Mycenaean economic geography is a sphere of study which is steadily drawing attention in recent years. One of its main concerns is to explore the palatial territories and the hierarchy between them through examination of archaeological data and field observation. In the light of this specific concern, it is the Argos plain that shows the most puzzling configuration of important settlements. in the Greek mainland. How can We explain the apparent coexistence of so many major Mycenaean sites or palaces in the limited space of the Argos Plain ? What kind of dynamic historical process is hidden behind the static pattern of site distribution observed here ? This is a local, but crucial problem, to which traditional studies on the Mycenaean world have never given a convincing answer, for they depend almost exclusively on the Linear B textual data. In this paper, the author attempts to shed new light on this problem using current models and theories on the spatial analysis of archaeological data. Throughout the argument, it is suggested that Mycenae had its original territory outside the plain, perhaps somewhere to the north, and Argos might have been politically subjugated by intrusive Mycenae during the Late Bronze Age. The implication is that the local historical sequence was a significant factor to determining the structure of the society, and the structure itself was not so uniform throughout the Mycenaean world as has been conventionally assumed.

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In this paper the author examines the process of forming the Risturyo Military system in Japan from the Taika-Kaisin (大化改新) in A.D.645 to the Taiho-Ritsuryo (大宝律令) in 701, in terms of the international relations of the Far East. The Ritsuryo military system-Gundan (軍団)-was formed through a series of reorganizations that institutionalized and homogenized the miscellaneous and uneven internal footing organization of the Kokuzo-gun (国造軍), which was mobilized by Kuni-no-miyatsuko (国造) in the former Taika era. At first the Taika military reorganization happened, namely constructing arms depots, Heiko (兵庫), in every Hyo (評; the regrouped Kuni-no-miyatsuko territory) and forming fifty household conscription units. This reorganization speeded up grouping in training, increased the number of enlistees, institutionalized the internal organization, and systematized the ranks and command in war. In this way, the Kokuzo-gun change over into the Hyozo-gun (評造軍). The second stage was the process of organizing the relief army for Kudara (百済). In this process the Tenchi (天智) government mobilized the army and drilled troops for the purpose of actual fighting under Soryo (総領)-Kokusai (国宰)-via the Hyo as the centralized military administrative organ, and organized the task force founded upon the mobilized army in the Soryo district. But, in the battle of Hakusukinoe (白村江), The broken fighting formation of the Japanese army was defeated by the superior Taug (唐) army. This defeat exposed the insufficient institutionalization of the Hyozogun's internal organization. In the third stage, during a cricis after the defeat, the Tenchi government took a posture of defense in the form of fortified Ki (城) day and night. The administrative organ of Soryo-Kokusai-Hyo was used as the organ of fortification. So it was reorganized into a military district for resistance, which was a copy of the Goho (五方) system in Kudara. Through these processes the local administrative organ was strengthed, and could firmly rule the People. The four stage was the military reorganization by the Tenmu-Jito (天武・持統) government. Its aim was to found an army able to maintain the compulsory tributary relation between Japan and Shiragi (新羅). The Government formed the Heiseikan (兵政官) as its military administrative organ to reform the existing army on the model of Taug army. The Government carried out this plan in stages. Its contents are as in the following. 1)Establishment of the honor guard system by armed officers, which was a stage setting for tributary etiquette and a supporting officer coros. 2)Establishiment of the system of common drill and censor according to a manual, whose aim was to institutionalize and homogenize the internal footing organization of the Hyozogun. 3) Establishiment of the system of the centralized state military, thus eleminating personal elements from the Hyozo-gun by placing such command instruments as drum, fife, and battle frag under government control, and starting conscription based upon family registers. Finally, when the Taiho-ritsuryo was promulgated, Gundan were established, to be commanded by Gunki (軍毅) with 1,000 military effectives. Gundan were not bound to Gun (郡) territories, however it was the ultimate aim the military footing organization be enbodied by Gundan, which would have a common internal organization, uniform scale, and homogeneous drill progrum.

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During negotiations over the twenty-one demands in put to China, Britain had more interest in China than America. However, the attitude of Britain's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, towards Japan was very passive and one of extreme caution, since he wanted to avoid any breach with the Japanese. Therefore, he did not give the Chinese any hint of support. However, Grey proposed that Japan should refrain from advancing any demands that could be considered to compromise the integrity or independence of China as it would be hard to "reconcile such demands with the terms of the Alliance" But, Grey's cautious approach was ignored by Foreign Minister Takaaki Kato. Kato's adopted such an aggressive stance despite the opposition of the Genro (the Emperor's supreme adviser), politicians in the Diet, the press, and a combination of militaristic pressure and nationalist opinion. Although Kato needed Britain as an ally during the negotiations with China, Grey's telegram of warning did not put any pressure on him and his attitude did not change. One of the aims of this paper is to add some background to the reason why from a military point of view. Kato continued such a strong and agressive attitude towards Britain. At this time, Britain was in a desperate position given the threat of a German breakthrough on the Western Front, while the Central powers were forcing a Russian retreat in the east. At this crucial stage in the war, the Japanese navy continued to render valuable assistance in the search of German ships, in the protection of trade, in the convoy of troops, and in helping the allies with material assistance in the conduct of the war by supplying arms and ammunition. Under such military circumstances, Japanese assistance was essential to British success, so it was desirable not to antagonize Japan. This paper's second view point concerns the influence of the Japanese Naval assistance in violatating the Indian garrison of Singapore, and Kato's "psychological moment" in convection with this incident. Prior to the twenty-one demands and the violation of the Indian Garrison of Singapore, there was already tremendous friction between Kato and Grey. Kato was annoyed at Grey attempt to place strict limits on Japanese military and naval operations in China and the Pacific. Furthermore, Grey proposed that Japan be controlled by a combined French, Russian and British operation. Kato was able to reject Britain's proposals because of Britain's precarious situation in the war. Britain had to change herself geographically for Japan, because of a desperate situation. Britain had to request the dispatch of a cruiser to North America, another three weeks later for the Indian Ocean, and still another one month later for the Dardanelles. Britain's weak position at the time goes some way towards explaining "the bulldozer tactics" of Kato. During this critical situation, the violation of the Indian Garrison of Singapore occurred and negotiations over the twenty-one demands began. The Navy sent the cruisers Tushima and Otowa to Singapore and rendered "Admirable and effective" assistance. Because of the Japanese assistance of arms and ammunitions, protecting convoys and chasing German merchant cruisers, Grey sent seven telegrams of appreciation for the Japanese assistances. Further, he acknowledged in three telegrams the dispatch of the cruiser Ibuki for convoy escort, three cruisers for the American Squadron chasing the German Far-East Squadron, and for the rescue operation of a merchant ship in the Indian Ocean. Such a continuous stream of telegrams must have provided Kato's "psychological moment" support for his agressive attitude toward Britain. Further, the weakness shown when Britain had to kill 50 Indian soldiers in her own colony gave Kato confidence to maintain his diplomatic

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