社会経済史学

The study of historical demography in England shows that nuptiality played a key role in determining fertility levels during the pre-industrial period. Several scholars have argued as to whether the same demographic pattern exists in Tokugawa Japan. For instance, Susan HANLEY insists that the mean age at first marriage or the percentage of women married is quite sensitive to short-term economic conditions; therefore, nuptiality also played a key role in determining fertility levels in Tokugawa Japan. On the other hand, Japanese scholars such as Osamu SAITO are quite skeptical about the possibility of similarities between Japan and western Europe, because of the relatively poor quality of the data which HANLEY used. Her study relies upon several series of shumon-aratame-cho, the annual village census, in Okayama-han. The data are weak because each series covers a relatively small population and there are also a certain number of records missing. In this paper I have used tojaku, the population registers, which were compiled within the Choshu-han region in the late Tokugawa period. The tojaku which I used here covers about one thousand inhabitants each year with almost no missing records; therefore, it can be considered a better source for the study of short-term demographic changes. In order to find the determinants of fertility, the mean age at first marriage, the marriage rate and the percentage of women married were regressed with the annual crude birth rate. No statistically significant relationship was found between these three variables and the crude birth rate. Interestingly, there was a clear positive relationship between the marriage rate and the mean age at first marriage. From this observation, I can conclude that relatively older women were given priority in marrying, and that nuptiality did not therefore play a key role in determining fertility levels in Tokugawa Japan.

抄録全体を表示

抄録を表示する抄録を非表示にする

The purpose of this paper is to analyze 'modernity' in a colonial setting through examining the characteristics of colonialism in Japanese-run factories in Korea and their effect on Korean society. First, in Japanese-run factories, Japanese and Korean workers were divided on ethnic lines for political reasons, but also because Japanese workers had superior technical skills. Korean workers could gain higher wages but were not promoted to supervisory positions. However, to encourage efficiency, the management introduced incentive schemes which applied equally to workers of both races. Individual Korean workers responded positively to these schemes as a way of achieving social and economic independence. While the ethnic division of the labour market led to increasing competition among Korean workers to enter factories, the incentitive schemes meant that they experienced fierce competition inside the factories as well. This experience of competing as individuals was something , which they had not met before, and it forced a change in their consciousness. Second, Korean workers became more skilled, both through their own efforts under the stimulus of the incentive sehemes, and as a result of company training programs introduced so that they could replace the more expensive Japanese workers. These skilled Korean workers contributed to the growth of the cement industry after the 1945 Liberation. Third, the colonial labour management system succeeded not so much because the humanity of individual Korean workers was denied, but because economic profitability and Japanese ethnic separateness were maintained through denying the humanity of Korean workers at a group level, as a result of racial discrimination against Koreans. Fourth, this labour management system nevertheless contained a fundamental contradiction in that it required the employment of Korean workers who were being encouraged to achieve social and economic independence on an individual level while gradually becoming aware that their humanity was being denied at a group level.

抄録全体を表示

PDF形式でダウンロード (2385K)

Im August 1933 wurde Die Aktiengesellschaft, Metallurgische Forschungsgesellschaft m. b. H. gegrundet. Diese Firma war eine Scheinfirma der Reichsbank, die von Reichsbankprasidenten Hjalmar SCHACHT zur Rustungsfinanzierung geschaffen wurde. Man hat diese Firma abgekurzt Mefo genannt. Zuerst hat die Rustungsindustrie Mefo-Wechsel ausgestellt und diese Wechsel an die Mefo gesandt, die diese akzeptierte. Danach hat die Mefo diese Wechsel der Rustungsindustrie zuruckgegeben. So wurde Mefo-Wechsel entstanden. Von 1934 bis 1938 wurden Mefo-Wechsel im Wert von 12 Milliarden RM ausgestellt. SCHACHT befurchtete, din Zunahme von Mefo-Wechseln konne zu Inflation fuhren. Deswegen wurde auf seine Veranlassung von Mefo-Wechseln am 31. Marz 1938 eingestellt. Ab Fruhling 1939 sollte das Reich die Mefo-Wechsel einlosen. SCHACHT und das Reichsbankdirektorium sandten ein Momorandum an Adolf HITLER, in dem sie fordernten, daβ die Reichsbank den Kapitalmarkt kontrollieren solle. Das bedeutete, daβ die Reichsbank nicht langer die Rustungsfinanzierung unterstutzte. Deshalb muβte SCHACHT als Reichbankprasident zurucktreten. Das System der Mefo-Wechsel bedeutete Rustungsfinanzierung durch Kredite. SCHACHT befurwortete eine mit Sparsamkeit verbundene Konsolidierungspolitik, aber NS-Staat konnte oder wollte SCHACHTS Vorschlagen nicht folgen.

抄録全体を表示

J-STAGEへの登録はこちら（無料）