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Volume 51 (1985)
- Issue 6 Pages 705-
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Volume 51, Issue 6
Displaying 1-7 of 7 articles from this issue
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KANJI ISHIIArticle type: Article
1986 Volume 51 Issue 6 Pages 705-719,878
Published: March 25, 1986
Released on J-STAGE: July 08, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSOne of the characteristics of Japanese capitalism before the end of the second world war lies in the possession of the colonies such as Korea, Formosa, and so on. The Purpose of this special issue is to investigate the history of Japanese colonies during the 1910s and 1920s in connection with the development of Japanese capitalism. The basic colonial policy of Japanese government at that time was "the policy of assimilation" which was similar to that of French government. Japanese government adopted such a policy in order to prevent the nationalistic movements in colonies and facilitate the economic activities of Japanese colonists. However, this policy strengthened the antipathy of colonial people against the Japanese, and led Japanese people to lose sensibility to recognize and accept other races as they are.View full abstractDownload PDF (1506K) -
FUMIO KANEKOArticle type: Article
1986 Volume 51 Issue 6 Pages 720-767,878-87
Published: March 25, 1986
Released on J-STAGE: July 08, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSFrom the end of World War I to 1920, Japanese investments in colonized Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria increased rapidly. The purpose of this article is to clarify the actual conditions of these investments, and in particular those made by medium- and small-sized enterprises. This purpose has two implications. On the one hand, by paying attention to the medium- and small-sized enterprises that advanced into the colonies, the article attempts to fill in the gap in the studies in this field, because most of the studies available on Japanese colonial investments in the period concerned have dealt primarily with the investments by large enterprises, such as state enterprises and those belonging to zaibatsu groups, and have thus failed to clarify the multilayered composition of enterprises in the colonies. On the other hand, the article is also meant to make a contribution to the study on Japanese emigration. The reason for this is as follows. In the theory of colonial policy, colonies are classified into two types, the settlement colonies and the investment colonies; but the Japanese colonies had the features of the two types. Given this fact, therefore, an analysis of minor enterprises in the Japanese colonies is closely related to an inquiry into the emigration of medium and small businessmen. This article carries out an analysis from the following three viewpoints: 1) comparison of Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria with each other; 2) clarification of the place which medium- and small-sized Japanese enterprises occupied in the economies of the three coolnies; and 3) clarification the interrelationship between colonial investments and emigration. The major conclusions reached are as follows. It was in Manchuria that minor enterprises made their investments most actively and speculatively, with their investments in Korea following next. Most of the investment funds were not raised in Japan but in the colonies themselves, and most of the medium- and small-sized enterprises that were established in the period under discussion were established by those who had emigrated to the colonies in the earlier period. This means that the increase in colonial investments toward the end of the 1910s was not accompanied by a corresponding increase in Japanese emigrants. Japanese enterprises' control over the local colonial economy was most extensive in Korea, while in Manchuria they were met with very strong counterbalancing power of indigenous Chinese enterprises. Consequently, when medium- and small-sized Japanese enterprises in the colonies were hit by business depression following the crisis of 1920, those operative in Manchuria, where many of them were speculative and were met with strong counterbalancing power of indigenous enterprises, suffered most seriously.View full abstractDownload PDF (3599K) -
SHIN-ICHI TANAKAArticle type: Article
1986 Volume 51 Issue 6 Pages 768-798,877-87
Published: March 25, 1986
Released on J-STAGE: July 08, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSIt is well known that there were three kinds of tenancy custom by which landlords collected rents toward the end of the 1920s or about 1930. Those were J<eon>^^^-g-jo (定租), Ta-jo (打租), and Jib-jo (執租). Though it has been every so often explained that those had remained unchanged since the Li Dynasty, it is a question. There were two kinds of tenancy custom by which landlords collected rents in the latest period of the Li Dynasty. One was called Ta-jag (打作) by which landlord shared the produce of the fields equally. The other was called Do-ji (賭地) by which one third of the produce went to landload. On paddy fields in the southern district of Korea, many landlords had been collecting rents by Do-ji. Peasants bore land taxes; however, Do-ji was more profitable for them than Ta-jag. Soon after Imperialist Japan annexed Korea in 1910, Do-ji rapidly came to extinction. So Do-ji disappeared toward the latter half of the 1910s, in place of Do-ji newly Jib-jo emerged, by which landlord looked over the standing crops and more than 50 percent of the produce went to landlord. Therefore, Jib-jo is not the same as Do-ji. Rice harvested in Korea was in quantity transported to Japan. It was important for Imperialist Japan to import Korean rice, most of which was the improved sort. In 1912 the improved sort was cropped 3 percent of total paddy fields. As the improved sort was clearing the paddy fields of the conventional sort for the 1910s, the cropping of the improved sort amounted to 62 percent of total paddy fields in 1921. Though the significance of the improvement has often been given large emphasis, it is questionable. Much water was essential to the improved sort. Since the paddy fields which had irrigation facilities were few in Korea, the improved sort didn't have much effect. It was necessary to sellect the improved sort wihch was fit for cropping on the paddy fields without watering. As a means of settling this trouble, the Rice Production Increase Plan had to be carried out.View full abstractDownload PDF (2816K) -
YASUTAKA TAKAHASHIArticle type: Article
1986 Volume 51 Issue 6 Pages 799-842,876-87
Published: March 25, 1986
Released on J-STAGE: July 08, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESS1. Through both of the construction of infrastructures in Formosa and the protectson policy of sugar by the Government-General of Formosa, the sugar industry in Formosa started in the 1910's. Since then it developed. Formosa sugar drove out Java sugar from the Japanese market. The most important part of Formosa trades was the sugar export to Japan. One of the large parts of Japanese capital export was applied to Formosa sugar industry. New sugar manufactories drove out old ones. 2. As Formosa and European entrepreneurs had declined by 1916, Japanese-sugar corporations gradually grew larger with mergers. At the same time they became multilateral and made inroads into other foreign countries, such as Java, China, Manchuria, and Korea. This business was controlled by five Japanese sugar dealers. They were Mitsui-Bussan, Suzuki-Shoten, Kobei Abe, Masu-da-Ya and Iwasaki-Shogyo. The railway, which was opened from north to south in 1908, organized the Formosa market along the rail. The most important goods by rail were sugar and coal. 3. After the gorden age in 1916-1920, the Formosa sugar industry was at the bottom of depression to 1935. A sugar can agriculture was challenged by a rice crop one. The labor cost increased. Here some sugar dealers, Masuda-Ya and Suzuki-Shoten, became insolvent. The mergers which consisted of four companies, Taiwan Seito Inc., Meiji Seito Inc., Dainippon Seito Inc., Ensuiko Seito Inc., were completed. These four companies integrated others, lands, raw and refining sugar process, and distribution. Not only the managers but also the workmen of these companies were mostly Japanese and Formosan workmen were few. By contrast, Europeans were few in Java sugar companies controlled by Dutch capital.View full abstractDownload PDF (3802K) -
HIROYOSHI KANOArticle type: Article
1986 Volume 51 Issue 6 Pages 843-861,875-87
Published: March 25, 1986
Released on J-STAGE: July 08, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSThis article aims at providing some data and information on the Javanese sugar industry at the summit of its development in the 1920s, with the purpose of making a contribution to the comparative study of economic history of Asian countries under the colonial rule before the World War II. The distinctive features of sugar production in Java which were not found in other sugar production areas such as Taiwan and the Philippines, can be summarized as follows: First, sugarcane was planted in the paddy fields of local peasants under the system of rotation farming with rice production. Secondly, sugar mills directly managed cane production in the fields which were possessed by peasants. In other words, the system of land renting from peasants to sugar mills made it possible to establish the complex system of production, a kind of articulation between the agro-industry of sugar production and the rice farming for subsistence by peasants. The direct management of cane production by the mills brought about much higher productivity of land than other areas, which gave it strong competitiveness in external market. Thirdly, in the 1920s Java mainly produced white sugar (plantation white sugar) for direct consumption. Needless to say, these three features mentioned above were closely interrelated and were developed in the background of the dependence of Javanese sugar on the free export market in the Asian region. As for the features of the producers of industry, it should be noted that most of them were Dutch enterprises which were organized as limited companies and coordinated within a syndicate. Among these Dutch companies, six prominent groups of enterprises were found out, each of which was integrated by a single banking corporation which was called cultuurbank. Sugar enterprises owned by Asians, i. e. the Chinese, the Japanese and the Javanese, were also found out, but their share in production was far smaller than Dutch enterprises. However, since the beginning of the 20th century, the biggest market for export of Javanese sugar had been made up of neighboring countries in Asia, especially India, China (including Hongkong) and Japan. In this relation, it is important to note that Japanese buyers increased the amount of purchase of Javanese sugar so rapidly that at the midst of the 1920s the volume of their purchase exceeded that of the Western buyers.View full abstractDownload PDF (1723K) -
Article type: Index
1986 Volume 51 Issue 6 Pages 869-873
Published: March 25, 1986
Released on J-STAGE: July 08, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSDownload PDF (191K) -
Article type: Bibliography
1986 Volume 51 Issue 6 Pages 874-878
Published: March 25, 1986
Released on J-STAGE: July 08, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSDownload PDF (272K)
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