This paper analyzes the reason why the Chinese automobile distribution has consisted of multi channels and multi tiers. In order to do so, we use two frameworks. First framework is concerning the transitional phenomenon from socialist planed economy to market economy. We examine this transitional phenomenon from three different factors: historical origins of multi channels and multi tiers; factors facilitating multi channels and multi tiers as a result of market economy; and factors facilitating multi channels and multi tiers because of the immaturity of market economy. Second is a phenomenon of “The more tires, the lower prices, ” which indicates the mechanisms in which the more tiers distribution has, the lower prices vehicles have.

抄録全体を表示

ASEAN automobile industries started from relatively early on while the scale was limited, but they only experienced their significant development in the 1980s. ASEAN countries have tried to establish their own automobile industries as a base of industrialization by fostering domestic assembly makers and component producers. However, because of their small market size, limitation of technology, lack of capitals, dominant of ineffective makers, they have hardly been able to attain sufficient development level until now.
In the meantime, the situation has changed since the later half of 1980s. Recent globalization and regional economic progress presented new favorable circumstances for ASEAN's automobile industries. Urbanization and regional income growth activated the automobile market, and increasing foreign investment and deregulation policies expanded component producing bases in the area. Additionally the industrial networks became able to distribute widely, developing into a strategic axis for world wide export. Especially, establishment of the AFTA framework is expected to promote automobile industrial networks throughout the region. Under these circumstances, American and European makers are strengthening their production bases through collaboration with Asian makers and are trying to explore the new potential Asian market which was formerly dominated by Japanese automakers. Japanese automakers are also expanding their industrial networks in ASEAN countries by using the AICO scheme and others. ASEAN governments and domestic manufacturers are responding positively to these changes and receiving foreign investment more actively.
In consideration of above matters, the following points are important to evaluate future development of automobile industries in the ASEAN region. (1) How far networks of component industries advance and deepen in the area after the AFTA framework is realized, (2) Whether the gap between advanced countries (e. g. Thailand) and others will widen in this area, (3) Whether Asian style conventional vehicles are developed more widely in the area and exported to other frontier markets, (4) How American and European big automobile makers could build up stronger positions in the area and explore the market more widely through network alliances, (5) Whether China emerges as a strong competitor with ASEAN in terms of market size and industrial investment in the field of automobile industries. In short, Asia, particularly ASEAN region, could be unquestionably highlighted as an arena of mega strategic competition of automobile industries now in the future.

抄録全体を表示

Following the demise of the Cultural Revolution, and opening its doors to foreign capital investment, the Chinese economy has continued to grow at extremely high average rate of 7% per annum. With the steady increase in domestic wealth in China, coupled with the increasing demand for electrical home appliances, “Industrial Clusters” of consumer electronics manufacturers, their suppliers and exporters have formed in many of China's costal regions (particularly in the PC, mobile phone and semiconductor sector), and have grown rapidly to provide internationally competitive products at a low cost.
China is in a unique position of succeeding simultaneously in both high tech and low cost production industries (Historically, developing industrial countries have followed a discrete pyramid process like a V-shape of flying geese, stepping from labour intensive, to capital intensive and then intelligence intensive industries).
Consequently, it is likely that Japanese manufacturing will weaken quickly and create a vacuum in the domestic industry, unless it can manage its Chinese satellite plants strategically, and form its own industrial clusters in Japan, which will create new employment opportunities. Japanese manufacturing industry can only survive if it moves away from its present high cost structure, and shifts to an intelligence intensive industry that is higher than that which is attainable in China, and is in a different market from Chinese products. A strategy of industrial clustering will help develop this new higher level.
It is highly likely that China will become the leading IT nation during this century. Throughout history the bench mark country of industry has shifted every few decades. In the past, civilizations have risen and fallen in China, India, the Middle East, Europe and perhaps today in America. During that time, Japan, although once dominating world industry, could not always maintain her position. From now on, Japan cannot consider its own industrial development strategy without considering that of China.
Japan will need to develop considerable talent to shift its manufacturing industry to a high value added (intelligence-intensive) type of manufacturing. It will be impossible to grow this talent overnight. A long term vision: “a hundred years to build a country” is required.

抄録全体を表示

Business structures in car parts manufacturing firms are undergoing a transformation. Assemblers are demanding that their auto parts suppliers respond to global procurement needs, outsourcing, and modulization. In particular, assemblers want suppliers to provide modules, rather than discrete components. One reason for this trend is that cost paring on individual components is approaching its limit. In addition, assemblers are increasingly outsourcing parts as a means of easing the development-cost burden arising from stricter environmental and safety standards.
There is no industry-wide definition of a “module”. In its simplest form, a module is an assembly made up of different car parts. Typically, a module is made up of parts that require the interaction of different engineering disciplines. For example, bumper engineers design a bumper assembly only, but a front-end module requires coordination between bumper, lighting, cooling and body engineers.
Many industry experts expect that the move to modular manufacturing will drastically shrink the number of Tier One suppliers. More and more suppliers are moving to undertake mergers or acquisitions as a way to increase capability to produce modules. In the future, there will simply be fewer suppliers in total. The race is on, globally.
Modulization will result in increased capital expenditure, R & D costs, and investment burdens for the parts companies. It raises concerns that the total return on each company's invested capital will decline for structural reasons. In spite of these concerns, suppliers are left with no choice but to modulize: those that can't produce modules will lose control of their destiny, and perhaps even their companies.
Megasuppliers have begun the recent rush to modulization, and continue to lead the way. “Black box” design proposals have been made for front-end, rear-end, or cockpit modules, and some are already supplied in domestic and overseas assembly plants. Suppliers are hoping to create modules that could be designed and developed in collaboration with automakers. As it happens, suppliers may eventually have a stronger voice in the design and development of car parts, a role traditionally left to the automakers.
There is no telling how far automakers and suppliers may push the idea of modulization beyond 2003. One inevitable outcome will be a major shakeup in the supplier community which was established in the mid-1980s. After that, we may see suppliers moving not only to control their own destinies, but to create them.

抄録全体を表示

In this paper, I briefly summarize the essence of health economics. I also point out the problems which exist in the health care system of Japan and show how health economics can contribute to solving them. As economic incentive of the players there, including patients, health care providers and insurers in health care system seem to be crucial for solving problems in health care systems, Health Economics can be expected to make much contribution to solving the problems in health care markets.

抄録全体を表示

Japanese sewing machine industry was promoted as an export industry after the World War II and expanded rapidly thereafter. At the beginning, Japanese sewing machines were regarded as “imitation of SINGER” and “cheap and nasty”.
Later, however, Japanese sewing machines surpassed SINGER, which they modeled after, not only in export volume and value, but in terms of quality as well.
In 1974, the sewing machine industry was released from Export Inspection Law, reaching its goal of improvement and stability of quality, far earlier than the camera (1989) and watch (1991) industries.
This paper clarifies the reason and background of the above. In 1949 Japanese sewing machine industry, in cooperation with Japanese government, standardized household sewing machines and their parts, and the de facto standard of sewing machine parts was formed in the 1950s. In the case of the parts of cameras and watches there is no standard specification like the one of sewing machine parts. Standardization of parts contributed to the stability of quality and cost down of sewing machines.
This paper demonstrates quality improvement of Japanese sewing machines, based on Japanese export inspection results and the product ratings by the Consumers Union of the United States.
Figures show that Japanese sewing machines surpassed SINGER, in terms of production quantity in 1957, and of quality in 1969. From this point of view, it can be said that standardization of sewing machine parts was one of the reasons why this industry gained international competitiveness earlier than cameras and watches. Just for reference, Japanese camera industry surpassed German ones, in terms of production quantity in 1962, and of quality in 1976.
This achievement was due primarily to the persistent efforts of Japanese sewing machine makers to improve their products, and to export promotion policy (including Export Inspection Law) of Japanese government (including JSMIA: Japan Sewing Machinery Inspection Association).

抄録全体を表示

This paper describes the development process of Mitsubishi Motors production system. Since 1980s, the flexible production systems of Japanese automobile makers have received significant attention as a source of competitiveness, and a large number of researchers have examined how the Japanese flexible production system generated international competitive advantages. However, a considerable number of past studies have been made on the production system of Toyota Motor Company, and paid little attention to the other Japanese automobile makers production systems.
Therefore this paper specifically examines the Mitsubishi Motors production system. And the paper focuses attention on the aspect of coordination among distribution, production, and purchasing. It also attempts to compare Toyota production system with Mitsubishi Motors production system, and focus its attention on the differences between both companies production system.
Now Mitsubishi Motors attempts to develop its production system in order to adapt efficiently and quickly to the changes of demand. As a result of this development, the differences between Mitsubishi and Toyota are becoming larger, and the following factors are especially important: firm scale; product development performance; strategy; supplier system.

抄録全体を表示

The prolonged recession in Japan and on-going globalization have changed the purchasing policies of Japanese automobile and autoparts makers. Because Japanese auto and autoparts makers maintain operations of Japanese transplants in East Asia, Japanese autoparts imports have been increasing since the Asian economic crisis in 1997. This paper uses simple statistical analysis (trade specialization coefficient and appropriate weights) in autoparts trade between Japan and Korea, China, Taiwan, and Thailand. From the analysis, Japanese-Chinese and Japanese-Thai trade show the process of autoparts complementation.
In spite of the fact that autoparts imports from Korea have increased, the comparative advantage of the items is that same as that in Chinese. That is, Chinese products have a cost advantage if Korean autoparts makers produce then same items. Korean makers may lose their position as exporters of Japanese autoparts. Taiwanese autoparts makers are building transplants in China. Japanese-Taiwanese trade of autoparts may decrease in its importance because Taiwanese makers shift production from Taiwan to China, and in addition, the Taiwanese industrial structure is changing to the high-tech sector. The reason why China and Thailand will likely increasingly be autoparts suppliers to Japan is that there are many Japanese transplants of auto and autoparts makers in China and Thailand. Japanese autoparts imports from China and Thailand are likely to increase because there is a trend for Japanese auto makers to purchase from Japanese parts makers. In addition, the items imported from Thailand are different from those imported from China. Chinese automotive industry shows rapid growth, and China already has an established industrial structure. Thailand is accumulating its automobile industry, and Thailand has a long-term experience of working within the Japanese style.
Imports from East Asia of low and middle value-added items will likely increase. It is expected that especially China and Thailand will play an important role as autoparts suppliers to Japan.

抄録全体を表示

Camera manufacturers have advanced the technology-related diversification with increasing the sales of cameras. Today, camera manufacturers have shifted their business strategy. The technology-related diversification has been promoted in earnest since the 70's. But it has not proceeded smoothly. Camera manufacturers cited four main reasons for the technology-related diversification: the unique characteristics of the products and manufacturers, the market size and market maturity since the 70's, the development of technologies, i. e. the automation of camera operation, at the highest stages, and the decrease of profitability.
Each manufacturer made the utmost use of its technology, and advanced to the highly profitable fields. The management gap has been formed by the product development competition and the degree of the technology-related diversification. Camera manufacturers show a strong competitive power in the diversified fields. The optical technologies of camera industries have become a barrier against the other industries entering the field, and a strength in the diversified fields.

抄録全体を表示