Although the significance of the archaeological approaches has been neglected in the historical study of the Edo period, the present paper, by combining archaeological materials with historical documents, aims at illuminating the Tokugawa government's monetary policy in the seventeenth century. Numerous copper currencies discovered from 153 graves of that period are undoubtedly important archaeological materials to specify the currencies in circulation. These currencies called Rokudosen (六道銭), buried as grave goods, can be classified into the four major types: the imported Chinese currencies (Toraisen 渡来銭), Kokan'eitsuho (古寛永通宝 first issued in 1636), Bunsen (文銭 in 1668) and Shinkan'eitstuho (新寛永通宝 in 1697). The patterns of their frequency distributions, analyzed by "frequency seriation" which is commonly used in the chronological study of prehistoric archaeology, indicate that the replacement of Toraisen by Kokan'eitstuho was achieved promptly. On the other hand, the transition from Kokan'eitsuho to Bunsen and from Bunsen to Shinkan'eitsuho required rather long duration. It is worth noting that the above observation corresponds to the descriptions of some historical documents on the government's monetary policy. The documents such as Shukubashiryo (宿場史料) indicate that the government intended to exclude the older, imported currencies, and that the government prohibited their use in 1670. The validity of these descriptions was hardly demonstrated in the previous studies; however, the result of "frequency seriation" obtained from the excavated currencies represents that the government's policy was effectively carried out. The consistency of the government's monetary policy, which is partly reflected in some documents, can be more clearly characterized by synthesizing both archaeological and historical evidence.

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As for the Mitsui around the Meiji Restoration, it has been emphasized that they changed their occupation from drapery and exchange to banking and that they carried out various reforms and at last established Mitsui Bank in 1876. One purpose of this paper is to make clear how their family property was reorganized from a financial point of view. In I871, Omotokata at Tokyo (head office in the Meiji era) was established by governmental funds. It invested in Mitsui Bank and later absorbed 0motokata at Kyoto (head office in the Edo era) which had invested and loaned in both drapery and exchange shops. However, Kyoto Omotokata's investments and loans in their shops were irrecoverable, since these shops had lost almost all of their own net assets. Tokyo Omotokata in effect inherited nothing of the family property other than real estate from the Mitsui in the Edo era. 0n the other hand, the financial situation of Mitsui Bank was very bad at the start because of a lot of bad loans its ancestor Kawaseza (banking company) had held. Another purpose of this paper is to show how Mitsui Bank improved its financial situation. Mitsui Bank selected borrowers of its funds carefully not to hold new bad loans (because the amount of deposits remained almost the same between 1880 and 1884, Mitsui Bank could not increase the amount of loans.) And it set up voluntary reserve accounts and reserved the profit from governmental bonds which it held. As a result, its financial situation began to improve gradually.

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Die Elektrofirma Siemens, die Mitte der 1880er Jahre auf den japanischen Markt gedrungen war, sah sich zunehmend zur Verstarkung ihres Engagements genotigt und faBte deshalb die Errichtung einer Produktionssatte in Japan ins Auge. Nach einer miBgluckten Fuhlungnahme mit dem Haus Furukawa vermochte die Firma die Verhandlungen mit Sumitomo uber eine gemeinsame Kabelherstellung so weit voranzutreiben, daB sidh bis kurz vor Kriegsausbruch der Entwurf des zu errichtenden Joint Ventures teilweise erarbeiten lieB. Die Weichenstellung zur Direktinvestitionsstrategie war, wie sie der firmeninternen Diskussion seinerzeit zu entnehmen ist, in erster Linie durch das Heranwachsen der einheimischen Elektroindustrie motiviert, die mit der ohnehin scharfen anglo-amerikanischen Konkurrenz auf Siemens einen starken Druck ausubte. Die Produktion in Japan sollte ihr somit durch die Einsparung verschie-dener Kosten, wid durch die Ausnutzung der bilIigen Arbeitskraft des Landes, wieder zu einer soliden Marktposition verhelfen. Dabei wurde auch in Betracht gezogtn, mittels der Geschaftsform des Joint Ventures die Investitionsrisiken im fernen, gleichsam undurchsichtigen Japan zu verteilen und die eigene unzurei-chende Marktkenntnis vom besser informierten einheimischen Partner erganzen zu lassen. Dieses logistisch-strategische Konzept stellte eine wichtige Etappe in der Ent-wicklung der Japanpolitik von Siemens dar, auch wenn das Projekt mit Sumitomo tatsachlich im Sande verlief.

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