semenov's book. But without a single word referring to Lenin. It seems to us, however, that the correct outputs are more consistent with Lenin's argument on the Russian iron industry and to point out his fault does not mean to injure his masterwork. Impeachment should be made against the Soviet scholars who have fallen into dogmatism and tried to conceal Lenin's fault.抄録全体を表示PDF形式でダウンロード (1057K) -
黒川 勝利原稿種別: 本文
1975 年 41 巻 1 号 p. 59-72,101
発行日: 1975/05/10
公開日: 2017/07/22
ジャーナル オープンアクセスThe purpose of this note is to analyze the situation of small white farmers in the South, especially in Mississippi, after the Civil War. (1) Broadly speaking, cotton product per acre was highest where the plantation system prevailed most and lowest where thc small white farmers had a majolity. But this relation was reversed when the natural productive capacities of the several soils occupied were taken into consideration. (2) The percentage of the tilled lands occupied by cotton was small where the small white farmers had a majority. However the proportion of white farmers engaged in the cultivation of cotton was increasing after the Civil War. (3) Another important change that had taken place in Southern agriculttlre since the Civil War was the remarkable increase of white tenants. In the South as a whole the average value of all farm property per farm was much larger in the case of the farms of white tenants than in the case of the farms of colored tenants. However, in Mississippi there was little difference between the two racial groups.抄録全体を表示PDF形式でダウンロード (1229K) -
竹岡 敬温原稿種別: 本文
1975 年 41 巻 1 号 p. 73-81
発行日: 1975/05/10
公開日: 2017/07/22
ジャーナル オープンアクセスPDF形式でダウンロード (1035K) -
作道 洋太郎原稿種別: 本文
1975 年 41 巻 1 号 p. 82-84
発行日: 1975/05/10
公開日: 2017/07/22
ジャーナル オープンアクセスPDF形式でダウンロード (376K) -
芳賀 登原稿種別: 本文
1975 年 41 巻 1 号 p. 84-87
発行日: 1975/05/10
公開日: 2017/07/22
ジャーナル オープンアクセスPDF形式でダウンロード (508K) -
三和 良一原稿種別: 本文
1975 年 41 巻 1 号 p. 87-90
発行日: 1975/05/10
公開日: 2017/07/22
ジャーナル オープンアクセスPDF形式でダウンロード (551K) -
上野 正治原稿種別: 本文
1975 年 41 巻 1 号 p. 90-93
発行日: 1975/05/10
公開日: 2017/07/22
ジャーナル オープンアクセスPDF形式でダウンロード (511K) -
大野 英二原稿種別: 本文
1975 年 41 巻 1 号 p. 93-95
発行日: 1975/05/10
公開日: 2017/07/22
ジャーナル オープンアクセスPDF形式でダウンロード (384K) -
吉田 静一原稿種別: 本文
1975 年 41 巻 1 号 p. 95-98
発行日: 1975/05/10
公開日: 2017/07/22
ジャーナル オープンアクセスPDF形式でダウンロード (469K) -
原稿種別: 文献目録等
1975 年 41 巻 1 号 p. 101-104
発行日: 1975/05/10
公開日: 2017/07/22
ジャーナル オープンアクセスPDF形式でダウンロード (223K)
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