In classical Athens there was no public prosecutor. Any Athenian citizen could prosecute public offenders through graphe. It is often said that the development of the democracy after the reform of Ephialtes gave rise to people who abused it, that is sykophantai (sg. sykophantes). We know many examples of their vicious activities, such as false accusation and blackmailing, by Aristophanes and orators, and know how disliked they were in Athens. Most of the historians of Greece have thought them as "the inevitable disease of democracy" (J.O. Lofberg), "a leech on society" (J.Ober), and so on. On the other hand, R.Osborne's article in 1990 proposes that (1)sykophantai should not be identified as malicious prosecutors motivated by money. The word was applied to any prosecutor, especially one who did not have a good case, whose case depended on improbable assumptions, empty assertions, or over-meticulous quibbling, (2)prosecution cases brought by sykophantai prevented rich Athenian citizens from using their wealth in an anti-social way. In this sense, sykophantai played a structural role in democratic Athens like demagogues. The term sykophautai has a very descriptive character. As a result, if we treat it in a static or synchronic way, our conclusions are likely to become imbalanced. The author suspects that both negative and positive theories are formed on an all too static analysis of evidence and are too simplified. This paper tries to treat sykophantai in a different way. It considers the activities of sykophantai in a diachronic perspective, in the actual changing circumstances in Athens from the middle of the fifth century B.C. to 322 B.C. The author's conclusions are as follows. (1)In the fifth cntury B.C. the activities of sykophantai as malicious prosecutors motivated by money were chiefly against the allied citizens. Of course, sykophantai annoyed the rich Athenian citizens, but this was limited mostly to the late period of the Peloponnesian War, especially after the oligarchic revolution in 411 B.C.. (2)As for the fourth century B.C., there are many references to sykophantai among orators. However, these references are untrustworthy. In other words, sykophantai as malicious prosecutors motivated by money were not rampant through the fourth century B.C.. (3)It is said that in classical Athens the trial was basically adversarial. However, as the scene in Aristoph, Plutus shows, prosecutions conducted by sykophantai had some inquisitorial character. References to sykophantai by orators should be grasped as indicating how suspicious the Athenians were about this inquisitorial prosecution by hoboulomenos.
This paper is based on a viewpoint developed in a previous paper concerning Diet power during the period of the Japanese-Chinese War, which criticized the opinion that during the Showa wartime era in Japan the National Diet was stripped of any real power, or else functioned merely as a passive reactionary group. In that discussion the author cited actual cases previously ignored, which showed the power of the Diet positively affecting the policy making process during the war in China. As a result of this investigation, the author was able to clarify that 1)the way in which the Diet was able to participate in policy making was not through political parties, but rather by means of suprafactional groups of DMs that based their activities on special interest groups, and 2)even after the dismantling of the political parties during the era of the New Establishment in the summer of 1940, the Diet continued to function effectively through those special interest groups. In the present paper, the author takes up a similar viewpoint in an investigation of the Paciffic War era, specifically during the 77th Session of the National Diet. It was in the autumn of 1941 that the Yokusan Giin Domei was formed by a majority in the House of Representatives supporting imperial rule. The bonds tying this alliance together were weak, and its policy making effectiveness depended mainly on existing special interest groups. This the author shows by means of tracing the issues of how to integrate agricultural associations and how to build an educational promotion system. In the case of integrating agricultural associations, for example, at first the influence of Diet member groups was not able to solve the impasse that had developed within the bureaucracy between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, after the national elections of April, 1942 (known as the "Yokusan" election), when the Yokusan Seiji-kai (hereafter Yokusei) organization was formed, the way in which Diet powers were able to participate in the policy making process was changed around the Yokusei's political affairs investigation committee. Both policy proposals and political compromises began to contain provisions that were not necessarily in line with the demands of special interest groups. This change is shown through examples of administrative simplification, agricultural association integration, and the issue of increasing the food supply. Yokusei embraced a number of different political forces and strongly resembled a ruling party capable of forming consensus opinions. As to the actual policy proposals made by the political forces in the Diet, while they did support the war efforts both in China and in the Pacific, they did oppose the government over the issue of expanding the powers of the bureaucracy. Soon after the fall of the Tojo Cabinet, as the movement to reorganize the political establishment strengthened, the involvement of the Diet in policy making waned. In sum, despite a relative overall weakening of the position of the National Diet in political affairs throughout the Showa wartime era in Japan, it definitely continued to play an important role in the area of policy making. The factors enabling the Diet to play such a role was its strong opposition to radical institutional reforms under the slogan of "national unity" and its influence in the government's choosing a wartime establishment instead.
Le conseil de prud'hommes francais fut institue pour terminer, par voie de conciliation, des petits differends entre patrons et ouvriers. Selon les recherches recentes, le conseil de prud'hommes au 19^e siecle a prononce des jugements avantageux pour les ouvriers. Les patrons ne se sont pas seulement soumis aux jugements du conseil, mais ils ont aussi beaucoup apprecie les activites du conseil. L'appreciation des patrons ne reflete pas exactement la realite. Elle revele aussi ce que les patrons attendaient du conseil. Donc en examinant des images du conseil vu par les patrons, nous pouvons rechercher comment ils ont vu des relations entre patrons et ouvriers. Nous allons examiner surtout les attitudes des patrons face au conseil de prud'hommes et essayer de reconstituer leurs facon de voir le conseil. Ils ont entrepris de maintenir leur superiorite dans un bureau de conciliation du conseil. Pour cela, ils ont considere le conseil comme un tribunal de famille. L'autorite morale de juges, qui n'ont pas recu d'indemnites et qui se comportaient en pere de famille, fut importante pour le succes d'une reconciliation des parties. Mais les ouvriers etaient aussi presents dans le conseil a titre de juge et ils ont demande une Ogalite complete entre patrons et ouvriers. Ils n'ont plus admis l'idee d'un juge qui fut patron en meme temps que pere. Pourtant les patrons ont essaye de maintenir cette image familiale du conseil. Pour cela, ils ont cru pouvoir renforcer l'autorite des juges par le moyen des elections des juges, et ils ont garde l'initiative dans le conseil.