From 1935 to 1945 reformist bureaucrats in Japan occupied virtually the center of policy making along with a group of politically and economically concerned military officers. These bureaucrats were not only able to exert influence in the complete bottom-up process of policy formation, but also, despite little formal powers, were also able to effect decision making to a far greater extent than in the era of the political party cabinets. These reformist bureaucrats belonged to a group of government officials who had received their formal university education in the 1920's in the Marxist tradition. They rose up through the ranks in the latter half of the 1930s from personal and professional relationships in the background of building a controlled economy. They philosophically refuted both Marxism and capitalism, which they viewed as degrading the human character by the strong emphasis on materialism. Focussing their views on success in Manchuria, they stressed domestic totalism (planned economy) according to political priorities (presuming of course the existence of the monarchical [Tenno] institution), and insisted on the "East Asian (toa) bloc" as the corresponding state of affairs on the foreign front. This way of thinking was based on German totalistic thought; however, we can also discern their Marxist educational background enabling them to adopt such an ideology. In terms of concrete goals, their totalism was commonly directed towards "reform" plans geared to increasing the military strength of the army. It was for this reason that these reformist bureaucrats joined hands with politically and economically concerned military officers in policy making and political action. The practical behavior of these reformist bureaucrats, being based generally on this kind of ideology, was geared towards carrying out within such integrative offices as the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikaku-in) a radical state reorganization effort (almost impossible in peacetime) as one link in the creation of a wartime system for supporting the war in China and the Pacific War. Their efforts meet with a fair amount of success. The true intentions of the whole "reformist faction", which included these bureaucrats and embraced totalism in the wake of the German victorids on the European front, came to light during the Konoe New Organization movement of 1940 and 1941. However, the "citizens organization" plan that they were most eager to put through was not realized fully due to resistance in the National Diet. In any case, these reformist bureaucrats, as a result of giving up on both Marxist and capitalist solutions, inevitably plunged Japan into the Pacific War and continued to hold this ideology even after the War was over. While we can say on the one hand that their criticism of both Marxism and capitalism was not completely irrelevant in that it can be linked in the end to Japan's postwar high economic growth, on the other hand, it was because of their hastiness in trying to reform the present situation that they brought a great many of human and material damages in the Pacific War. Furthermore, when looking at the problem in terms of comparative history and national system theory, in the sense that it was the army officers and reformist bureaucrats who exerted real political influence through their commitment to totalist ideology, but were able to realize only a part of their goals in very gradual steps, we could call this period in Japanese history "a wartime state regime tending gradually towards totalism".
The "Total Revolution" Movement (1974-75) in India led by J.P.Narayan (called "JP" for short) was a very remarkable movement in the sense that it involved a unique theory and practice of changing the individual and that it led to the collapse of the Congress Party government, which had continuously been in power since Independence. JP's role in the formation of the Janata Government by leading the "Total Revolution" Movement has been generally acknowledged in the sense that he was protecting Indian democracy. But the idea of "Total Revolution" itself, which aims at changing the individual's behavior and thinking, has been judged negatively as being too fanciful. In this paper the author attempts to take a new look at the idea by attaching importance to the inner logic of why JP hammered out his theory and thus reevaluate the "Total Revolution" Movement as a whole. Though the "Total Revolution" Movement is in fact an extension of the "Sarvodaya" (uplift of all) movement inherited from Gandhi and Vinoba Bhave, research up to now has generally ignored this point, which can only be understood in the context of Indian society and the background of the movement's ideas. JP's movement has usually been dismissed as a mere "political" movement. This paper discusses the strategy of the "Total Revolution" Movement and its efforts at social reform. It also tries to clarify the movement's historical meaning, emphasizing the above-mentioned "inner logic." In the first place, concerning strategy, in contrast to Vinoba, JP emphasized the aspect of "resistance" to government and extended the village-centered movement of Vinoba into the cities and drew new revolutionary power from the intelligentsia, students, and other young people. It was largely as a result of this that JP's movement showed such a big upsurge. As for the practice of social reform, in this case the establishment of "Janata Sarkar" (people's government), which JP advocated after noticing how Vinoba's "Gramdan" (donation of villages) movement had become more form than reality, Sarvodaya activists very often entered villages and tackled the establishment of "Janata Sarkar". But although we may sympathize with JP's assertion that changing individual mind-sets is in-dispensable for meaningful, long-term change in Indian social structure, we may still be forced to say that the social-change aspects of his movement were more a failure than a success, since they obviously needed more time for fruition. However, it is also a fact that in the process of joining the movement a lot of people were awakened to their inner power and changed themselves in substantial ways. If we disregard this fact, we will not be able to understand the full significance the movement had. A final point to be stated in relation to the reasons for the collapse of the movement is that JP did not continue to pursue its revolutionary direction in a real sense and changed it into an "opposition political party" movement. JP should have been more thorough in driving home the sort of grass-roots democracy seen in the "Janata Sarkar". Or he should have personally taken a share in power after Indira Gandhi's ouster. Yet he did neither. His concepts surely had (and have) potential, and many no doubt wish he could have realized them more fully during his lifetime.