This paper examines how governmentality has changed in the past decade. Since the 1980s, we have experienced the hegemony of economic liberalism (or neo-liberalism) and the spread of globalization. But at the beginning of 21^st century, and especially over the past 10 years, politicians’ way of discussing these issues has changed and supporters of a kind of anti-globalism or skepticism of free market society have considerably increased.

  There are several arguments for the support of market mechanisms and market society. Among them, I examine the concepts of ‘trickle-down’ theory, ‘limited government’ and ‘doux commerce.’ These ideas are becoming more and more dubious and the distrust of the global market system has given birth to a big wave of new political movements (both conservative and liberal). I show that this kind of distrust has a long history and even at the birth of market theory, judicious thinkers like Jean-Jacques Rousseau radically criticized market-oriented society.

  To understand and evaluate new political trends more concretely, it is useful to consider Michel Foucault’s idea of governmentality and Karl Polanyi’s scheme of market versus society. Recent political demands can be seen as a revolt against market-oriented governmentality and a reflection of the serious need to create a new governmentality that can regulate and moderate the severe effects of global market forces.

  As a term that indicates the modern socio-economy, the word “market economy,” in place of “capitalism,” became widespread from the 1990s. While “market economy” depicts modern economy as a horizontal relationship among free and equal members, “capitalism” besides implies a vertical relationship especially between capital and labor. Even when we use here the word “market economy,” we refer to “capitalism.”

  How to coordinate/regulate the market economy? This is the central question of the French Régulation School. This school, succeeding Marx’s historical, and Keynes’ institutional points of view, approaches the market economy from an analytical angle of “social regulation of capitalism.” This is of course a critique to the auto-regulating view of market by neoclassicals.

  The question of social coordination/regulation of capitalism also constituted an original subject of the Japanese thought of civil society, represented by Yoshihiko Uchida. The development of capitalism does not necessarily realize a penetration of the law of value for the labor-force as a commodity. That is, one cannot expect the civil-socialization of the wage-labor nexus on the so-called logic of market alone. After grappling with Kazuo Okochi’s social policy theory, Uchida opened up a viewpoint that a normal development of market requires an institutionalization and coordination/regulation from the side of “society.”

  From these reflections, we can point out two principles that consist in the modern socio-economy: market principle and society principle. The two are conflicting and also complementary. A particular market economy is formed by their concrete combinations, and this is why there were/are so many varieties of market economy in the history and in the contemporary world.

  My brief paper does not aim to respond directly to Prof. Yamada’s presentation. The paper, however, criticizes Franco-Italian “Cognitive Capitalism”, which is sharing a strange conception of ‘(Post-) Fordism’ with French Régulation School, that at last has come up with the denial of Marxian Wertsubstanz (Cf. Orléan, André, L’empire de la valeur. Refonder l’économie, Paris, Seuil, 2011).

  Simulteneously, my paper criticizes a tendency which has ignored Marxian concept of das fiktiv Kapital, e.g. moneyed (monied) Capital posed in Marx’s 1863-65 Manuskripte titled ‘Das zinstragende Kapital’, and which has stressed ‘Knowledge- Cognition-Linguistic’ bias.

  Focusing on my paper, the essential points against “Cognitive Capitalism” are as follows: ①The authors of “Cognitive Capitalism” arbitrarily pick up parts of Marx’s descriptions in Gruntrisse, Resultate des unmittelbaren Produktionsprocesses and Das Kapital Band I (Engels’s edition). Then their ‘theory’ is an embarassing, awkward, and chimerical ‘patch’ swelled out of ‘Marx-like terms’. ②Their claim of the ‘dialectical pair’, e.g., ‘material Labor – immaterial labor’, is never dialectical because the ‘pair’ can not really be posed.

  The authors of “Cognitive Capitalism”, as well as the theorocrats of the “Régulation” school, believe in the mana-geability (or, regulability) of European financialized market (not the global one). Their belief, however, can not be realized under the domination of accelerating global movements of Fictitious Capital. The reason is: today’s dominant situation of market is nothing other than a series of financial trading events within nano-seconds, and tends to sweep human interactions, using machine trading and the High Frequency Trading - computational program. In other words, the idea of human-centralized manageability (or regulability) of market is a mere daydream, and we will never manage, regulate, or control the runaway market, other than try and explore an entirely new alternative to abolish Global Capitalism.

  Reaching 150th anniversary of the first edition of Das Kapital (Band I), we need carefully, minutely but daringly discuss the contemporary phase of Capital and Market.

  In this paper, the author consider the capitalist market from the Marxian idea on the market as an economic system capable to gratuitously take advantage of natural and cultural potentialities existing outside the market for the sake of profit maximization. According to Marx, profit maximization not only derives from the exploitation of surplus-labor from workers but also from the gratuitous use of nature. What characterizes “productive powers of capital” consists in its power to transform natural resources and laws existing outside the market into productive factors that make continuous technological revolution possible. Such natural power is called “gratis natural power of capital” by Marx. By this concept, Marx tries to explain that the market is not a closed self-regulating economic system but an open one that depends upon various possibilities to make gratuitous use of external economic potentialities.

  The idea on “gratis natural power of capital” is applicable not only to natural environment but also to cultural and historical conditions that coexist with the market. In this context, the author considers Marx’s idea on peasants and their mode of production in terms of their historical contribution to capitalist formation and development. The author tries to demonstrate that Marx well understood the indispensable role of peasants in the historical formation of capitalist system.

  Finally, the author tries to explain the incredibly rapid economic development of Chinese Republics in the recent forty years by applying Marx’s ideas on peasants and their inexhaustible potentialities.

  Between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Atlantic countries were characterized by a number of remarkable congruities in the discourse of political thought. This essay examines one such transatlantic congruence, focusing on two parallel schemes for multinational coexistence devised by Alfred Zimmern (1879-1957), a notable British international thinker on the one hand, and an American cultural pluralist Horace Kallen (1882-1974) on the other. In analysing their resonating schemes, the essay advances three main arguments. First, Zimmern and Kallen both crafted a theory of multinational and multicultural symbiosis under the influence of the leading cultural Zionist Ahad Ha’am. Second, the dense intellectual communication between Zimmern and Kallen across the Atlantic helped these two thinkers formulate their similar projects of multicultural symbiosis. Finally, the two thinkers proposed such projects as an ideal for reorganizing their respective political communities: the British Empire for one, and American civil society for the other. The essay concludes that Zimmern’s and Kallen’s schemes of multicultural symbiosis prefigured contemporary liberal multiculturalism, albeit with a marked difference. Unlike contemporary theories, they were both characterized by an organic integration of nationalism and internationalism.

  This paper aims to display the kind of problems the French Third Republic faced over the establishment of “économie sociale” (social economy), by exploring the conflict between “republican solidarisme” (L. Bourgeois, L. Mabilleau) and “coopératisme” (C. Gide).

  Several researchers have attempted to extract the conceptual framework of “économie sociale” from the history of social thought. Although their studies assist us in classifying various ideological currents based on whether or not they played a key role in organizing “économie sociale,” the competitive relationship between those currents classified as “économie sociale” organizers has not been investigated sufficiently.

  Furthermore, in the early 20th century, the attempt to reach a consensus on “économie sociale” generated a philosophical conflict, continuing the institutional rupture between cooperative society and mutual aid associations. Both “republican solidarisme” and “coopératisme” placed a high value on private initiatives or associations, as they were considered effective in improving existing solutions to social problems. However, a conflict of opinion on liberty and duty arose between the two ideological currents. The former considered the mutual aid association as a new avenue for citizens to fulfill social duty, requiring governmental intervention for reinforcing public-private sector partnerships. However, according to the latter, the application of “republican solidarisme” to social reform might endanger the principle of modern solidarity that was based on private initiative or association.

  Intellectuals in the 20^th century had shared one dilemma: while they were passively produced in the educational system established by the ruling class, once they obtained their intellectual resources, they also began to critically scrutinize the asymmetrical educational structure and use their intelligence for the sake of the least advantaged people. In this sense, the social and political commitments of the representative intellectuals in the 20^th century can be seen as their struggles to overcome this contradiction in their own contexts.

  This paper focuses on the British political thinker Harold Laski (1893-1950) and argues that Laski tried to solve this dilemma by (1) strenuously scrutinizing the academic institution and its ‘impartiality’, (2) getting access with the working class movement, (3) representing the unprivileged and the forgotten people, and (4) trying to nurture the intellectuals within the working class people themselves.

  Through these considerations, this paper concludes that the role of the ‘public intellectuals’ in the 20^th century was not only to recognize their contemporary society but also to show the hope for the alternatives.

  The purpose of this article is to illustrate some key features of Japanese postwar political thought, with special focus on two political scholars’ ideas from the perspective of theories of mass society—those of Keiichi Matsushita (1929 − 2015) and Younosuke Nagai (1924 − 2008).

  First, I examine the general characteristics of theories of mass society. These theories emphasized some aspects of “mass society” compared to modern “civil society.” In these theories, autonomy was the keyword, of which there were two types. One emphasized that political autonomy in mass society were deteriorated by national inclusion of intermediate spheres such as labor unions; the other argued that people in mass society were subordinate to the intermediate spheres’ norms.

  Keiichi Matsushita used theories of mass society to illustrate its positive and negative effects upon political autonomy. Importantly, he noted the significance of not only independence from nation but also obtaining social welfare through reforming labor movements.

  Younosuke Nagai, on the other hand, dealt with political consciousness in mass society. He determined that political consciousness was a significant factor in the politics of mass society. Based on Nagai’s idea, it can be concluded that the changing political consciousness is beneficial for social minorities.

  This article analyzes the critical outcomes of the political thoughts of Matsushita and Nagai via theories of mass society, emphasizing the necessities of social democracy (by Matsushita) and political realism (by Nagai). I conclude that we can unite their political thoughts and interpret them as realistic thinking for the political reform in social democracy in the present age.

This article demonstrates that “reconstructive critique” is the consistent framework and the methodology of Habermas’s social theory. Reconstruction in reconstructive critique, on the one hand, distills from the perspective of participants normalcy conditions of participants’ praxis, and that conditions become criteria of critique. Critique, on the other hand, from the perspective of theoretician analyzes social pathologies that distort the praxis. By using the “immanent” criteria, critique effectively exposes the pathologies to the participants. Examining his three major works, “Knowledge and Human Interests,” “The Theory of Communicative Action” and “Between Facts and Norms”, I elucidate that the unseparable division of labor between reconstruction and critique constitutes the framework of the three works. Previous researches often discuss “linguistic turn” in the 1970’s and interpret the turn as withdrawing critique from the components of his social theory. And they argue that by presenting abstract democracy theory, BFN retreat from “Critical” social theory. Against them, by showing reconstructive critique as the framework of Habermas’s critical social theory, this article interprets the turn as refinement of reconstructive critique and demonstrates the method of critique not only in KHI, but also in TCA and BFN.

  Recent debates over the conception of “secularism” have received wide attention among various academic disciplines, including philosophy, sociology, political science, and studies of religion. In this article, we take a look into a redefinition of secularism offered by Charles Taylor, who is one of the insightful critics of this problematic concept.

  Examining the arguments which are gathered in the volume titled Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, we try to illuminate two features of the secularism redefined by Taylor. First, his conception of secularism itself can well be understood in terms of the Catholic religiosity, which defines Taylor’s own moral-spiritual source. Second, his religiously motivated secularism, however, does not show narrowness or exclusiveness to non-Catholic others. Taylor insists that secularist societies should refrain from treating religion as a special problem. While this claim would be rooted in the Christian faith as his deepest motivation, it also incorporates a certain logic of universalization, which enables Taylor himself to transcend his own particularity. At the conclusion of this article, we articulate how the public and the religious are interwoven in Taylor’s discourse on secularism.