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Volume 52 (1986)
- Issue 6 Pages 731-
- Issue 5 Pages 607-
- Issue 4 Pages 451-
- Issue 3 Pages 303-
- Issue 2 Pages 151-
- Issue 1 Pages 1-
Volume 52, Issue 5
Displaying 1-10 of 10 articles from this issue
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Yukiharu TAKEOKAArticle type: Article
1987 Volume 52 Issue 5 Pages 607-639,730
Published: January 25, 1987
Released on J-STAGE: November 22, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSTraditionnellement on localise une des sources du rEtard de l'industrialisation en Framce au 19^e siecle dans la stagnation de son agriculture, dans les consequences economiques et sociales du systeme de la propriete paysanne, et on pretend generalement que le debut de "la revolution agricole" ne date que du milieu du 19^e siecle. Toutefois les evidences quantitatives recueillies par J.-C. Toutain et M. Levy-Leboyer montrent la croissance rapide et soutenue de la production et la productivite agricoles des la premiere moitie du 19^e siecle. D'autre part quelques auteurs comme M. Morineau refusent ces evidences et affirment la stabilite relative de l'activite agricole jusqu'au milieu de 19^e siecle; plusieurs historiens et economistes insistent toujours sur les inperfections du changement du systeme agricole qui out permis la persistance de la petite propriete paysanne en France durant le 19^e siecle. Cette imobilite pretendue de l'agriculture francaise a-t-elle retarde le processus de son industrialisation et cause la performance pauvre de sa croissance economique ? Cependant, d'ily a quelque temps, divers economistes agricoles ou historiens ont tente de sauver les petites exploitations de l'opprobre general. Ils apprecient leur dynamisme et leur capacite a investir en visant a une hausse des rendements et des gains de productivite ou a absorber la force du travail. Nous avons essaye dans cet article d'analyser quelques aspects de la contribution qu'a apportee l'agriculture francaise a l'industrialisation et de faire la lumiere sur son role en tant que variable plutot subordonne dans le processus global de l'evolution economique.View full abstractDownload PDF (3129K) -
Takeo KIKKAWAArticle type: Article
1987 Volume 52 Issue 5 Pages 640-663,729-73
Published: January 25, 1987
Released on J-STAGE: November 22, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSThe purpose of this paper is to make clear the actual conditions of the fund raising of Japanese electric power industry from 1883 when the first Japanese electric power company, Tokyo Electric Light Co., was established to 1918 when World War I ended. In Japan, the electric power industry contributing to its economic growth through a number of channels have been one of the most important industrial sections. Besides, the electric power industry had raised the greatest social funds among all sections. Therefore, the study to examine the mechanism of raising the electric power industry's funds is signicant for the analysis of Japanese capitalism. Before World War I Japanese electric power industry had raised funds mainly by issuing stocks. In this paper I elucidated that the social basis of the industry's fund raising expanded conspicuously during the post Russo-Japanese War period, and that the number of holders of electric power stocks increased during World War I.View full abstractDownload PDF (2189K) -
Naoto KAGOTANIArticle type: Article
1987 Volume 52 Issue 5 Pages 664-696,728-72
Published: January 25, 1987
Released on J-STAGE: November 22, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSThe subject matter of this study is to exmine the pattern of cartelization by the Japan Cotton Spinners Association (JCSA) before the First World War. Japan's cotton spinning industry, which had become highly dependent on export markets after the Japan-China War, was regulated by the deterioration of export market conditions since 1897 as well as financial stringencey in the domestic economy. This industry was then also regulated remarkably by the speculative transactions of the domestic traders of cotton yarn and the Chinesse merchants which had immoderately influenced the price of cotton yarn. The move towards the cartel arrangement by the JCSA was thus required as a counter-measure to the above-mentioned business recession, and it was promoted by the government and Mitsui Bussan. In this respect, the government had undertaken the 'Reduction of Production Plan' as a policy to limit to domestic supply of cotton yarn, while Mitsui Bussan had put the 'Export Promotion Policy Policy for Cotton Yarn and Cloth' forward with an aim to counter operation of Chinese merchants. These measures were supposed to limit the domestic supply of cotton yern by the expansion of the export, and therefore, to regulate the price of cotton yarn. However, the arrangement for cartelization after the Japan-China War was subjected to limitations. The formation and the continuation of such cartel had been impeded by the conflict of interests arising out of the differences in the rate of export dependency and the desire to secure one's own market territory among the members of JCSA. Blessed by the business boom during the Japan-Russia War, the JCSA gained such an oligopolistic position that it could be controlled by certain number of leading enterprises with regards to the policy decision-making process. As a consequence, the major leading enterprises gradually intensified their cartel activities, and reorganized the JCSA for the formation and the continuation of internal cooperation. On the other hand, however, this arrangement was the process that restrained gradually the low-ranking minor enterprises from voicing their views and suggestions. Under the background of such cooperative arrangements, the cartel activities of JCSA became to result in wider practical impacts. Above all the regulation of the price of cotton yarn through the export promotion policy was important, and this activity has substantially reduced the dominance of Chinese merchants in foreign trade. In addition, to secure the market in China was necessary for the stabilization of cotton yarn price at high level through the export promotion policy. The JCSA changed therefore its character into a positive pressure group against the national policy about China. This process shows the emergence of imperialist character of the JCSA with such a cartel arrangement.View full abstractDownload PDF (2944K) -
[in Japanese]Article type: Article
1987 Volume 52 Issue 5 Pages 697-705
Published: January 25, 1987
Released on J-STAGE: November 22, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSDownload PDF (964K) -
[in Japanese]Article type: Article
1987 Volume 52 Issue 5 Pages 705-708
Published: January 25, 1987
Released on J-STAGE: November 22, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSDownload PDF (511K) -
[in Japanese]Article type: Article
1987 Volume 52 Issue 5 Pages 708-710
Published: January 25, 1987
Released on J-STAGE: November 22, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSDownload PDF (379K) -
[in Japanese]Article type: Article
1987 Volume 52 Issue 5 Pages 710-713
Published: January 25, 1987
Released on J-STAGE: November 22, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSDownload PDF (516K) -
[in Japanese]Article type: Article
1987 Volume 52 Issue 5 Pages 713-716
Published: January 25, 1987
Released on J-STAGE: November 22, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSDownload PDF (421K) -
[in Japanese]Article type: Article
1987 Volume 52 Issue 5 Pages 717-723
Published: January 25, 1987
Released on J-STAGE: November 22, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSDownload PDF (767K) -
Article type: Bibliography
1987 Volume 52 Issue 5 Pages 728-730
Published: January 25, 1987
Released on J-STAGE: November 22, 2017
JOURNAL OPEN ACCESSDownload PDF (158K)
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