This report is to clarify the features of recent rationalization activities in Europe, America and Japan and to consider future prospects for the Japanese economy, of which the industrial structure is in an adjustment stage.
Recently, in Europe and America, the rationalization of production encompassing the introduction of JIT production systems is moving forward. There are also changes in the area of labor along with this movement, however, these have not produced satisfactory results because of social limitations.
Japan's rationalization efforts have developed rapidly corresponding to the increasing strength of the yen. As a result, differences between medium and small enterprises and among labor are becoming greater.
The increasingly strong yen has accelerated moves to produce overseas. The power to compete internationally which should be the premise for advancing overseas, can be strengthened by rationalization activities. In Japan, rationalization to deal with the yen's strength has been a part of preparations to advance overseas. At the same time, these activities are accelerating improvements in information gathering and contributing to a reform of the social structure and enlarged domestic demand. Notice should be taken of this point.
Thus, changes in Japan have involved more structural changes in society and greater technical innovation than those in Europe and the United States. As a result, it cannot simply be said that, at least for the moment, hollowization of industry will occur in Japan, or that Japan will lose its power to compete internationally.

抄録全体を表示

1. The characteristics of the Japan's patenting activity
(1) The characteristics of the Japan's patenting activity is the tremendous amount of the number of the applied patent. But seeing the absolute number and the rate of increase of the number of the patent granted, the number of the Japan's patent is yet approaching to the level of the American's, now being less than the American's. (2) The Japan's patent-applying behavior is so much concentrated to the particular sectors and firms. For example, the share of the top 10 sectors is 47% (at 1985), and the share of the top 10 firms is 33% (at 1982). (3) The rate of publicity to the whole number of the applying patent in Japan is 35%. Comparing the application-granted ratio of the patent internationally, the ratio of Japan is relatively low. (4) The foreign patent granted behavior of Japan has been “poor” yet. The advanced countries except Japan are granted much more at foreign countries than the number of the patent granted at their domestic countries. (5) The foreigners' share of the patenting activity in Japan is inclined to decrease, and its share of the U. S. is inclined to increase. (6) The number of the patent granted of Japan to another advanced countries has become greater than the number of another foreign countries to Japan at early 1970s.
2. The characteristics of the trend of the Japan's technological balance of trade
(1) In spite of the active patenting behavior, the characteristics of the trend of the Japan's technological balance of trade is yet deficit in total. The Japan's receipt of the technological balance of trade is less than another advanced countries, but the Japan's payment of it is more than them. (2) However, seeing the sum of the new contracts only (ie. net of continuing bill from the total), the ratio of technological receipt over payment is more than 2 at 1984 (only this figure is one of Japan's F. Y.).

抄録全体を表示

Over the past thirty years, the Japanese computer industry has dramatically grown and Japan has become one of the most-advanced computer countries. This remarkable growth of the Japanese computer industry was partly due to the industry's own efforts for development of advanced technologies, quality improvement, active importation of foreign technologies, formation of various business relationships with foreign computer manufacturers, and an aggressive pricing and other marketing strategies. However, the Japanese computer industry's success was largely due the Japanese government's computer industry promotion policy. An adoption of such an industrial policy by the Japanese government is not unique to the computer industry, but a mere copy or an adaptation of the industrial policy previously adopted by the Japanese government for other industries such as steel, chemical, shipbuilding, textile, automobile and so forth.
Japan has been successful in developing its various key industries by adopting and implementing such industrial policies particularly since the late 1940s after World War II.
All industrial policies so far adopted by the Japanese government to develope those industries were virtually the same in their major characteristics and constituents of the policy. However, a magnitude of the government's assistance to the Japanese computer industry in finance, providing the legislative basis for the industry growth and local computer manufacturers' market domination including antitrust exemption of various collusive activities among the Japanese computer manufacturers and a market reservation for Japanese manufacturers far exceeded to the assistance to other industries.
The Japanese computer industrial policy consisted of the following measures: (1) restrictions on importation of foreign computer and on the inflow of foreign capitals into Japan so that a growth of the infant Japanese computer industry would not be hindered; (2) the governments' assistance in an acquisition of foreign computer technologies, for example, through a way that unless the foreign computer manufacturers make their patents open and available to the Japanese computer manufacturers, these computer manufacturers were not allowed to remit a profit and repariate the invested capital; (3) a provision of huge amount of the government subsidies and the low-rate interest loans the statutory basis of which was the computer industry promotion laws such as the Designated Machinery and Electronic Industry Promotion Provisional Law (1971-1978); (4) creation of various governmental research projects under which the government provided the huge amount of research fund for developing computer technologies to compete with foreign competitors; only the Japanese computer manufacturers were allowed to participatc in such projects; this was another form of the government's financial assistance; (5) tax incentive to computer leases in case where the special computer leasing company which was created under the special legislation was utilized; again, only the Japanese computer manufacturers were entitled to use such a leasing-company; and (6) the Cabinet Determination of “Buy Japanese Computer Policy” (September, 1963) under which the national and local governments as well as educational institutions were forced to use the Japanese computers; even private companies were requested to cooperate to this policy.
Such an industrial policy successfully built up the Japanese computer industry on one hand, but it obstructed a fair competition in the industry and distorted its industry structure which should have been formed based on the free-competition market principle on the other hand. The major task for the Japanese government from now on is to make all segments of the market open and to restore a free and fair competition principle in the market.

抄録全体を表示

The develoment in computer technology has brought us the high information society. The role of information in the society has become by far important than before. But we only have a slight acquaintance with the information industries, especially the software industry.
In this paper we pursose to describe the principal characteristics of the Japanese software industry referring to the traditional methodology of Joe S. Bain, and to discuss how the problems in it could be solved.
Software is devided into two. one is the basic software and the other is the application software. They have each market. Two markets contrast sharply. The basic software has the oilgopolistic market structure, but on the other hand the application software shows the conditions of the monopolistic competition.
The life-cycle of the software is long, so firms seem to maximize rather their market shares than profits. The price of software is set by “NINGETU HOSHIKI”, a type of full-cost principle, which multiplies the total number of engineers engaged to develop it by the time needed to develop it.
As we are short of the data, it is difficult for us to evaluate accuately the whole performance of the software industry, but as far as the existing data in the application software is concerned, it seems to be comparatively good. Many new comers have been entering the market, it keeps contestable for now. But we have some serious problems. The most serious one is the shortage of the engineers and the low productivity. Besides them the working conditions of the engineers aren't so comfortable.
We think that the basic orientation to solve such problems may be for individual film to develop more highly value added software. As to the concrete methods, for example, introducing the method of the software engineering or raising the weight of the package software are effective.

抄録全体を表示

Recently, Japanese direct foreign investment has been increasing, especially by automobile and electronics companies. The findings of this paper are based on the results of a field study conducted from August to September 1986 by the Japanese Multinational Enterprise Research Group. Automobile, electronics, and semiconductor industries were investigated (16 plants in the United States and 1 in Mexico).
These industries in Japan have held comparative advantages in the world market, so their exports explain much of the recent Japanese trade surplus. As a result of trade friction and the appreciation of the yen, the expansion of production overseas, especially in the United States, has become inevitable for these industries. However, Japanese companies are now faced with the problem of how to be competitive in the U. S. market. Because the comparative advantages of Japanese companies are said to be derived from the so-called Japanese production system, or more generally the Japanese management system, which is based on the particularities of Japanese society and the attitudes of Japanese people, it is very difficult to replicate such a system in the United States. That is, when Japanese companies operate in the United States, it is necessary for them to operate as efficiently as in Japan in order to be competitive but, in order to implement the same production system as in Japan, there are many difficulties for them to overcome. Herein lies the problem of transferability of the Japanese management system.
In this paper, I used an application-adaptation model to interpret the findings of the field study. Application refers to the extent of the introduction of a Japanese management system, while adaptation reflects the extent of adaptation to the local environment. The actual conditions of 14 plants are assessed by using this model. The results indicate that automobile plants apply more aspects of the Japanese management system, while electronics plants are more adaptable. Case studies of 3 plants were also included in order to highlight the situation concerning local production in the United States. In concluding remarks, I referred to the possibility for more optimal conditions for Japanese local production in the United States.

抄録全体を表示