A problem of land speculation is one of the important studies in history of American land policy. Since Frederick J.Turner considered it, the land problem has been treated as one of basic elements which decided a course of development of American society. Namely according to Turner, the source of American Democracy was due to "free land" stretching in the West. He thought American people could easily get their home and chance of economic success there. But recent studies of land speculation make clear that "free land" was scarce there because of land speculation. Then the problem of it compels us to reconsider the image of course of development of American Society. This article also treats it from the point of view. The object of it, however, is not of speculation of public land but of Indian "reserve". The Federal Government had been occupied with Indian policy as one of the most important political subjects and enacted various laws under the intention of encouraging friendship and peace with Indians. The Government also enforced policy of granting "reserve" to individual Indians with the object of civilizing them. The holders of "reserve" were restricted to sell by Indian treaties. But gradually it became regarded as the object of land speculation. It was the Indian traders that executed the leading role to it. They aimed at getting promising "reserve" in conspiracy with the Indian agent who had extensive power to Indian trade. It was the policies providing cattle, agricultural implement, supply, and money in lieu of their land cession that they could do so. Consequently, Indian was good client having fund for them. They supplied a large quantity of goods in credit and could get huge profits and they reinvested thier profits in Indian "reserve" and so on. Meanwhile, Indians fell into debt to Indian traders and in return for it, they had to cede their lands to the Government and to settle west of the Mississippi. After all, what I want to say is that Federal Indian policy was system of encouraging land speculation and plundering Indian land by Indian traders.

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Under the British rule India had a large amount of export surplus. It was undoubtedly the result of considerable deficit in her invisible trade, which was regarded by Indian nationalist as "economic drain" from India. And this deficit was partly attributed to the payment of so-called Home Charges and other charges to England on public account. The purpose of this article is to make clear the amount and method of India's public payment to England under the East India Company's trading activities. After 1814 the Company's accounts of the commercial and territorial branches were separately kept, the latter branch being India's public finance. Therefore it is not impossible to accurately estimate the amount of India's territorial charges paid in England, and to analysis by what means the Company made remittance to England. By investigating all the components of the "Home Charges" and other items paid in England between 1814-1833, it is concluded that India's public payment to England would be amounted to near 3 million pounds a year, about a half of which was consisted of military expenditure and various charges connected with it. Next, what was the Company's method of the territorial remittance to England? It was not made independently of their trading activities. In the Company's Charter of 1813 it was prescribed that the sum equal to payment at home on account of Indian territory should be applied in India to "investment" i.e. export trade to England. In fact, according to our examination of the Company's account between the commercial and territorial branches, the Company generally made remittance to England through their "investment". At this period the Company's export trade from India, however, was not as profitable as one from China, in which Chinese tea was lucrative merchandies for the Company. Consequently the Company made remittance partly by way of China, but in case of the remittance to China from India the Company considerably relied on private traders. The importance of China trade in the Company's remittance to England from India did not decrease during this period. This method of the remittance to England on public account continued till 1833, when a new Charter Act depriving the Company of trading activities was enacted. Thus the Company was compelled to make remittance through private trading activities after this period.

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Yoshimuraya is Yokohama silk merchants originally from Joshu, who grew rapidly following 1862 when they came from Omama-machi, Yamada-gun, kozuke-no-kuni (now Omama-machi, Yamada-gun, Gunma Prefecture) to Benten-dori (now Naka-ku), Yokohama. Yoshimuraya played a significant role in silk export in the early Meiji period. In 1876, for instance, they accounted for some 15 percent of total Japanese silk exports. Yoshimuraya was one of the big silk merchants who dominated domestic distribution of silk and its sale to foreign merchants. The analysis of Yoshimuraya's management would help clarify how the oligopolistic silk export system-the so-called "Uriko-misho Taisei"-was established in the latter half of the 1880's. Of the question of Yokohama silk merchants in early Meiji only few studies have been made. There have been no other scholarly works than Takashi Ishii's "Shoki Yokohama Boeki Shonin no Sonzai Keitai" in Yokohama Shiritsu Daigaku Kiyo (Yokohama City University Review) and Fukuju Unno's article in Yokohama Shishi (The History of the City of Yokohama), vol. III, part I. These studies, however, do not necessarily examine every aspect of silk export in early Meiji. Ishii examined Koshuya, but Koshuya wasa small trading merchant who gradually declined after 1870. There were also a different type of merchants from representative silk merchants such as Yoshimuraya, Kameya and Nozawaya. Unno made it clear that the "Urikomisho Taisei" was established in the latter half of the 1880's, but for lack of source material he was unable to examine the actual state of the big merchants. In this paper I intend to throw light on the hitherto unknown aspect of the big merchants, by analyzing the management of Yoshimuraya. On Yoshimuraya's growth in the Bakumatsu period I have already made research and read a paper at the 35th Convention of the Chihoshi Kenkyu Kyogikai in October 1984. The paper, developed and elaborated since then, will be published in the report of the convention. The present paper is a sequel to it and examines the management of Yoshimuraya during 1868-1872. This paper consists of three parts: 1) monopoly policies of various han and Yoshimuraya; 2) the Franco-Prussian War and Yoshimuraya; and 3) decreased demand for Joshu silk and Yoshimuraya. Part 1 examines how Yoshimuraya responded to local monopoly in silk carried out by various han in 1869. Part 2 looks into the influence of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 upon the Yokohama silk market and examines Yoshimuraya's response to it. Part 3 analyzes the movements of the Yokohama silk market from the end of the Franco-Prussian War to 1872 and examines the management of Yoshimuraya during the period, especially focusing attention on the relations of the rapidly decreased demand for Joshu silk following the end of war with Yoshimuraya's management. The above examination in three parts has thrown light on how big merchants tided over the great depression in early Meiji. It has also made it clear that after the Franco-Prussian War severe competition for better quality silk arose among a limited number of big silk merchants. It is my assumption that such competition eventually led to the establishment of the "Urikomisho Taisei" by Kameya and Nozawaya. But the question after 1873 requires further examination.

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