This article analyzes efforts by the Soviet Union to maintain some form of cooperation between the member states of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), by focusing on the negotiations of 1990-91 within the Council concerning its reform and the formation of a successor organization. The research to date on the CMEA has almost totally neglected these intra-CMEA talks, wrongly assuming that the Council simply collapsed after Eastern European regime change in 1989. To the contrary, the collapse of the CMEA was far from self-evident; in fact, as this article shows, the Council ended up disbanding itself as a result of rapid changes occurring in European international relations, policy changes in some CMEA member states, and prolonged negotiations with non-European member states.
   While the Soviet Union at first attempted to bring about economic integration within the CMEA, amidst strong objection from Central European countries---namely, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland---it was finally agreed to form the Organization for International Economic Relations (OMES), whose main aim would be consultation between its member states, resulting in the Organization having only limited authority. Moreover, due to demands made by Cuba, one of the CMEA’s non-European members, for special arrangements and its consequent objection to the OMES draft statute, it took additional time to reach a unanimous agreement.
   After the Soviet Union seemed to have succeeded in obtaining approval from all the member-states at the beginning of February 1991, the three Central European members retracted their approval shortly thereafter, on the grounds that non-European countries would take part in OMES. However, the real reason for their unilateral withdrawal was rather their decision to prioritize talks over their accession into the European Community. As a result of this policy reversal, the CMEA disbanded without any organization to succeed it.  

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During the war interim period, the Japanese central government repeatedly tried to exert influence on or negotiate with governments of its colonial territories, notably the Government-General of Korea and the state of Manchukuo, whose administrative authorities were strong enough to resist unilateral intervention. The research to date on this kind of political process involving the central and colonial governments of Imperial Japan has yet to shed sufficient light on affairs after the Manchurian Incident of 1931, during which time cooperation with colonial governments rapidly increased in importance for overcoming the Great Depression and constructing a self-sufficient economic bloc comprised of Japan and its colonies. The purpose of this article is to consider how the Japanese central government negotiated with the colonial administrations of Korea and Manchukuo to form imperial economic policy during the 1930s, focusing on agricultural measures, over which an especially intense conflict of interests existed between the center and its colonies, in particular tracing the activities of the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (hereafter MAF) in negotiating with the two colonial governments.
  Early in the 1930s, MAF came into political conflict with the Government-General of Korea over restrictions on rice imports, in the midst of Japanese growers suffering from a collapse in the price of rice during the Great Depression. This attempt at bilateral negotiations met with strong objections on the Korean side and ultimately failed.
  In contrast, MAF was able to successfully negotiate with Manchukuo by firstly participating in the formulation of development programs through the Japan-Manchuria Industrial Regulation Committee, comprised of such bodies as the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Natural Resource Bureau (資源局), thus facilitating multilateral negotiations. Furthermore, MAF was given the opportunity to participate in the formulation of the Manchurian Five Year Industrial Development Plan. Through this process, MAF was able to establish cooperative relations with Manchukuo, which after the outbreak of the 2nd Sino-Japanese War, enabled the Ministry to formulate imperial agricultural policy reflecting Japan’s interests in the region.​ 

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