This study is the result of field research in Jintian-Zhen (金田鎮), which is well-known as the birthplace of the Taiping movement. Because of a lack of information, it has been very difficult to study the history of Guangxi society and the early days of Taiping. The author collected new materials during several visits to Jintian-Zhen between 1987 and 1990. The goal of the study was to illuminate the historical and social-anthropological features of the settlement in Jintian and, in particular, the social order that elite migrants established. The migration of Chinese into Jintian started in the 16th century with the supression of a resistance movement by the local Yao (瑤) minority. Many of the early migrants were Chinese bureaucrats seeking refuge from the conflicts indemic to the period between the Ming (明) and Qins (清) dynasties. The migrants occupied an extensive land area under the protection of the local goverment and forced tenant farmers to bring land under cultivation for the commercial purpose of selling rice at Guangdong (廣東). Jintian's development was thus different from that of Zijing (紫荊) where the Hakka Chinese (客家) language group settled. These differences suggest that there were several patterns in the settlement and cultivation of the frontier area, and, further, that these differences have greatly influenced the range of races and language groups in the area, as well as the extensiveness of the Baishangdi-hui (拝上帝会) activities. The early Chinese migrants who settled in Jintian made great efforts to build up their politcal and economic bases by using various social networks such as tongxiang (同郷) and the tongzu (同族). In particular, the lineage organizations of the Chinese migrants to Jintian, in spite of their small size compared with that in Guang-dong, led to great distinctions between migrants groups in terms of their population and property, as well as the political influence that was acquired by seholar bureaucrats and their lineage schools. Thus, powerful lineages took leadership in Jintian by using lineage organizations to establish and maintain law and order to their own advantage. Thus, newly-rising lineages such as the family of Huang-tizheng (黄体正) of Gucheng (古程) village, who was the organizer of "An Liang yue" (安良約), the Baojia (保甲) organization before Taiping, regarded marriage and association with powerful lineages as the most important means to elevate their family social status. The participants' lists of joint enterprise activities, such as the establishment of or repairs to the Sanjie (三界) shrine, clearly indicate the social status and rank of each lineage in the Jintian area. The seventy leaders of "An Liang yue", who opposed Taiping, were the same people that had close relationships to each other through marriage, goverment service, schools and literary circles. In this paper it is argued that the Jintian settlement society may be characterized by the idea of "sheng guang fa cai" (昇官發財), which means the acquisition of wealth through the perquisities of bureacuratic posts. This feature is different from that of Jiangzhe (江浙), a more mature province where the literary elite (文人) held substantive power. The Chinese migrants to the Guangxi frontier area ardently sought a stable foundation of economic and political security, as did the officers and troops of the Taiping army through "sheng guang fa cai". The examination for bureaucratic posts was regarded as the means for the control and integration of settlement society by powerful families. Jintian is a society where this "Ke ji" type elite group ruled, and where members of the Baishangdihui were persecuted by them.
This paper analyzes the political processes of 'Guidelines for Implementing National Policy' (Teikohu Kokusaku Suiko Yoryo) which was adopted by the Third Konoe Cabinet. During the term of the Third Konoe Cabinet, Japanese foreign policy was formulated at the Imperial Court by the Imperial Head-quarters-Government Liaison Conference (Dai-hon'ei Seifu Renraku kaigi). The decisions of this Conference were more influential than those of the Cabinet. Issues concerning National Policy (kokusaku) proposed by the Army and Navy were debated and constructed at the Liaison Conference. However, the Liaison Conference was unsuccessful in overcoming the structural flaw in the Meiji Constitution which saw legislative power shared between the Cabinet and the General Staff. The Liaison Conference could not override the Cabinet or General Staff in decision making. In cases where the interests of the various government organs conflicted, the Liaison Conference either avoided making a decision, or forwarded policies for imperial ratification that incorporated the interests of all the opposing government institutions by processes called Ryoron-Heiki. It is through these processes of compromise that National Policy was formulated. The formation of the Guidelines for Implementing National Policy is seen as the cornerstone for Japan's decision to go to war. This paper analyzes the political processes involved in the formation of National Policy. It examines the following points. 1)The political goals of the Army and Navy immediately after the establishment of the Third Konoe Cabinet. 2)The reaction of the Army and Navy towards the 'freezing' of Japanese funds in the United States by the United States Government. 3)The influence of assertions as to attacking the Soviet Union. 4) How the Army and Navy perceived the domestic and international situation when the Guidelines was first adopted. The chief aim of the Guidelines originally proposed by the Navy was to accelerate its arming against its potential enemy, the US. The summit meeting between Roosevelt and Konoe was the other dimension of the policy, as Navy Minister Oikawa was optimistic that a successful diplomatic agreement would be reached by the two leaders. The war Offlce stated that if diplomacy failed, the next step was war. The General Staff Office's position was that Japan must set a date for the commencement of war, but at the same time must persist through all diplomatic avenues available to try and reach some agreement. The stance of the Navy office was to continue to prepare its forces for war, but refuse to commit itself to a date when hostilities would commence. In the end, however, a compromise was reached with the deadline for any diplomatic solution being set for early October. This deadline was set immediately after Japanese authorities received a telegram reporting that Roosevelt was positive towards a summit meeting. Furthermore, the Navy Office was also successful in increasing the number of political procedures required in reaching a decision for war, effectively making any such decision harder to obtain. In the opinion of the Navy, a Japanese victory depended on a favourable change in the international situation. In short, the Guidelines was an ambiguous move to compromise. On one hand, diplomatic negotiations were still being pursued. On the other, preparations were being made for war. Yet, the success of either of the two objectives depended upon a change in the prevailing international situation. The inability to reach a decision led to Konoe to dissolve his cabinet in the middle of October, 1941.
This paper is a an empirical study of the law that shows to recover the Ise Shrine Estate Recovery Act (Shiryo kogyo-ho), which the Warrior Government at Kamakura (Bakufu in the East) proclaimed in 1285 and 1301. In early 1285 A.D. (koan 8) the Bakufu ordered local warriors and tradesimen (kotunin) on the states of the Ise Shrine to return their holdings to its original owners, the Shinto priests of the Ise Shrine. The author has found seven judicial precedents of this law in the diaries of court nobles like the Kanchu-ki. These precedents ranged from Ise province to the Kanto area. Because this act applied not only to Bakufu vassels (gokenin) and rear vassels (buke-hikan), their tenure rights, under the fueki-ho and nenki-ho being annulled, but also Kyoto-based hikan groups, who subsequently litigated the Ise Shrine priests. As a result, the Court in Kyoto ordered the Bakufu to repeal the act. At the close of 1286 A.D., the Warrior Government repealed the act of 1285 and reestablished relations with Kyoto. But in l301 the year the (Mongols) navy occupied koshiki-zima Island, as soon as Halley's comet appeared, the Bakufu proclaimed another recovery act for the estates of the Ise Shrine. The Bakufu sent a mission to the Court in Kyoto, to discuss how to defend against the Mongol invaders. The Bakufu's proclamation was one part of their strategy. According to the act, Shinto priests of Ise Shrine were allowed to turn local warriors and tradesmen out of Shrine territory by force. The estates of the Shrine were unified by its leaders, especially the Gegu Shrine priests. In short a concentration of the Shrine power was developing. After all, Bakufu's law, wishing to recover the Estate of the Shrine play an important role to constract "Ichien-ryo", under the policy agreement between East Government (Kamakura Bakufu) and West Government (Kyoto Court). In addition our previous studies said the first law which had played the role to construct "Ichien-ryo" was the law (1312 A.D.) allowing 5 shrines in kyusyu province to recover their Estase.