The most important mechanism for litigation concerning feudal proprietorship during the Kamakura Shogunate was the Hikitsuke (引付), or the court reaching a decision by mutual consent. However, during the Muromachi Shogunate we can see that fief related lawsuits were fundamentally decided at the discretion of the Shoguns themselves. This change in the way of rendering judgement is very important. In this essay the present writer investigates how the Muromachi Shoguns came to render judgement based on their authority and how the court presided over by them came to be established. First, the writer studies Naidangata (内談方), which is known as a court similar to Hikitsuke except for the presence of Ashikaga Tadayoshi (足利直義). The writer then indicates that the second Shognn Yoshiakira (義詮) started a new court called Gozenzata (御前沙汰)... that is, "a trial before Yoshiakira"... which dealt with the same kind of lawsuits as Hikitsuke and gradually surpassed it in authority. Thus, Hikitsuke gradually lost real power and virtually came to an end with the continuing reinforcement of Gozenzata's authority. However, Gozenzata could be overruled under the influence of another court held by the Shogun, namely OnShogata (恩賞方), which dealt with claims for fiefs granted as service rewards and which had existed since the biginning of the Muromachi Shogunate. Since Gozenzata was reduced to be composed of similar members to Onshogata, the secretary to the Shogun (Shitsuji 執事) came to be present at Gozenzata. In Onshogata this secretary controlled the only department, Tokorozukegata (所付方), Which assisted the Shogun on practical affairs. However, because Gozenzatd lacked such a department as Tokorozukegata, the secretary would often find himself at odds with the Shogun. Finally this secretary retired from Gozenzata to reopen and personally direct Hikitsuke. He was soon to retire from Onshogata as well. In this way Gozenzata turned into a court which was composed of Shogun and functionaries (bugyonin 奉行人) and which was fully established during the reign of the third Shogun Yoshimitsu (義満). During this period, too, the court presided over by the shitsuji was formed on the basis of the reopened Hikitsuke. And a similar relation-ship between Onshogata and Tokorozukegata was carried on between these two courts, which enabled them to exist side by side over a long period of time.

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The Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 has long been considered an epoch-making event by which Parliament finally overcame the monarchy of the Stuarts. However, this too easily accepted view makes it impossible to see any serious meaning in the rather negative attitude of the Jacobites towards the Revolution. But since an assurance of the 'Revolution Settlement' was above all guaranteed by maintaining through parliamentary laws a new monarch against his lifelong rival, Louis XIV, and since only a minority of Englishmen accepted the Revolution without hesitation, Jacobitism should be regarded as more reality than nightmare. To begin with, this paper questions whether the Act of Settlement of 1701 could actually 'settle' the succession of the Crown and do away with all hopes of Jacobitism. And if not, as the author believes, it must be asked how subsequent attempts were made to secure that settlement and what circumstances necessitated such measures. One of the most important events of 1702 occured when Louis XIV, despite his former recognition of William III as the lawful King of England in the Treaty of Ryswick of 1697, proclaimed James II's son 'King James III'. This single action was enough for England to declare war on France, although the Spanish succession has been a sounding issue among the major sovereigns of Europe since 1701. Just before the War of Spanish Succession broke out, the English Parliament decided at last to take positive steps to reject any implications of Jacobitism as illegal : first, dealing with foreign allies by proposing a Commons' Resolution requiring an additional clause in some treatises of alliance ; and next, dealing with the English people themselves with two resolute pieces of legislation -the Bill of Attainder for the Old Pretender and the Abjuration Oath demanding that they 'renounce, refuse and abjure any allegiance or obedience to him'. These events make clear that Jacobitism was regarded in much the same way as Louis XIV's intervention in determining the English throne and therefore in the Revolution Settlement itself, and explain why Jacobitism posed a serious threat in that critical year of 1702. The fact that admittedly not all M.P.s were ready to abjure allegiance to the Pretender is another testimony concerning the extent to which the Revolution Settlement was established, or was expected to be established, during the thirteen years of William III's reign.

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