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Volume 45 (1979)
- Issue 6 Pages 601-
- Issue 5 Pages 483-
- Issue 4 Pages 357-
- Issue 3 Pages 233-
- Issue 2 Pages 113-
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Volume 45, Issue 5
Displaying 1-5 of 5 articles from this issue
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KENJI KIKEArticle type: Article
1980 Volume 45 Issue 5 Pages 483-510,600-59
Published: February 29, 1980
Released on J-STAGE: July 15, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSBusiness corporations in Asian countries, particularly in India were managed and controlled through Managing Agency System. But nature of this system has still remained in the vague. Most scholars argue that this institution emerged and grew in order to overcome shortages of entrepreneurs, managerial talents, financial resources and technology in these countries. Reviewing critically such arguement, we propose a fresh hypothesis that the substance of this system is to ensure the entrepreneurs the hereditary control of management and prior claim to profit of their concerns. Entrepreneurs here do not intend to manage their concerns directly. Rather they enter into a contract of Managing Agency Agreement with the very company which they promote and nurse. They carefully ensure their hereditary control and prior claim to profit by regulating a long tenure of management and a high piece-rate commission as their remuneration in these agreements. In practice, it was extremely difficult for any one to modify the terms inserted by them. Therefore, by virtue of the Agency Agreement, entrepreneurs could not only maintain the control of management but also absorb the considerable portion of profit for long time with far less share-holding. Especially, before the amendment of Indian Company Law in 1936, protective share-holding could be astonishingly small in case of companies managed by first-class entrepreneurs. Concentration movement through such a system presents quite a unique feature. Entrepreneurs promote companies one by one and they appoint themselves as the Managing Agents of their companies. Repeating the same process, they begin to concentrate a number of companies. Now they are made into a holding company or apex institution of big houses without protective share-holding of the subsidiary. In India, by the First World War some big houses like Andrew Yule, Bird・Heilger etc., were firmly established in this way. In fact, they concentrated a large number of companies particularly in the fields of tea, coal, jute and light railway. These fields were rather export-oriented ones which were characteristic to the typical British big houses. In striking contrast to them, Tata, this Indian big house controlled rather import-substituting concerns like cotton mills, iron and steel, chemicals and electric power. In Malay Peninsula, a few Europian big houses like Guthrie and Harrisons & Crosfield, were commanding numerous rubber companies through the same institution. The critical analysis of such an important system may produce some new directions to Asian economic studies.View full abstractDownload PDF (2932K) -
SHOJI ITOArticle type: Article
1980 Volume 45 Issue 5 Pages 511-536,599-59
Published: February 29, 1980
Released on J-STAGE: July 15, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSMost of the Indian zaibatstu, the owners of the larger industrial houses of present day India belong, community-wise, to the Marwaris, the Gujerati-Banyas, or the Parsis. This article examines the nature of business activity and institution of each of these three major business communities just before and after the time of their entry into modern industrial enterprises, i.e., around the middle of the 19th century in the case of the Parsis and the Gujerati-Banyas and at the turn of the present century in the case of the Marwaris. The main purpose of this article is to find out that these communities shared some common features when they entered the modern industrial fields in spite that they did so, as is well known, at different times and through different paths. The conclusions are as follow; Firstly, the fact that most of the owners of the present day Indian zaibatsu belong to a very few particular business cnmmunities originates from the historical facts that only the large scale merchant capitalists were in a position to start modern industry in the backward and colonial economy and that a few business communities dominated the industrial fields right from the beginning of the Indian modern industrial capitalism. Secondly, the success as prominent merchant class by the particular communities, especially the Marwaris and the Chettiars, and perhaps all the other successful business communities, was not a little due to existence of some kind or other of the institutions that accomodated unsparingly the needs and wants of their own communities' members. Thirdly, those merchants wgre no doubt basically compradors. But the few Parsis and Marwaris that first ventured in modern industry had been of less comprador nature: They had been engaged in such relatively independent business as foreign trade on their own account, or speculation on large scale. This article, en Passant, notes that absorption and amalgamation movement was not so unimportant a factor, as is usually argued, for bringing forth the larger managing agency houses so far as the cotton textile industry of Bombay, the strong-hold of Indian capitalists, during the nineteenth century is concerned. There occurred very many failures of the cotton mills then, which certainly helped some of the mnaging agency houses to emerge as dominant ones.View full abstractDownload PDF (2199K) -
HIDEKI NAKAIArticle type: Article
1980 Volume 45 Issue 5 Pages 537-564,598-59
Published: February 29, 1980
Released on J-STAGE: July 15, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSThe Shanghai Machine Weaving Mill started operation in 1890 after a long thirteen year gestation period, which seems to show an unfortunate beginning of the Chinese cotton industry. The cotton mills amounted to thirty-one including foreigner-owned ones until the First World War, but almost all fell into a long slump in business. It is usually said that their failure was due to the foreign imperialism and inner feudalism. But facts do not necessarily support such a common view to the best of the author's investigation. Rather the determining point seems to have been whether the entrepreneurs could successfully overcome the obstacles, especially hua-kuei sha-chien (花貴紗賊 simultaneous rise of price of raw cotton together with fall of that of yarn) as a characteristic condition of the Chinese market. In this paper the author attempts to shed light upon the managerial aspects of the native-owned mills with reference to the attitude toward the conditions of market. Main sources are contemporary nespapers and observations, and Business Reports of Dah Sun Cotton Mill (大生紗廠). Some basic facts found are as follows. Firstly even if the first mill had been erected earlier without the monopoly right, potential possibility of development of the Chinese cotton industry could not have been estimated too much especially because of their extremely poor entrepreneurship. Secondly the phenominon of hua-kuei sha-chien frequently occurred with a socio-economic mechanism peculiar to that time and place. Thirdly there were three types of entrepreneurs: bureaucrats, merchants, and modern shen-shang (紳商). While the first two failed in getting over that barrier through their very bureaucratic and speculative management, the last, as typically in the case of Dah Sun, could win success with the positive policy of buying raw cotton en masse cheaply in every crop season. It is the traditional factors, his social prestige and good qualities as the traditional elite and the regular payment of kuan-li (官利) that made it possible for him to raise much money and adopt such a positive policy. Lastly the success of Dah Sun seems to be due to such an excellent entrepreneurship rather than the condition of location which has usually been emphasized. At least it is certain that the potential possibility of their industrial development did depend upon the supply of the high entrepreneurship.View full abstractDownload PDF (2671K) -
NAOSUKE TAKAMURAArticle type: Article
1980 Volume 45 Issue 5 Pages 565-594,597-59
Published: February 29, 1980
Released on J-STAGE: July 15, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSAfter the First World War, Japanese cotton spinning companies competed to hold mills in China. As a result, the Japanese spinning industry took a leading part in the export of private capital to China. The purpose of this paper is to inquire into the formation of the Japanese cotton spinning industry in China during the period leading to the First World War, and to reveal its characteristics. With Japan's winning of the right to holding industries in foreign settlements in China by the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, two spinning companies were founded in China, though both were dissolved before spinning mills were constructed. The direct reason was that the Chinese Government attempted a taxation on manufacturing goods. However, there were more important reasons. First, the international status of Japan still lacked in stability in China. Second, wages were higher there than in Japan. Third, Japanese trading companies were not powerful enough to deal with raw cotton and cotton yarn. In the 1900's, some changes appeared. First, the North China Affair and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance raised the status of Japan in China. Second, wage levels in Japan gradually became higher than in China. Third, Japanese trading companies ceased from relying upon comprador and strengthened their business organizations. With these changes in the background, the Mitsuibussan Company, which accepted a part of capital of the Shanghai Cotton Spinning Co., Ltd. in 1902, undertook the management as its agent. The Naigai Wata, Co., Ltd. built a spinning mill in Shanghai and started operation in 1911. Both companies succeeded in management. Thus in the period prior to the First World War, the Japanese spinning industry in China was promoted by these trading companies, and Japanese spinning companies had little intention to hold mills in China. The reason was that production costs of cotton yarn were still higher in China, because productivity was lower in China, though wage levels had already become lower by then. Therefore, trading companies made up for these disadvantages by using their own trading organizations which dealt with raw cotton and cotton yarn. 0n the other hand, spinning companies, which did not have such advantages, rather sought a profit by increasing the export of cotton yarn to China. It was after the period when production costs sharply increased through the First World War that Japanese spinning companies began to hold mills in China.View full abstractDownload PDF (2670K) -
Article type: Bibliography
1980 Volume 45 Issue 5 Pages 596-600
Published: February 29, 1980
Released on J-STAGE: July 15, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSDownload PDF (279K)
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