It is well known that, in the process of Toyotomi Hideyoshi's (秀吉) invasion of Korea, various feudal lords (daimyo 大名) were subjected to a consolidated military service levy based on the annual output in terms of rice (kokudaka 石高) of their domains. In this essay, the author will take up the process of how daimyo, who had not yet dismantled the castles and forts, built within their domains by warlords, during the previous Sengoku period (1467-1568), were able to muster the great amount of men and provisions for the Korean expedition. For this purpose, the Shimazu Family (島津氏) of Kyushu (九州), who played a leading role in the invasion, will be taken as a case in point. Actually, the Shimazu Family was not able to provide a military force for the initial maneuvers involved in the first expedition to Korea (1592-1595), and was, therefore, called upon to carry "Japan's greatest follow-up campaign." For this purpose, a land survey was carried out by a Toyotomi functionary, Ishida Mitsunari (石田三成), with an aim to significantly increase the directly held domains of the Shimazu Family. However, such a plan was nipped in the bud due to the resistance, forthcome from various classes of Shimazu subjects in response to the re-apportionment of fiefs effected by the Ishida survey. As a result, 78,000 koku 石 of the Shimazu holdings, valued at a total 200,000 koku, went into fallow due to an insuffiicience of cultivators. What this all means is that the original intent of Hideyoshi's land surveys (Taiko Kenchi 太閤検地), that is, the creation of direct daimyo holdings capable of satisfying the need for military provisions, as well as the formation of an enfeoffed entourage capable to shoulder the burden of military service, were, in a word, thwarted. Being unable to answer the call to arms, and faced with possible relocation out of Kyushu or even fall from daimyo status, the Shimazu were driven to expediency. Therefore, with promises of fief appropriations, they demanded such groups as locally based samurais (jizamurai 地侍) within their domains and direct vassals desiring additions in their holdings, to stand as the Shimazu force for the invasion of Korea. This demand was answered by a self-provisioned army, composed of such people as the former vassals of families, who had previously opposed the Shimazu and had fallen, vassals who had lost a good portion of their fiefs as a result of the Shimazu's pledge of allegiance to the Toyotomi Family, and local samurais who had been amassing military power while pracficing agricultural management. While, on the surface, the military forces under the Toyotomi regime were to be supported by funds from the public coffers, in the case of the Shimazu Family, whose direct holdings were incapable of provisioning a standing army, it to muster all voluntary self-provisioned force was the only possible alternative. In this very fact lies the proof to negate the conventionally held opinion that the military forces mustered by the Shimazu Family and other families of daimyo status for the Korean expeditions, were standing armies of military men completely separated from agricultural activities (heino bunri 兵農分離). Despite being the object of a thorough cadastre carried out by the central regime, the Shimazu domains still widely maintained local samurai status holders unremoved from agrarian responsibilities ; and rather than daimyo power working to negate these soldier-farmers, it actually strove to garner their support in meeting the military service demanded by the Toyotomi regime. Later, between the years 1611 and 1614, the Shimazu were to carry out their own land surveys and promulgate (in 1611) a set of restrictions ordering the separation of soldier and peasant. However, despite this, some of samurai rank throughout the Tokugawa feudal (bakuhan 幕藩) system still, in rare cases, set up camp in agrarian villages, and took the lead in

(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)

View full abstract

If one were to analyze the previous research work done on provinces held in fief (chigyokoku 知行国), one could divide this work into studies on the changes which took place in that system over time and studies of the system's structural characteristics. As opposed to the former's tendency to limit itself merely to provinces held in fief by the Taira Family (Heishi 平氏), in this essay the author attempts to trace the development of provincial fiefdoms in general over the whole period of the retired emperor's house rule (Insei-ki 院政期) from 1086 to 1179. In concrete terms, the author will trace the changes which occurred in the provincial fiefdoms held not only by the Taira but also by the female members of the retired emperor's family (Nyoin 女院), house advisors (In-no-kin-shin 院近臣) and the Fujiwara Regents (Sekkanke 摂関家), and investigate the changes in relation to the political process of the time. In his investigations the author was able to discover some previously unnoticed historical materials which helped him to make the following points : 1)Provinces held in fief were established into a system in the form of allotments to house advisors ; however, this stage was only achieved after the 2nd year of the Kajo 嘉承 era (1107), when the house government of the ex-emperor Shirakawa 白河 got under way in earnest. 2)Provincial fiefdoms formed the material base of the lord/vassal relationship between the ex-emperor and fiefdom holders ; and the appointed numder of these fiefdoms was the numerical expression of the degree of intimacy between the two parties. And for that reason, all fiefdom holders went out in many ways to both maintain and increase their appaointed number. 3)The Taira Family, through the risings of the Hogen 保元 and Heiji 平治 eras (1156 and 1159), succeeded in expropriating the provincial fiefdoms held by house advisors and the Fujiwara Regents, and built the Taira hegemony upon them which lasted until 1185. 4)The fact that the infeudation of the top administrative office for Kyushu, Dazaifu 太宰府, was urged by both the Taira and the Fujiwara Regents, proves that the provincial fiefdom system also spread to various offices within the imperial court.

View full abstract