This paper aims to elucidate an aspect of the machine industry during the early and mid-Meiji era through a positive analysis of machinery supply for coal mining, which was the largest on-land machinery market. Japan's production of coal mining machinery started early in the Meiji Period by foreign-financed manufacturers. The production by the Ministry of Industry followed. Products of the ministry were inferior in both cost and quality. But the attempt was significant in introducing machinery production technology to Japan. In the mid-Meiji Period, top quality machinery mainly imported from the West was in use at the Miike mine, and the use of simple steam powered machinery spread mainly through the Chikuho coal fields. The former was of first class even compared to contemporary Western machines. An attempt at domestic production of this machinery was made from 1893 to 1896 at a factory affiliated to Miike mine under the instruction of graduates of higher institutions of technology using imported machine tools. The latter, in contrast, utilized the steam engines practical at minor, underdeveloped coal mines. These were produced by craftsmen who learned their skills at national and foreign-financed factories and used homemade lathes. The large demand for these machines gave rise to multi-layered production systems formed by independent workshops of craftsmen using Western technology, native ironworks and factories in the form of corporations. Thus inexpensive and speedy supply of the product was attained. The Process for domestic production of the former was the attempt to follow the technical level of the contemporary Western machine industry. The latter process was something like reproducting the process of the machine industry during the Western motive power revolution.

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The first premiership of Istvan Tisza is a neglected period of Hungarian historiography. Tisza's role in triggering the Constitutional Crisis has often been described as that of a stubborn, tactless politician, or even characterized as a "bull in a china shop." Against the opposition parties which used filibustering as an instrument to enforce the Hungarian command-language in the joint army dominated by German nationals, Tisza stoutly opposed this on three grounds. First of all, he believed that the alliance with Hapsburg-Austria was an indispensable asset for the national security of Hungary. Secondly, there was a possibility of a fatal consequence by delaying the effort for armament-expansion with regards to the territorial ambition of the Balkan states and their potential ally, Russia. Thirdly, Tisza was convinced of the critical importance of parliament as a core of national integration in the Hungarian political system, and feared the harmful effect of filibustering -total loss of prestige of the century-old mechanism. To reach a compromise with the opposition parties, however, Tisza in turn had to abandon his lenient policy toward ethnic minorities. Since the opposition leaders claimed that the tradition of the joint army was virtually German-oriented and strongly affected the rank-and-file of minority soldiers to the disadvantage of Hungarian national unity, the Elementary School Bill of 1904 aimed at strengthening state surveillance over the schools attended by minorities to promote the notorious magyarization policy. Such a change in policy received severe criticism from a part of the minorities. Moreover, as Minister of Interior, Tisza encountered increasing farmer-uprisings in minority areas influenced by socialist ideas, which he had branded as a sworn enemy of the existing social order. He started the relentless oppression of these movements, which created a rift between the government and the opposition especially during the railway strike of April 1904. The difficulties with which the first Tisza ministry had to contend suggests that the Constitutional Crisis resulted from not so much the conflict between the ruling classes of Austria and Hungary, as from the deep-rooted internal crisis within the multi-national Hungarian society. At the same time, these difficulties also bring to light how seriously Tisza's political conception suffered from inner contradictions and how poorly it could compete with reality.

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Scholars have scarcely dealt in suitable detail with the political structure and function of the Muromach Shogunate after the Onin-Bunmei War (1467-77). This essay clarifies the actual circumstances behind the 9th Shogun Yoshihisa's 義尚 decision making by means of gozen sata 御前沙汰 (direct judgement) and discusses its significance in connection with Bakufu politics. Until his expedition to Omi province in 1487 in order to surpress Rokkaku Takayori 六角高頼, a shugo who had ignored shogunal ordinances, Yoshihisa as shogun had had no political power. The ex-Shogun Yoshimasa 義政, his father, conducted Bakufu administration directly through his bugyoshu 奉行衆 (magistrates). Yoshihisa, however, stayed in Omi with his hokoshu 奉公衆 (immediate retainers) as well as the said bugyoshu for one year and half until his death due to illness. Yoshihisa's administrative and judicial decisions while in the battlefield were made by means of relying on consultation from his hyojoshu 評定衆 (councillors) selected from among his reliable entourage, instead of adopting his father's practice of presiding over the "magistrates". The newly established hyojoshu was different from the group of the same name once composed of hereditary bureaucrats (whose ancestors served the Kamakura Shogunate), and was composed of persons of different social background, free of tradition, and competent to become his advisors or even his surrogates. This fact suggests that Yoshihisa secured his power by relying on his own entourage and new councillors, thus reducing the influence of the "magistrates" then still entrusted by his father to the submission of advisory reports (iken 意見). Previous scholars have maintained that Yoshihisa's regime in Omi was initiated by the "immediate retainers". Indeed, the main body of the military force consisted of these retainers, and their services were vindicated by Yoshihisa, but the nuclear group of "councillors" was not necessarily composed of representatives of these "retainers". The expedition, judging from an examination of Inryoken Nichiroku 蔭凉軒日録 and other contemporary source materials, was positively intended by Yoshihisa himself to effect a separation from his father yoshimasa and his liege vassals, including "immediate retainers" and "magistrates", and to form his own system of decision making. The author concludes that (1)previous studies emphasized the voice and influence of the "magistrates (bugyoshu)" which grew larger in shogunal decision making after the Onin-Bunmei War, but the shogun's entourage (sokkinshu 側近衆) also played an important role in this procedure ; (2)the "councillors (hyojoshu)" newly established during the reign of Yoshihisa can be taken as the precursor of the "inner consultants (naidanshu 内談衆)", who would appear later during the reign of the 12th Shogun Yoshiharu 義晴.

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