It has often been noted that manufacturing in Italian cities was in decline during the modern period and that the Italian economy was not based on urban industry but on rural agriculture. Corresponding with this fundamental transformation, the Enlightenment reforms enacted in many Italian States during the second half of the 18th century were aimed at the construction of a new society based on landowners. The reforms of Peter Leopold in Tuscany are regarded as one example, and many historians have stressed their Physiocratic character.
However, one aspect of those reforms that is most difficult to understand from this perspective is the reinstitution of policies to protect the silk industry. In 1788, just seven years after the traditional prohibition on the export of raw silk was lifted, export was again stopped in order to protect the textile industry, a prohibition that remained in place until the fall of the Grand Duchy. Many historians have considered this to be a only a partial, and thus unimportant, deviation from general Physiocratic policy. Nevertheless, taking into account recent research which has stressed the importance of the Tuscan silk industry, as well as disagreements among ministers within the government of Peter Leopold, it is possible that those who worked to sustain this protectionist policy in fact wanted to reorient national economic development on the basis of a new approach, requiring a review of economic theory at the time in light of protectionist intentions.
The author begins this article with an overview of the silk weaving industry in Florence during the first half of the 18th century, then looks into the institutional changes that occurred during the decades of the 1770s and 80s. He concludes with memoranda written by the main architect of Leopold's reforms, Francesco Maria Gianni, analyzing his economic ideas and protectionist proposals. The analysis shows that by promoting the thriving silk textile industry of Florence by means of protectionist policy, the Grand Duchy's objective was to open a path to economic development based upon the export of industrial products such as silk textiles.
In ancient Japan during the Heian period there were restrictions on overseas travel, called tokaisei 渡海制, which required permission from the Emperor to leave the country. In discussing these sanctions, the author of this article takes up the interesting case of the Tendai Sect monk Jojin, whose pilgrimage to Song China in 1017 (never to return) has been described as an “unauthorized (clandestine) departure” due to the desire of certain aristocratic friends of the monk to keep him from making the journey. The author raises a number of problems regarding such an interpretation, including inconclusive evidence and the mere fact that these same friends, who desired him not to leave, assisted him in his efforts to leave.
The tokaisei restrictions, which form the backdrop to Jojin's overseas departure, have been described as a ban on leaving Japan without the emperor's knowledge. However, when one reviews the actual related cases, the great majority of “unauthorized departures” were successful; while upon the return of the “stowaways”, it was close to impossible to avoid detection by the state-controlled customs and foreign trade authorities. Therefore, the reality of the tokaisei restrictions created an environment in which it may have been possible to leave Japan in violation of them, but near to impossible to reenter the country without the imperial court's eventually knowing of the journey.
Next, the article raises the problem of Jojin's “clandestine departure” being unique to all the other cases of similar behavior under the tokaisei restrictions, meaning that his case had to be “exceptional”. The evidence to date for the “clandestine” nature of Jojin's journey comes from three sources: (1)his own China travel journal, San Tendai Godaisan-Ki; (2)he diary of Jojin's mother, Jojin Ajari no Haha no Shu; and (3)a “lives of the saints” genre biographical source, Zoku Honcho Ojoden, the last of whose unhistorical content raises doubts as to its veracity concerning Jojin's activities.
The account of the journey in Source (2) has Jojin stating, “If ［when? after?］an announcement［of an imperial order; senji 宣旨］ is issued, I will sail to Song［China］”, before his actual departure. Here we have circumstantial evidence implying that Jojin's departure may have in fact been authorized, thus removing any grounds that it was at all secretive. Finally, we find in Source (1), Jojin's own words, nothing allowing one to conclusively determine that he had left Japan in secret.
Given such a lack of historiographical evidence in light of the reality of the tokaisei restrictions clarified in the article, the author concludes that in all likelihood, Jojin's departure for Song China was authorized in full accordance with those sanctions.
The “Great Merger of the Showa Era” (Showa no Daigappei 昭和の大合併) was modern Japan's second nationwide policy of municipal mergers and dissolutions (haichi bungo 配置分合), conducted for several years from October 1953 onwards. All municipalities (shichoson 市町村) in all prefectures were supposed to take part in order to reduce the total number of municipalities to one third as a measure to solve the postwar fiscal crisis being faced at the local administrative levels. During this “Great Merger” many new cities were established, one of which was Tenri City in Nara prefecture.
Tenri City, which was founded on 1 April 1954, initially incorporated six towns (cho) and villages (mura): Tanbaichi-cho, Nikaido-mura, Asawa-mura, Fukuzumi-mura (all from the district of Yamanobe-gun), Yanagimoto-cho (Shiki-gun), and Ichinomoto-cho (Soekami-gun). The name “Tenri” was derived from the newly rising religious sect, Tenrikyo, founded in 1838 and headquartered in the Mishima area of Tanbaichi-cho, which was the home of the sect’s founder Nakayama Miki. Since Tenrikyo is a religion which demands and encourages pilgrimages to its headquarters, since it is also the main sanctuary, Tanbaichi had enjoyed economic prosperity since the end of the 19th century. Therefore, the “Great Merger” presented Tanbaichi with an excellent opportunity to found a new city with the town and the Tenri Sect as its center.
The Revised History of Tenri City (Kaitei Tenrishi-Shi 改訂天理市史), which was published in 1976, does not describe the municipal merger which created the city in much detail, but has chosen rather to present an overview, implying that no problems were encountered during the process. To the contrary, there were indeed several major problems which threatened to prevent the newly merged municipality from obtaining city (shi 市) status, as described in such contemporary sources as official documents and news coverage, which have not been included in the Revised History's five separate volumes of source materials. For example, Nikaido-mura and Ichinomoto-cho did not at first wish to be merged into Tenri City; and in order to use the term “Tenri” as the name of the new city, the Tenrikyo Sect would have to give its permission, which at the beginning was not a certainty, as the protocols of the merger commission indicate.
This article discusses the role of Tenrikyo during the merger process in more detail within the context of the above mentioned problems, then goes on to discuss the significance of the Tenri City incorporation for the “Great Merger” program in general. Although the research to date on Japanese municipal mergers and dissolutions has not considered religion as a factor, this article shows that in the case of Tenri City religious aspects cannot be ignored entirel.