The purpose of this paper is to clarify the method by which Japan introduced foreign capital during the period of industrialization. During this period the introduction of foreign capital into Japan was characterized by the following three aspects : (1) shift from of the period during which new technology and knowledge were introduced i.e. shokusan kogyo ki (the period of promotion of industrial activities, 1870-1885) to the period of capital introduction which started after the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) ; (2) foreign capital was introduced mostly through the issue of national bonds while direct investment by foreigners were rare ; (3) foreign capital was mostly used for the administration of the colonies. These three chracteristics are deeply related to the fact that in Japan the industrial revolution proceeded simultaneously with the formation of world imperialism. Since under the international conditions of those days, the import of foreign capital was directly linked with the danger of being colonized or semicolonized, the goverment of Japan, in contrast with Russia and Italy, did not welcome the introduction of foreign capital. By 1984, when Japan obtained the revision of the uneaqual treaty with the United Kingdom and thus became able to establish diplomatic relations on an equal footing with the weatern countries, the government of Japan had prohibited the import of foreign capital. (Though from the last years of the Edo period until the first years of Meiji, a considerable amount of foreign capital had activly been introduced, after 1881 its introduction was completely prohibited.) Following the Sino-Japanese War, capital became scarce as economic development accelerated. Further, the preparation of the Russo-Japanese War required large amount of expenses. Such financtal difficulties made both the bourgeaisie and the bureaucrats eager to obtain foreign capital. However at this time, the government believed that disorderly import of foreign capital by Japanese capitalists could be harmful. The government intended to regulate and control the import of foreign capital. Kentaro Kaneko, a leading bureaucrat, thought that the government should establish a bank which could introduce foreign capital and invest it in projects deemed indispensable for the industrialization. He also believed that the bank could prevent Japanese companies from being dominated by foreign capital. On the basis of Kaneko's plan, the Industrial Bank of Japan was established in 1900. As the project of introducing foreign capital from Morgan & Co. failed, the financial situation of this bank became shaky. Meanwhile, the government adopted the gold standard in 1899, thus facilitating the inflow of foreign capital. Following the adoption of the gold standard, the government began to raise funds from foreign countries. At that time the government tried to raise funds directly on the London market, without the assistance of the trading companies or banks which had branches in Japan. After having been granted the privitedge to handle foreign loans, the Yokohama Specie Bank developed its activities under the protection of the government. In this way, by giving special protection to the Yokohama Specie Bank, Japan suceeded in keeping independence from the foreign trading companies and banks. Kentaro Kaneko and his partners wanted to make the Industrial Bank of Japan the exclusive importer of foreign capital, but this plan failed because of the opposition of the Yokohama Specie Bank. However, with the law of 1905, the Industrial Bank of Japan was granted the exclusive right to handle loans by local governments and private debentures. As a result, around 1905, the system of introduction of foreign capital through the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Industrial Bank of Jaban was firmly established.

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In the Showa Depression, the State-owned Yawata Iron Works showed a loss, but it recovered soon and Yawata's bureaucrats carried out a scheme of merging Yawata with major private firms (seitetsu godo). Why did Yawata's bureaucrats carry out it in spite of the recovery from the Depression ? The aim of this paper is to analyze how Yawata recovered from it and to suggest the attitude of Yawata's bureaucrats towards the merger movement. The following facts were found out. (1) Yawata made gross profits in 1932 as much as in a level of the pre-Depression period. The main factor of the recovery was a decline in the manufacturing cost. (2) A fall in the materials and fuel cost contributed most to the decline in the manufacturing cost. (3) The fall in the materials and fuel cost was due to both an increase in its productivity through the rationalization program and a decline in materials and fuel prices. These facts suggest that Yawata's bureaucrats did not carry out the scheme of the merger in urgent need of reducing the manufacturing cost. To clarify further why Yawata's bureaucrats thought that it was necessary to realize the scheme of it, we need to examine the decision-making process of Yawata towards the merger.

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La theorie de H. Pirenne a longtemps determine l'orientation des recherches sur la draperie medievale des Pays-Bas meridionaux. Elle consiste essentiellement a opposer une draperie urbaine des XII-XIIIe siecles a une draperie rurale des XIVe-XVe siecles. La premiere, prospere au debut grace aux activites des marchands-entrepreneurs, importateurs de la laine, distributeurs du travail aux artisans et exportateurs des draps, aurait du decliner a cause des contraintes corporatives croissantes et de la diminution d'approvisionnement en laine anglaise, permettant ainsi que la seconde vienne occuper une place primor- diale beneficiant d'une liberte des activites economiques et utilisant principalement de la laine espagnole. Depuis les annees 1950, les historiens, sur la base de nombreuses etudes par ville ou par region, accumulent de nouvelles connaissances contredisant le schema pirennien. (1) On constate de plus en plus une diversite des laines tant sur le plan de leur provenance que de leur qualite. Les sources de la draperie urbaine montrent que la laine anglaise n'est pas exclusive aux XIIe-XIIIe siecles, ni inexistante aux XIVe-XVe siecles. Quant a la laine locale, l'etude de l'elevage des campagnes a atteste son utilisation importante. (2) Le role des "marchands-entrepreneurs" dans la draperie urbaine a ete reduit par la constatation que la sphere de leurs affaires se limite au commerce et que les artisans organisent la fabrication des draps. Par consequent la chute des "marchands-entrepreneurs" ne conduirait pas a la ruine de la draperie urbaine. (3) L'image de l'industrie rurale s'est sensiblement modifiee. D'abord, plusieurs preuves de son existence des le haut moyen age ont ete apportees. Ensuite, les travaux sur l'industrie rurale ont demontre qu'elle partage avec l'industrie urbaine la tendance a s'organiser corporativement lors du retrecissement de ses debouches. (4) On envisage aujourd'hui les effets des reglementations corporatives sur la draperie urbaine d'un nouveau point de vue. Elles auraient, selon de recents travaux sur les metiers, permis aux secteurs industriels concurrences de s'adapter souplement aux circonstances changeantes. Ces resultats permettent die souligner, contre Pirenne, une complementarite des industries urbaines et rurales. Pour le moyen age, quelques historiens envisagent cette complementarite comme une specialisation de la draperie urbaine dans la fabrication des produits de luxe pour les Pays-Bas a cote d'une orientation de la draperie rurale vers l'exportation des tissus de moindre qualite. Pour finir on remarquera que les points de vue pris en consideration par le present article, font partie des nouvelles tendances chez les historiens economistes en train de se liberer de la conception dichotomique "villes-campagnes".

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It has been proved that there were a lot of land alienations among the peasantry in medieval England. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the land alienation and the peasant family, through analizing 'Carte Nativorum' of the Peterborough Abbey. In this record complied in the fourteenth century, we find about 500 charters concerning the land alienation among the peasantry, of wich 50 are related to the intra-familial land transfers. The custom of inheritance among the peasantry is primogeniture, which was enforeced by the lord. The lands acquired by charters were distinguished from the patrimonial properties which were subject to primogeniture, and the alienation of them were comparatively free. In most cases the peasants gave most of them to their children who had not been allowed to inherit the patrimonial properties, while they were alive. Not only sons but also daughters got such lands. The lands got by this means were nomally quite little. Occasionally some of them accumulated more lands by purchase and became well-to-do, but it seems that a majority were near the cottars. Many of them got married and had their families on the bases of these little holdings. In conclusion the custom of primogeniture does not necessarily mean that the only one son inherited the whole of his parent's land. The land alienation among the peasantry seems to play an important role in maintaining the custom of primogeniture. Since in most cases the land acquire by purchase was not always added to the patrimonial property and was distributed among the children, the existence of the land market did not necessarily result in the social differentiation in the peasantry.

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