Eisangelia (the impeachment trial) in classical Athens is known as a legal process to try political and military leaders for major public offences. The author attempts to reconstruct its procedure in the period from Solon to Ephialtes, and to assess the powers of the demos (people) and the Areopagos within early Athenian democracy. Two problems are discussed in this paper. One is when and by whom eisangelia was instituted, and the other is what political body heard the pre-Ephialtic eisangelia. The author finds it less appropriate to ascribe the institution to Solon than to Kleisthenes, partly because no contemporary evidence proves the existence of a Solonian eisangelia, and partly because the danger of tyranny must have been felt more seriously by the latter reformer. It seems more probable that Kleisthenes (or his successors) made use of the Solonian ephesis to introduce some method of prosecution against tyranny. By means of the ephesis, i.e., the reference of a case from one of the arkhons to the heliaia, the demos was invested with the power to hear the trials for major public offences. This is because the heliaia at that time was in substance a judicial session of the ekklesia (assembly of the citizen body). In this way a legal system came into being to impeach those who attempted to threaten the existence of the democratic constitution. It may be called the prototype of eisangelia. After the arkhons lost their political significance in 487/6 B.C., the prytaneis (presidents of the council of Five Hundred and the assembly) took their place and became the recipient of eisangelia. Two possible ways of prosecution were then open to an accuser: he could bring an impeachment either to the council or to the assembly. These channels formed the classical procedure of eisangelia for major public offences in the post-Ephialtic period. The only judicial body to hear eisangelia in the pre-Ephialtic period seems to be the demos, whether as ekklesia or as heliaia, though some scholars have argued that sovereignty in eisangelia belonged to the Areopagos. The author also offers a hypothesis that eisangelia to the arkhon for maltreatment of orphans and parents derived from the prototype and retained that original form until the time of Aristotle. Eisangelia is one of the oldest types of procedure for political trials, and its course of development shows us how the Athenian demos came to secure a way to protect their own democracy.

View full abstract

The Kobaidono (located in present day Shimogyo-Ku, Kyoto) is thought to have originally been the residence of Sugawara-no-Michizane, but fell into disrepair after Sugawara's banishment from the capital. It was then apparently transformed into a shrine with Sugawara's deification and the rise of the Tenjin belief. However, as of the mid-Kamakura era the shrine had all but disappeared from the site. Within this set of circumstances, the people living on this 1 square block (yonmen itcho = 1 cho on all four sides) of land claimed various proprietary rights and steadily increased their hold over it. Then in 1306 a lawsuit arose between these local residents and the Kitano Shrine over the question of charging rents (jishi 地子) on the site. The Kitano Shrine argued that since it was the Kobaidono's parent shrine is held overriding proprietorship over the whole, 1 square block area and therefore had to right to receive rent from the local residents. The local people rejoined that the Kobaidono Shrine itself covered a strip of land occupying only about 1/10 of the total area (7 jo by 20 jo; 40 jo = 1 cho on a side). The litigation documents that were compiled in the journal known as Kobaidonosha Kiroku show that the lawsuit lasted until 1311. The documents contained in this record were prepared based on the judicial system practiced by the civil authorities (kuge 公家), and thereby give us an excellent and clear example of this very difficult to understand litigation process in actual practice. Since the litigation also included an incident involving a deadly sword attack in the 8th month of 1310, this original land dispute spilled over into the court of the capital military authority at Rokuhara, which was authorized to pass judgement on matters concerning public safety. For this reason, the Kobaidonosha Kiroku also allows us to view in practice the negotiations carried on throuhgh a functionary known as the kanto moshitsugi 関東申次 between the civil and military authorities with regard to settling this matter. One more interesting point is that after the local residents lost their long court battle in 1310, they took measures to appeal the case (osso 越訴) before the fudono 文殿, the civil authority's secretariat, in a process called teichu 庭中. Here we can observe the teichu process as a direct appeal to the secretariat, "going over the heads" of the usual litigation channels.

View full abstract