The purpose of this paper is to analyze quantitatively the careers of the intendants de province (intendants de justice, police et finances) by adopting the method of prosopography. The intendants have been regarded as an important mechanism in local administration in France. Given extensive competence and stationed in the intendance, they wielded the powerful local control. They were commissaires who were appointed by the king, and the royal government was able to dismiss them at any time. This is different from the officeholders (officiers) who purchased government posts (offices) under the venality-system and were irremovable. In recent years, however, it has been questioned whether their local administration was effective in practice, because the intendants themselves came from the maitres des requetes, that is to say, the officeholders. To clarify this subject, the author makes a comprehensive examination of 317 intendants nominated from 1661 until the French Revolution, focusing upon their past careers and courses of promotion. In most cases, a great majority of intendants started their careers as conseillers of sovereign courts, especially Parlement de Paris, that were the higher officeholders. However, future intendant took up the post of conseiller in his youth and his term of office was exceedingly short. He then assumed the office of maitre des requetes as soon as possible and began his administrative career. Maitres des requetes were of couse officeholders who formed the corps, but they were subject to the influence of the Crown, which cultivated them as faithful magistrates to the king. They became habituated to the operations of royal government and accumulated practical experience and knowledge needed for local administration in the Conseil du roi. The Crown selected its most trusted and competent agents from them. Several intendants advanced to higher positions in the administrative bureaucracy such as conseillers d'Etat, controleurs generaux des finances, and secretaires d' Etat. Therefore, intendants certainly were recruited from officeholders, but the womb from which the intendants came, namely, maitres des requetes, took on a particular character unlike other officeholders, and new factors such as loyalty, talent and experience were taken into consideration at the time of their nomination. Consequently, intendants and maitre des requetes formed a caste of new ruling elites, as the system of recruitment of intendants germinated the modern bureaucracy.
This paper focuses on the role of Sheng Xuanhuai 盛宣懐 in the complex political changes under the Guang Xu (光緒) Political Reform after the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. It is populary understood that the Political Reform movement was broken down by the refusal of Empresses Dowager, who after the Boxer Uprising changed its conservative policy and agreed to take an unyielding stand against the foreign powers. The general view is based on the mistaken idea that there was no effort made at institutional reform during the two years following the "Hundred Days" of 1898. Political reform during the late Qing period began with a plan to modernize its military forces, which had been defeated by Japan. The edict of 1895, which required the reconstitution of tariffs, was the most important policy for the fiscal reconstruction of the central government. In order to change the tariff rate and increase revenue, diplomatic negotiations to revise the commercial treaty (Treaty of Tientsin, 1858) were begun in the fall of 1899. Then, as the Boxer Uprising broke out in North China, Sheng Xuanhuai took a part in diplomatic negotiations to maintain safety in Yangzu and South-east coast of China. These negotiations prepared the international protocol of 1901 and the Mackay Treaty, which revised tariff rates. It is the conventional understanding that the Guang Xu Political Reform was suddenly started in 1901; however, the analysis in this paper shows that Sheng Xuanhuai, who had contacted Wang Wenshao (王文韶), carefully presented the plan of Political Reform. Especially, it attracts our attention that Sheng Xuanhuai's telegram letter (30th Dec, 1900) to Wang Wenshao used the special term 'composing reform plans' one month earlier than the edict of Guang Xu Political Reform, and became a key term of the Guang Xu Political Reform from 1901. The author shows that Sheng Xuanhuai proposed the establishment of an administrator for commerce.
In March 1943, during the Pacific War, an Administrative Inspection system was enacted. The purpose of this system was assigning a minister of the state or cabinet adviser as a inspector, to examine the production and to point out problems to productivity increase. Such Administrative Inspections were carried out 13 times in all by the end of the war. Each one was characteristic of the war situation at the time of it implementation. The first inspection was carried out on government policy penetration into the iron and steel industry in Kanagawa Prefecture. As the result of this inspection, the government established a region administrative council. The third inspection aimed at increasing aircraft production in contrast to the first one which had had put emphasis on the administrative aspect. The inspection report said that aircraft production was certain to rise 2.5 times utilizing the existing facilities and labor. The result of this third inspection exerted influence on. the establishment the Munitions Ministry. The eighth inspection was performed on provisions. This time, unlike former inspections, it pointed out the need to revise the existing uniform policy, and regain the people's trust in the food administration. Administrative Inspection helped to gather data on the Japanese economy in order to formulate government policy. The goal of Administrative Inspection was wartime productivity increase. There were a few sectors that did increase output temporally, but all decreased after; and confused production fields can also be found. The government provided incentives for an increase in productivity by helping to supply equipment, raw materials and labor, relaxing restrictions, and correcting irrational policies. However, there existed a restrictive factor in the pressure to increase productivity from the military and the bureaucracy. Therefore, there were both incentives and restrictions factor in the policy to increase wartime productivity, resulting in policy failed to invoke spontaneous cooperation from the Japanese people.