In this paper the author examines the characteristics of ritsu-ryo (律令) code Regulations (kyaku 格) during the Heian period. In the first chapter, the auther divides the Heian period into three parts : (1)the time after the Engi-regulations (Engi-Kyaku 延喜格) were enforced, (2)the time after the Jogan-regulations (Jogan-Kyaku 貞観格) were enforced, but before the Engi-Kyaku were enforced, and (3)the time after the Konin-regulations (Konin-Kyaku 弘仁格)were enforced. He then examines whether in each time period kyaku compiled previously were differentiated from other laws at the time. As a results of this study, the following facts are clear. In time peridds (1) and (2), kyaku meant regulations compiled previously, but in time period (3)some laws quoted as kyaku were not contained in the Konin-Kyaku and other laws quoted as fu (符 the Document for Communication from superiors to inferiors) were contained in the Konin-Kyaku. The form of the laws is different from that in time periods (1) and (2). Kyaku in the (3)time only meant a law enforced by itself. Consequently the author concludes that the Jogan-Kyaku should be considered more important than Konin-Kyaku in terms of the consciousness of the bureaucrats. In the second chapter, the author investigates reasons why Jogan-Kyaku represents a turning point. He finds that i) it was difficult for bureaucrats to accept the Konin-Kyaku because its complilation was the first project for compiling kyaku in Japan and it involved a complicated process of enforcement; ii) the work of the office of the Regulations for Appointments were (Senkyaku-Sho 撰格所) was more active when the Jogan-Kyaku was compiled than when the Konin-Kyaku were compiled, and the Jogan-Kyaku were not mere imitations of the Konin-Kyaku. Looking further at the perface to the Jogan-Kyaku, we find that it characteristically contains rules about the clothing of the emperors which, we cannot find in the Japanese ritsu-ryo code or the Konin-Kyaku. These facts suggest that although the Jogan-Kyaku contain many rules peculiar to Japan, it is a set of regulations which first included the Chinese-style Rites (rei 礼) and also states that the emperor existed in the Rites order like the rest of the people. In the third chapter, the author estimates missing documents and contents of the present Ruiju-Sandai-Kyaku (類聚三代格). A matter that deserves serious consideration; however, as argued in chapter one; he presumed some document was one of the rule or regulation quoted as a Kyaku after Jogan but not contained in the present Ruiju-Sandai-Kyaku, can be assumed to either have been lost or contained in a related historical source.

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During the first half of the sixteenth century, the rapid territorial expansion of the Ottoman Empire caused the expansion of its foreign relations in the directions of both east and west. It has important effects on the making of early Modern Europe. Under these new circumstances, the Ottoman-Venetian relation, which had had a long tradition and was still important for both sides, must have also changed in some aspects. The Ottoman Empire and Venice remained on friendly terms throughout the first half of the sixteenth century, except for 1499-1502 and 1537-1540. In this paper, five ahdnames granted to Venice by the Ottoman Empire to conclude the peace treaties of 1502, 1513, 1517, 1521 and 1540 are examined to shed some light on changes in some aspects in Ottoman-Venetian relations. Provisions in these five ahdnames were based on the tradition of treaties concerned with trade in Middle East Islamic and Mediterranean societies. These provisions can be classified into four categories as follows : 1.The preconditions to make ahd, especially territorial agreements. 2.Establishing order on the seas between the Ottoman Empire and Venice. 3.Rights and obligations of Venetians in Ottoman territory. 4.Treatment of fugitive slaves, criminals and debtors. Almost all of the provisions followed the same content in each ahdname. On the other hand, some provisions were, reflecting the real situation, changed or newly added when each new ahdname was granted. By examining these changed or added provisions, the author concludes as follows. At the time when Bayezid II (ruled 1481-1512) and Selim I(ruled 1512-1520) were confronted with the rising of the Safvids in Persia while maintaining a peace policy toward Europe, the expanding Venetian's rights in the Ottoman territory became more important than the obligating principles of Islamic law on them. After the enthronement of Suleyman I (ruled 1520-1566), who succeeded to the vast territory expanded toward Syria and Egypt by Selim, the Ottomans extended their influence into the Levantine sea under a westward expanding policy. In 1540, two years after the Ottoman victory at the battle of Preveza, Ottoman superiority over Venice was recognized formally. Many of the provisions changed or added in the ahdnames of 1513 and 1521 were included in the draft of the Ottoman-French treaty made in 1535 and the ahdname granted to France in 1569. What it means is that the making of a new framework for Otto-man-Venetian relations in the first quarter of the sixteenth century had importance for building an Ottoman-French friendship under the reign of Suleyman.

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This article is an attempt to examine the relationship between prewar Japanese colonial policy and domestic politics through an analysis of the so-called "rokusan question" during formative period of the Katsura-Saionji ("Keien") regime. The rokusan question is the political confrontation that arose over "The Bill Related to Laws and Ordinances to be Enacted in Taiwan" that was passed by the Imperial Diet as its 63rd (hence, rokusan 六三) act of 1896. It was in this bill that provisions were made for the appointment of a governor-general of Taiwan, provisions that were clearly inconsistent with both the Imperial Constitution and the principles of parliamentary government. In particular, it was around the time of the Japan-Russia War, when the "Keien" regime was taking form, that a parliamentary investigation into possible reforms to the "rokusan" law became intertwined with domestic political affairs and the search for proper colonial policy for Japan. During the debate over the "rokusan" question during the sixteenth session of the Diet in 1902, the present Cabinet led by Katsura Taro, an important figure in the bureaucratic clique under Yamagata Aritomo that held considerable power in both the military and the upper house of lords, argued that Taiwan should be ruled under a political system independent of Japanese domestic politics, and therefore a bill related to governance of Taiwan in accordance this principle should be passed. This policy direction was similar to the stance taken by the Third Ito Hirobumi Cabinet and Goto Shinpei, who was appointed to take charge of rule over Taiwan. It was also a very convenient stance for the army, which wanted its power in Taiwan to be free from any invention by the Diet and the parliamentary parties in colonial affairs. Parties such as the Rikken Seiyu-kai, who were aiming at participation in colonial policy making, were of the opinion that Taiwan governance ought to be a Japanese domestic administrative matter decided mainly by the Diet. However, such an idea was far to advanced for the times, and the parliamentary deliberations resulted in a three-year extention of the original rokusan law. When the issue came up again three years later, the Katsura Cabinet decided to draft a new bill emphasizing in its tone Taiwanese political and institutional independence. However, within the formatian process of the Keien regime from the time of the war with Russia, Katsura had approached such figures as the Seiyu-kai's Saionji Kinmochi and Hara Takashi on the question of colonial policy, and decided to abandon a stance emphasizing independence for Taiwan and support the Rikken Seiyu-kai's position. This change is no doubt telling of Katsura's recognition of the expansion of power being achieved by the political parties at the time, but also reveals a conviction that the policy direction supported by the army and the Yamagata clique had definitely reached its limitations. As a result, the first Saionji Cabinet and its Home Affairs Minister Hara Takashi decided to introduce into the 22nd session of the Diet a bill that would gradually realize a change in the rokusan law in accordance with the ideals of the rising political parties. Despite opposition to this new bill from such people as Kodama Gentaro and Goto Shinpei in the Taiwan governor-general's offices, Hara engaged Katsura in negotiations over the rokusan question and gained the latter's consent for a new bill to be introduced. However, due to opposition from the Yamagata-led house of lords, the passage of the Saionji Cabinet's bill and a transition to a colonial policy created under its ideals failed. Within the process of this confrontation, Katsura began to take action independent from the Yamagata clique, which was noticed and employed by the Hara-Seiyu-kai faction in its attempts to block the

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