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Volume 42 (1976)
- Issue 6 Pages 565-
- Issue 5 Pages 463-
- Issue 4 Pages 341-
- Issue 3 Pages 235-
- Issue 2 Pages 123-
- Issue 1 Pages 1-
Volume 42, Issue 4
Displaying 1-9 of 9 articles from this issue
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HIROYA AKIMOTOArticle type: Article
1977 Volume 42 Issue 4 Pages 341-363,462
Published: February 28, 1977
Released on J-STAGE: November 29, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSThis article is a research into the han finance and its Policy of the Mid-nineteenth century Choshu. Although much work has been done, no quantitative study has made a significant contribution to our accurate understanding of this topic. This paper will, first, clarify problems of the data which preceding works depended on and point out some misunderstandings resulting from them, and then show new data for discussion As is well known the government of Hagi han kept many records of the taxes and other very detailed imformations about the finance toward the end of the Tokugawa period. These records include Onezumicho(1821), Fusaidan(1840), Shinchukengi (1842), Chushinan(1842) and others. The results estimated by these data show another explanation of financial conditions in Choshu and introduce us a different understanding of the han economic policy from those based on the old data. While it has been noted and accepted that the financial condition of Hagi han was unbalanced, which inevitably brought the Tempo-reformation in the han to improve the financial stringency and to rebuild the han economy, the new data will not. support this received version. The writer will show that the han kept a balanced finance, that is, an annual revenues could meet the working costs and extraordinary expenditures. It could cover even the financial investment mainly in thc land reclamation before 1800 and hozogin (asset as a form of money) in the nineteenth century. It is true that the han debt to Osaka merchants increased so rapidly that it reached the level threetimes as much as annual revenues at Tempo era. Needless to say, the aim of the Tempo-reformation was to negotiate for the reduction of interest rate and puting off the repayment of the principals. But our estimation shows that the sum total of the debt was almost as much as that of assets of the land and the money mentioned above. It must be emphasized that the han could have paid the debt to Osaka by those assets. But they left the assets untouched and made all effort to reduce the rate of interest and to put off the repayment of the principals in the Tempo-reformation.View full abstractDownload PDF (2008K) -
SATORU TAJIMAArticle type: Article
1977 Volume 42 Issue 4 Pages 364-392,461-46
Published: February 28, 1977
Released on J-STAGE: November 29, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSThis article attempts to elucidate the development of small-scale commodity producers in the light of agricultural structure by analyzing managerial performance of a family, `Nakajima', who belonged to the upper peasantry at Agatsuma gun in Gumma ken. The business activities of the family were concentrated on purchase of cocoons, spinning of silk yarn, and selling of the yarn. Distinct landlord characteristics cannot be found in their management. Moreover the extent of their manufacturing activity was limited by both a large proportion the raw material occupied and low productivity of a hand reeling silk manufacturer, of which the former meant that their management was always very vulnerable to fluctuations in the market. The first point to be made clear of the Nakajima family's management is the way they gathered cocoons. They did not get them through Verlagssystem; rather the cocoons they bought were those produced by peasants who had not direct contact with the Nakajimas. This fact shows a general development of peasants industry in this area. The next point observed is the way they provided themselves with the money to purchase the cocoons with. They seldom borrowed the money from outside, which may have been due to their insufficient ability to secure their creditor on their property. Thus the amount of money available to purchase cocoons depended largely on the sale of silk yarn. When the money for the yarn was paid smoothly by the local merchants, then they could buy cocoons without difficulty, but immediately when the payment was delayed, they found themselves short of money and had difficulty purchasing cocoons in good time. So though their manufacturing business saw expansion both in scale and profit up to 1866, it gradually declined afterwards on account of delay of payments for their silk yarn by the local merchants. Such characteristics of the upper peasantry as were shown in the case of the Nakajimas cannot be explained simply by the development of commodity production in this area. It is necessary to examine the nature of their management and change of its content in terms of their monetary fund. With this in view, the writer intends to trace the managerial performance of one of thc upper peasants in those days.View full abstractDownload PDF (2544K) -
HARUHITO TAKEDAArticle type: Article
1977 Volume 42 Issue 4 Pages 393-420,460-45
Published: February 28, 1977
Released on J-STAGE: November 29, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSDuring the depression after the world war I, the `Big 5 Japanese Copper Companies' (Furukawa, Sumitomo, Mitsubishi, Kuhara, and Fujita)came to produce about 95 percent of the copper output in Japan. This high concentration of copper output resulted from ore trade system (baiko-system)peculiar to Japan. In 1910s, big mines under the control of these ` Big 5' got to buy ores from smaller mines near by, and gradually expanded their own smelters and refineries. The invitation of Pyrite Smelting at the Kosaka Mine in 1900 was, in terms of productive capacity, the pre-condition for the ore trade system to develop. With the spread of Pyrite Smelting, the smelting furnace became more enormous, and smelting productivity rose higher. This reduced the smelting cost and necessitated a huge amount of fixed capital, which made it very difficult for the smaller mines to keep up their own smelters, and caused them to sell their ores to big smelters. In this process, there lay several factors which made ore trade system grow more and more: reilways were nationalized in 1907, which made freight much less expensive; air pollution from smoke posed a severe social problem; a system of taxation was reformed ; and so forth. A new business relation in ore trade, that is a loan advance from smelters to smaller mines, made the control of big smelters of big smelters over smaller ones muchstronger. Thus ore trade rapidly expanded in 1910s. During the world War I, the amount of copper ores processed at the main refineries increased by about 700,000 tons, 70 percent of which was bought from smaller mines near by Though copper output decreased greatly after the war, the ore trade did not show a proportionate decline; for smelting and refining capitals intended to save elasticity of copper output by adjusting ore purchase. So in 1929, the main smelters and refineries in Japan possessed by the `Big 5 Companies' depended for half of their ores on ore purchase from smaller miners. As a result, while the ` Big 5 Copper Companies' could concentrate no more than 70 percent of copper ores output, they concentrated 95 percent of copper output because of the ore trade system. The monopoly of the copper trade was secured on the basis of the ore trade system.View full abstractDownload PDF (2681K) -
KATSUTOSHI KUROKAWAArticle type: Article
1977 Volume 42 Issue 4 Pages 421-439,459-45
Published: February 28, 1977
Released on J-STAGE: November 29, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSThe purpose of this note is to analyze the development of the Yazoo Mississippi Delta which was the most powerful plantation area in the South in the first half of the twentieth century. (1) The agriculture of the Delta was hard hit by the Civil War. For example, the farm acreage in the Delta's four counties decreased from 748,000 acres in 1860 to 345,000 acres in 1870. The soil and climate conditions of the Delta were, however, so favorable for cotton raising that the Negroes began flocking into the Delta at the end of the 1860's and Negro population of the Delta increased rapidly. Therefore, the restoration and development of the Delta after the Civil War was very rapid. (2) By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Delta became the most important plantation area of the South. Of the 87,370 farmers in the Delta in 1930, 95 percent were tenants and 83 percent were Negro. These percentages were probably higher than those in any other area of the South. (3) The great part of the Negro farmers in the Delta were tenants and were subject to only a few but powerful planters. Of the 72,834 Negro farmers in the Delta, lessthan 2,000 were owner farmers. According the 1930 census, however, the average value of farm property per farm of them was considerably larger than that of all the Negro owner farmers of the South.View full abstractDownload PDF (1659K) -
shiro SugiharaArticle type: Article
1977 Volume 42 Issue 4 Pages 440-448
Published: February 28, 1977
Released on J-STAGE: November 29, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSDownload PDF (907K) -
Masao HamabayashiArticle type: Article
1977 Volume 42 Issue 4 Pages 449-451
Published: February 28, 1977
Released on J-STAGE: November 29, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSDownload PDF (351K) -
Eisaburo KogaArticle type: Article
1977 Volume 42 Issue 4 Pages 451-454
Published: February 28, 1977
Released on J-STAGE: November 29, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSDownload PDF (489K) -
Yasuzo HorieArticle type: Article
1977 Volume 42 Issue 4 Pages 454-456
Published: February 28, 1977
Released on J-STAGE: November 29, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSDownload PDF (392K) -
Article type: Bibliography
1977 Volume 42 Issue 4 Pages 458-462
Published: February 28, 1977
Released on J-STAGE: November 29, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSDownload PDF (234K)
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