In 1870, the Japanese government decided that government-owned factories and mines be privatized by way of public auction. As a result, the Ministry of Industry (Kobusho 工部省), which had from 1869 been promoting the development of all kinds of industries through a policy of government supervision and guidance, found its very existence being questioned. In this paper, the author examines how Industry Minister Sasaki Takayuki and other officials, in their attempt to formulate a policy to deal with this crisis, influenced or disturbed the political and business communities in Japan at that time (i.e., from 1871 to 1875). The authors finds that : 1.Ministry of Industry officials endeavored to improve income and expenditures balances in order to prevent privatization. 2.These measures were unsuccessful due to the over-presence of government enterprises. 3.The Ministry of Industry then attempted to bring about a gradual, safe transition of the enterprises it had developed over to private management. 4.Ministry officials successfully approached such politically affiliated zaibatsu as Mitsubishi to take over such enterprises as the Nagasaki shipyards. 5.The Ministry's involvement with these business groups gave rise to opposition from both political and business circles. 6.Minister of Finance Matsukata Masayoshi set his sites on transferring to his authority the export-oriented coal mine at Miike, and foreign currency producing gold mines at Sado and Ikuno, in an attempt to improve Japan's monetary and fiscal positions. 7.This attempt gave rise to severe conflict between the Ministries of Industry and Finance over how to regulate coal production at Miike. What the above investigation shows is how attempts by the Ministry of Industry to protect the interests of politically powerful zaibatsu gave rise to political and economic conflict during the early 1870s.

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This article attempts to define the function of the Edo-garo (principal retainer) and to examine the structure of the han (the clan during the Tokugawa period), by looking at one domain, Kaga-han. Previous research has understood the han structure by the concepts of kaku (rank) and shoku (post). This does not seem enough to grasp the actual state of the han system. In this paper, the author intends to clarify the relations among the posts in the Edo-yashiki (the residence in Edo). The headquarters of Kaga-han, consisting of toshiyori and karo, oversaw the han personnel management through formal appointments and transmission of laws, and also dealt with the petitions from the whole office and supervised its official work. The relationships between each member of the headquarters and the officers under his supervision were more formal but looser than those between the kashira (the original chief of the personnel as a military system), or the shihai-nin (the chief making directions in the working office), and his subordinates in a department. On the other hand, the system of personnel management of the officers on duty in the Edo-yashiki was irregular, because all of the kashira did not attend the Edo-yashiki. An officer in the abosence of his kashira worked under the direction of the special shihai-nin in Edo. Therefore, the office in the Edo-yashiki cannot be regarded as a complete department. The Edo-garo forwarded correspondence from the officers in the Edo-yashiki to their counterparts in Kanazawa. Among these documents, personnel-related papers were the most important. This shows that the Edo-garo worked as a intermediary between Edo and Kanazawa, although he was not be able to break away from the directions issued by the office in Kanazawa. Finally, the author suggests that the Edo-garo possessed not only the same duties as a karo in Kanazawa but also the same as a toshiyori. The Edo-garo played the role of a "miniature" clone of the whole headquarters in Kanazawa. As a resuilt, the supervising system under the Edo-garo made it possible for the officers in Edo and their counterparts in Kanazawa to work together. Such a system, although clearly seen in the Edo-yashiki, also holds true for the whole organization of Kaga-han.

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El estallido de la Guerra Civil Espanola (1936-1939) provoco un nuevo problema agrario en el campo catalan: la colectivizacion de la tierra. Esto causo una gran polemica entre los partidos politicos y los sindicatos. Este nuevo antagonismo tuvo varios niveles de oposicion : (a)campesinos de trabajo colectivo y campesinos de trabajo individual (b)ex-jornaleros y ex-aparceros, pequenos terra-tenientes (c)CNT・FAI y UR・PSUC (UGT・FCTT) (d)sindicatos (sobre todo CNT) y la Generalitat (el Departament d'Agricultura). En Cataluna, la CNT tomo la inciativa tanto en la colectivizacion agricola como en la industrial. Sin embargo, en el campo predominaba la explotacion agricola de pequena escala y la colectivizacion de la tierra se encontro con una fuerte resistencia de los campesinos, que intentaron ampararse en el PSUC y UGT (FCTT). En consecuencia, la colectivizacion catalana fracaso en gran parte. Sin embargo, la Generalitat de Catalunya no fue tan intransigente con las colectividades agricolas (CC.AA.) como para exigir su total desaparicion. Mas bien, intento integrar los campesinos individuales y los colectivistas en los Sindicatos Agricolas (SS.AA.) mediante el Decreto de "Sindicacion Obligatoria". Se puede decir que el objetivo era un nuevo sistema mixto, que anadiera el elemento socialista del cultivo colectivo al sistema capitalista de cultivo individual. Ademas, mediante la "legalizacion de las colectividades agricolas", intento separar las CC.AA. legalizadas y las no legalizadas y ayudar a las primeras y desarticular las demas. No se puede negar que la Generalitat tenia la intencion politica de contener la influencia de la CNT sobre las CC.AA., pero tambien era cierto que tenia la necesidad apremiante de aumentar la efectividad economica de las CC.AA.. Frente a la politica agraria del Gobierno Regional, la CNT no pudo tomar una actitud decidida hasta el ultimo momento. Mientras que los radicales, que insistian en la colectivizacion total, atacaron las medidas de la Generalitat calificandolas de contra-revolucionaria, los sindicalistas moderados intentaron una evolucion de las CC.AA. mediante su participacion en los SS.AA.. Al prinicipio, en la CNT era mayoritaria la opinion moderada: desarrollar las CC.AA. dentro de los SS.AA.. Pero, a medida que aumentaban los conflictos entre ellos y otros campesinos, los cenetistas empezaron a tomar una postura mas radical e intentaron el desarrollo de las CC.AA. fuera de los SS.AA.. El nuevo sistema agrario de la Generalitat, la FSAC (Federacio de Sindicats Agricoles de Catalunya) tenia los objetivos siguentes : (a)mantener y aumentar la produccion agricola integrando todas las fuerzas humanas en los SS.AA., (b)garantizar el abastecimiento de alimentos a las ciudades controlando los precios, (c)conectar los SS.AA. y las CC.AA. de manera armonica. Pero,? este sistema funciono bien? y? pudo conseguir sus objetivos? La conclusion es que la FSAC no llego a conseguir resultados positivos en estos objetivos, porque los campesinos no quisieron ofrecer sus productos agricolas a los SS.AA. por varias razones: baja tasacion de los productos, insatisfaccion por parte de los campesinos respecto al control guvernamental, desconfianza hacia los SS.AA, busqueda de ganancia privada etc. Como la funcion distributiva de la FSAC era precaria, resulto cada vez mas dificil garantizar el abastecimiento de las ciudades, donde aumento el descontento de los trabajadores hacia los campesinos.

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