In This paper, the author attempts to investigate duice (answers to imperial examination questions) by Dong Zhongshu, a well-known figure in the intellectual history of China and clarify certain problems regarding their authenticity. In another monograph, the author already analyzed documents concerning duice which survive in the Hanshu 漢書 (History of the Former Han Dynasty), and came to the following conclusions. Answers to imperial examination questions are required (1) to be itemized in form, (2) to be preceded by a repetition of each passage of the question, (3) to begin with the standard phrase chen wen 臣聞 ("Thus have I, your subject, heard"), and (4) to have a conclusion to each answer. However, when the three answers to imperial examination questions attributed to Dong Zhongshu are considered in light of these four rules, several doubts arise. For example, his first answers contain three parts, which the emperor did not require at all, In addition, his answers do not begin with the fixed phrase chen wen, but rather with the unusual chen jin an 臣謹案 ("I, your subject, have respectfully considered"). Moreover, a number of his answers do not follow a repetition. of the passage of the question, and they also lack a conclusion. In the second answers, there are two different kinds inconsistent with each other. Finally, at the end of the third answers, there is a long passage which expresses Dong's own personal opinion in full. Consequently, there seem to be a number of contradictory elements in Dong Zhongshu's duice. Based on these doubts, the author supposes that these duice consist of two different components, one composed by Dong himself and another written by adherents and followers who attributed their writing to Dong. Going a step further, the author discusses the fact that these answers were compiled under the title Dong Zhongshu shu 董仲舒書 (Records of Dong Zhongshu), at the end of the Former Han. He also presumes that the biography of Dong in the Hanshu was written based on these records. It should be noted, however, that the biography of Dong Zhongshu itself was intentionally compiled by Ban Gus 班固 based on his own ideas. On the basis of this research, the author concludes that it is necessary to reexamine the generally accepted opinion that Dong established Confucianism as the state doctrine under the reign of Emperor Wu 武帝 during the Former Han.
It has been thought that during the Muromachi Period, the "king of Japan" (the Muromachi Bakufu shogun) did not have exclusive authority over diplomatic relations with foreign countries. Diplomacy with Korea was carried out on a so-called "pluralistic" basis not only by the "king of Japan" but also by such powerful families in western Japan. as the Ouchi and Tsushima-So clans and by powerful provincial feudal lords residing in the capital and calling themselves "ministers of the capital" (ojo-daijin -王城大臣). However, we find source materials dated 1470 that confirm the existence of not only a number of embassies representing these "ministers of the capital" but also "pseudo-embassies representing the king of Japan," bring up the question of what constituted an "authentic" Japanese diplomatic mission. In this paper, the author examines whether or not we can confirm in the available Japanese sources if there actually were persons whose names were used for the purpose of conducting diplomatic missions; and if so, what similarities and differences did they possess ? The author was able to confirm only one case of an authentic, official embassy in the name of such persons, the diplomatic mission representing minister of the capital Sabuei Yoshiatsu sent in 1431. All the other cases found, beginning in 1455, were pseudo-missions carried out through the cooperation of merchants in Hakata and Tsushima. Furthermore, in order to stop these pseudo-embassies in the names of ministers of the capital and the king of Japan, Japan and Korea set up a system of diplomatic certification called the gafu 牙符 system, which eventually brought about the disappearance of minister of the capital diplomatic missions in the early sixteenth century. The significance such facts have for studying international relations in medieval Japan is twofold. First, they call for the reevaluation of the boom that occurred in sending diplomatic missions to Korea during the time. This "diplomaticboom," which lasted from the late 1460s to the early 1470s, was a phenomenon that saw a flood of embassies to Korea from Japan in the wake of storied concerning auspicious Buddhist omens occurring in the Choson Dynasty. This boom has been studied mainly from the aspect of how the diplomats responded to this phenomenon: that is, their view of korea at the time. However, the author has, made clear that the nucleus of this diplomatic boom was minister of the capital embassies that flocked to Korea in 1470; and given the fact that all of these missions were pseudo-embassies, any discussion of what the general view of Korea was at the time becomes moot. Rather, an attempt should be made to understand this diplomatic boom in terms of pseudo-embassies that took advantage of the political confusion in the capital region during the Onin era civil wars from the standpoint of how these impostor diplomats viewed Japan at the time. Secondly, with regard to the heretofore vague definition of Japan-Korean diplomacy as being pluralistic in character, the author argues that his research has shown clearly that "diplomatic sovereignty" in Muromachi Japan was concentrated in the hands of the "king of Japan," based on firm shogunal authority in the capital region within the framework of relationships between the Bakufu and its provincial magistrates (shugo 守護). In other words, in practice a central core existed called "Muromachi bakufu foreign diplomacy". This discovery has finally made possible a Comprehensive understanding of international relations under Japan's medieval state institutions that goes beyond the mere categories of Japan-Choson and Japan-Ming relations.
The political crisis that occurred in Japan in 1916 (Taisho 5) is represents a crucial stage in the transition between 1913 and 1918 from the "Keien" settlement to the era of parliamentary government. Although many historians have investigated the process of this political crisis, which lasted from February to October 1916, they have not fully understood the political situation during 1913-1918, known as "Taisho-zenki". This paper mainly investigates the complicated situation in the House of Peers at the time of the crisis, a subject that has here-tofore been ignored by almost all historians. First, the author attempts to elucidate negotiations concerning succession to the premiership among Okuma, Terauchi and Yamagata, a "Genro", during this crisis. It is generally thought that the crisis was caused by the stubbornness of Terauchi. However, he was the only one with the flexibility to solve the problem. On the contrary, it was Okuma who refused to compromise. Secondly, the House of Peers' Saiwai club, the largest group in the House, was split into many factions. Therefore, they did not have enough power to support the Terauchi Cabinet. Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives three main government Parties, the Rikkendoushi-kai Kensei-kai and Koyu Club, were united. into the "Kensei-kai" to support Takaaki Kato as prime minister. Okuma advised the Emperor to select Kato as his successor; but Yamagata opposed this move and selected Terauchi. Although Yamagata rejected Kato as primier, he did not think the new administration could stand up against both Houses. Nevertheless, contrary to Yamagata's expectations, Terauchi did not receive the support of both Houses, resulting in a new ministry that was fragile legislatively.