SHIGAKU ZASSHI
Online ISSN : 2424-2616
Print ISSN : 0018-2478
ISSN-L : 0018-2478
Volume 95 , Issue 7
Showing 1-20 articles out of 20 articles from the selected issue
  • Type: Cover
    1986 Volume 95 Issue 7 Pages Cover1-
    Published: July 20, 1986
    Released: November 29, 2017
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  • Type: Cover
    1986 Volume 95 Issue 7 Pages Cover2-
    Published: July 20, 1986
    Released: November 29, 2017
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  • Shoichi Oba
    Type: Article
    1986 Volume 95 Issue 7 Pages 1135-1172,1286-
    Published: July 20, 1986
    Released: November 29, 2017
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    Chinghis khan reorganized his troops in accordance with the decimal system in 1204 before he attacked the Naiman tribe. This formation was a military unit, but on the other hand, it was also an administrative unit. This system is called the Ch'ien-hu-zhi 千戸制, which has remained the standard system in the Mongol Empire since then. The features of this formation are a simple chain of command, a simple style of organization and ease of mobilization. It functioned very effectively. But this formation had irregular characteristics and various ploblems. For example, the chief of the Ch'ien-hu 千戸 (chiliarchs) posessed a Po-hu 百戸 (centurions) which was under his direct control. He held the post of the chief of the Po-hu concurrently. And the chief of the Po-hu posessed a Shi-hu 十戸 (decurions), which was under his direct control. He held the post of the chief of the Shi-hu concurrently. In these cases, we find the traces remaining of the body guard formation of clan faction organization. These cases do not describe the usual military formation of the Mongol empire. At least in the period of the Yuan dynasty, the hierarchy of officers was systematized bureaucratically and the officer's compentence was restricted reasonably. However, in the cace of the Shih-wei-ch'in-chun 侍衛親軍 (the imperial personal army), there was not a solitary commander who could lead the whole army in the bureaucratic system, in order to prevent an army clique from appearing. On the contrary, high officers of the central government were able to occupy the post of the solitary commander. It was too difficult to prevent men from concentrating power. They were the Mongolian and the Se-mu-ren 色目人 who stood on the basis of the Shih-wei-ch'in-chun. There are various explanations about the Ch'ien-hu. The correct explanation is that it was organized with one thousand hu 戸 (households), which were able to offer one thousand soldiers. In Mongol, the general idea of hu was that it was a kinship group, each such group with one manhood was counted as one hu, whose man was destined to be a soldier. A group with two soldiers was counted as too hu, and so on. Therefore, every hu had only one male member who should be a soldier. In Mongol it was the social custom that they counted the number of hu this way. The Ch'ien-hu was the military and administrative unit organized with one thousand hu each of which offered one soldier. However the number of members or hu was not mathematically strict. The Yuan dynasty used the system of Ch'ien-hu when it organized the Chinese into the Han-chun 漢軍. But the households of Han-chun could not stand the military economic burden. Therefore, the Yuan dynasty had to allow military households, which could not offer a soldier, to mainly bear military expenses. Consequently, the capacity for mobilization did not correspond to the fixed numbers in accordance with the decimal system. This difference resulted from the fact that the military formation of the nomadic society was applied without revision to the farming society. However, after the middle of the Yuan period, the formations of Han-chun were completed relatively, resulting in the military of the Mongols and the Se-mu-ren severely lacking in soldiers. This paper aims at describing the general idea of the military formation of the Mongol empire and the Yuan dynasty and how to solve it's structural deficiencies from the viewpoint of both the chain of command system and the style of organization.
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  • Yasuko Hatamori
    Type: Article
    1986 Volume 95 Issue 7 Pages 1173-1196,1284-
    Published: July 20, 1986
    Released: November 29, 2017
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    The extreme centralization of the Fourth Dynasty broke down gradually during the latter half of the Old Kingdom (the Fifth and Sixth Dynasties). In this period, the kings promulgated decrees of immunity upon some temples and funerary foundations. Especially, in the case of the exemptions to local temples in Upper Egypt, it is said that they were related to the two main factors which led to the decline of the State's system : financial difficulties and decentralization. That is, such exemptions damaged the economy of the land and gave rise to the power of the provincial nobles, thereby aiding the course of decentralization. The purpose of this paper will be to examine the validity of these statements. First of all, we will look at why these so-called immunity laws were enacted, what they hoped to accomplish, and the nature of their impact upon the socio-economic conditions of this period. In particular, we will first focus on the triangular relations between the royal authority, the local administrators, and the temples, and then see how these relations were altered by this granting of immunity to the temples, which by virtue of these decrees were exempted from many charges. The conclusions are as follows : (1)From the Fifth to the Mid-Sixth Dynasty, the local administration system in Upper Egypt changed gradually within the framework of central control. In theory, the immunity bestowed upon the temples meant the restraining of the local officials' power by protecting the temples from infringement and the burden of taxation, which were the sources of power for these provincial governors. (2)In practice, however, the temples were sometimes infringed upon by the local offices, although this infringement would have been much greater had the immunity laws not been enacted. (3)It is difficult to conclude that immunity damaged the State's finances severely, because we don't know how many temples or lands were granted these privileges within the same period. Since the kings were able to revoke the immunity we know from some decrees that they actually did, those privileges would not have been accorded without limit. (4)Finally, the local officials still managed in the following period to exert increasing control over the local temples. This can be explained by the fact that in accordance with the immunity decrees, the local officials were allowed to intervene in temple matters when it involved the protection or preservation of these institutions. The provincial governors might have interfered with temple business on that pretext. Therefore, we could say that the policy of immunity was only a temporary stop-gap measure, and in the final analysis, it was unable to check the eventual decline of the monarchy. So we should infer from this that the causes of the decline of the central authority were rooted in the conflict between the royal administrators and the provincial officials. And that in this context, the decrees of immunity were only minutely related to the two aforementioned factors which led to the eventual decline of the State's centralized system.
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  • Ryoju Sakurai
    Type: Article
    1986 Volume 95 Issue 7 Pages 1197-1220,1283-
    Published: July 20, 1986
    Released: November 29, 2017
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    In the post Russo-Japanese War period, streetcars in the city of Tokyo became a political issue with respect to fare increases and municipalization. The streetcars were a necessity for the city's residents, so this issue received a great deal of attention from the masses. One important aspect is the campaign which rose up against the Tokyo Railway Co. (Tokyo Tetsudo Kaisha 東京鉄道会社), the firm which controlled the Tokyo city council through pro-Seiyukai 政友会 party aldermen. Conventional scholarly accounts explain that fare increases, company mergers and municipalization were enacted by the Seiyukai. in conspiracy with their political cronies on the city council, a number of business cliques and a group of bureaucrats. However, in fact, a variety of different expectations and motives, not unrelated to the downturn in the economy of the time, played an important role in the alliances which were formed and the conflict which arose between the bureaucracy, the political parties, the business world and the masses. Here we see such cases as non-Seiyukai factions welcoming the social policy thinking of the bureaucracy, and the Seiyukai itself backing the interests of monopoly firms. For example, the nationalistic foreign expansionist faction (kokuminshugiteki taigaikoha 国民主義的対外硬派), which has been described as holding an anti-bureaucracy and therefore anti-Seiyukai position, was actually more flexible in its politics. Where they elected to throw their support between these two positions differed depending on the particular issue at hand and the general circumstances of the time. This complicated position taking was a result of the fact that the breadth of political choice was often determined by such factors as economic conditions and the Government's basic economic policies. This is exactly the case in the issue of Tokyo Railway during the era of the first Saionji 西園寺 and second Katsura 桂 cabinets (Jan. 1906-Aug. 1911). The economic and political problems which complicated this issue included : (1)the Tokyo city council majority faction (i.e. the Seiyukai faction), which reflected the wishes of Tokyo Railway, (2)the opposition city council minority, which backed municipalization, (3)the close relationship between the Seiyukai itself and Tokyo Railway, (4)the Katsura cabinet's policy direction favoring municipalization, (5)the municipalization policy of Goto Shimpei 後藤新平, which was designed to eliminate the political influence of the Seiyukai from the Tokyo city council and fully realize public utility company service, (6)the political movements of the masses. While this paper takes up the specific issue of Tokyo streetcars, the major problem itself is hardly confined to one region alone. The major issue for Japan as a whole following the war with Imperial Russia was the creation of prosperity and strength in connection with the establishment of a militarily powerful nation. In order to accomplish this task, it was necessary to harness the people's energy into some sort of organizational form. The mere recognition of this problem was identical to the quest for political power. Those politicians, like Goto, who raised urban issues, took up the pros and cons of fare increases and publically sponsored utilities as one link in overall urban policies, in order to give full play to the people's energy and to eliminate the barriers to the development of local-government. Therefore, these issues formed one aspect of how to re-integrate the Japanese empire as a whole. It was in this sense that the social policy considerations of bureaucratic factions took a critical position vis-a-vis Seiyukai control of the Tokyo city council, and were able to team up with the non-Seiyukai minority in designing a plan for the municipalization of puplic utilities.
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  • Makoto Ogawa
    Type: Article
    1986 Volume 95 Issue 7 Pages 1221-1229
    Published: July 20, 1986
    Released: November 29, 2017
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  • Masahisa Segawa
    Type: Article
    1986 Volume 95 Issue 7 Pages 1229-1235
    Published: July 20, 1986
    Released: November 29, 2017
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  • [in Japanese]
    Type: Article
    1986 Volume 95 Issue 7 Pages 1236-1237
    Published: July 20, 1986
    Released: November 29, 2017
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    Download PDF (249K)
  • [in Japanese]
    Type: Article
    1986 Volume 95 Issue 7 Pages 1237-1239
    Published: July 20, 1986
    Released: November 29, 2017
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    Download PDF (377K)
  • [in Japanese]
    Type: Article
    1986 Volume 95 Issue 7 Pages 1239-1240
    Published: July 20, 1986
    Released: November 29, 2017
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  • [in Japanese]
    Type: Article
    1986 Volume 95 Issue 7 Pages 1240-1241
    Published: July 20, 1986
    Released: November 29, 2017
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    Download PDF (264K)
  • [in Japanese]
    Type: Article
    1986 Volume 95 Issue 7 Pages 1241-1243
    Published: July 20, 1986
    Released: November 29, 2017
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    Download PDF (377K)
  • [in Japanese]
    Type: Article
    1986 Volume 95 Issue 7 Pages 1243-1244
    Published: July 20, 1986
    Released: November 29, 2017
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    Download PDF (269K)
  • [in Japanese]
    Type: Article
    1986 Volume 95 Issue 7 Pages 1244-1245
    Published: July 20, 1986
    Released: November 29, 2017
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  • Type: Appendix
    1986 Volume 95 Issue 7 Pages 1245-
    Published: July 20, 1986
    Released: November 29, 2017
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  • Type: Article
    1986 Volume 95 Issue 7 Pages 1246-1280
    Published: July 20, 1986
    Released: November 29, 2017
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  • Type: Article
    1986 Volume 95 Issue 7 Pages 1281-1286
    Published: July 20, 1986
    Released: November 29, 2017
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  • Type: Appendix
    1986 Volume 95 Issue 7 Pages App1-
    Published: July 20, 1986
    Released: November 29, 2017
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  • Type: Cover
    1986 Volume 95 Issue 7 Pages Cover3-
    Published: July 20, 1986
    Released: November 29, 2017
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    Download PDF (38K)
  • Type: Cover
    1986 Volume 95 Issue 7 Pages Cover4-
    Published: July 20, 1986
    Released: November 29, 2017
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