This paper analyzes informative but imperfect bank ex ante credit screening, based on the model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, AER). This model showed that credit rationing arises as an equilibrium phenomenon when asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers exists, and we consider this a case of bank lending without screening. Credit screening enables the bank to imperfectly distinguish types of borrowers. Under the assumption that investment returns are risky in the sense of mean preserving spreads, if a bank could set the loan interest rate equal to the borrowers' credit risk, it would achieve higher profits through credit screening. However, the total amount of lending decreases because of the imperfectness of screening, which is caused by driving types of low risk out of the bank lending market. Thus, we regard this as a social cost. It is also evinced that unlike collateral, an application fee, which borrowers pay before bank screening, cannot function as a self-selection mechanism of borrower types.
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