From the time of “Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness,” Nishida’s thinking gained in depth by pondering the problem of self-awareness. In his later years, however, the viewpoint from which he grasped self-awareness was not the same anymore as before. Self-awareness, earlier defined as “the self seeing the self within the self,” came to be rethought as “the self seeing the absolute other in the bottom of self, and seeing the absolute other as the self”. Now, knowing the other in the self is the reality of self-awareness. Nishida, then, clarified this “structure of the self-awareness” by the concept of “representation (expression).”
Nishida borrowed the meaning of the concept “expression (representation)” from Leibniz and understood it as “the one reflecting the other, when a durable relationship between the one and the other originates.” From there, Nishida spoke of the self seeing the absolute other in the bottom of the self as the absolute other reflecting itself in the bottom of the self, and thus interpreted the other that is reflected in the bottom of the self as the representation (expression) of the absolute other. In the same line, he then came to understand the self as “a point of self expression of the world,” which reflects the world within itself ; in other words, as an individual self. This kind of self-grasp is what Nishida now understand by “self-awareness”
The relationship involved in the structure of self-awareness manifests the relationship in religion between immanence and transcendence, this shore and the other shore, I and Thou. The characteristic of this relationship is that there does not exist an outside (or third party) to grasp both from the outside ; in other words, that the relationship can only be grasped from the inside. Here lies the reason why the religious relationship are “irrational” imprevious to reason, and inseparably linked to scandal (stumbling block for reason) and faith. In other words, self-awareness contains the problems of irrationality, scandal, and faith within itself.
In the attempt at clarifying the relationship proper to the notion of representation (expression), as involved in self-awareness, I first wanted to look for the clues of understanding outside Nishida, before engaging Nishida’s own texts. I refer to the later Nishitani’s “image-ination of emptiness” and “diaphanation of being,” Descartes’ “idea of God”, Heidegger’s “Herstellung,” Soga Ryojin’s “Primal Vow as watershed,” and Levinas’ “dire”. In their reflections on these themes, these different thinkers all pursue the structure of self-awareness, each from a different perspective.
In the present essay, I have tried to shed some light on the matter which Nishida endeavored to grasp through the concept “representation”, by way of an investigation of the above-mentioned strains of thought. This “matter” is the idea that the self is itself by reflecting in itself that which transcends the self.

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One of the most important words in the last work of Nishida Kitaro is “inverse correspondence (gyaku taio)”. He makes use of the word 24 times there. However, its notion is not distinctly defined. That makes us face a problem of a right understanding of its meanings and functions. At the same time it causes some difficulties, when we try to position his designed “philosophy of religion” in the whole system of his philosophy. Therefore, I try in this paper to confirm those meanings and functions by means of the analysis of its usage.
The usage of the word is classified into three groups:
1. He employs the word to express the religious relation between God and human beings.
2. The word is used to indicate a dynamical structure of self-mapping within the sphere of the Absolute (or God).
3. The application of an adjective form of the word to the world is carried out to express the structure of the world as the Place-where-in (oite aru basho).
Through the analysis of the usage and making a comparison between meanings and functions of the word in his last monograph and some preceding treatises, I reached such conclusions as follows:
A prototype of the “inverse correspondence” including “inverse auto-determination (gyaku gentei)” can be found in a kind of “inverse self-mapping” of the Absolute as an absolutely contradictory conversion from the absolute Nothingness to the absolute Being within the sphere of the Absolute. The prototype, then, maps itself onto the “Place (basho)” of the absolute Nothingness, and the Place itself becomes inverse correspondent. This Place as the ultimate Place-where-in gives rise to the embodiment of Places where inverse correspondent relations are established between the Place and the individual as the one which is found in (oite aru mono) the Place.

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Les deux orientations du spiritualisme français culminent dans la philosophie de la religion, d’un côté chez H. Bergson et de l’autre côté chez M. Blondel. Dans cet article, nous essayons d’éclaircir chacune sa vision sur la liberté, en vue de dégager deux types distincts et idéaux de la philosophie de la religion dans cette école.
D’abord, nous considérons deux manières d’envisager la pensée chrétienne lesquelles Blondel a présentées dans un article sur la méthode de Bergson : attentif à la seule réflexion mystique, celui-ci ne s’attache pas aux réalités historiques, pratiques, du christianisme. Deuxièmement, nous précisons ce que la liberté signifie chez Bergson en confrontant son idée sur le mysticisme avec sa pensée sur l’artiste : pour lui, la liberté est la toute indépendance et l’inconditionné, du moins dans son essence. Dans l’intention de mieux saisir le point de vue de Blondel sur la liberté, troisièmement, nous analysons le texte de L'Action, en particulier les quatrième partie et cinquième partie : pour lui, la liberté est toujours réfléchie comme une option, avec le sacrifice qu’est tout option, et la positivité à quoi elle donne lieu dans l’action. En nous fondant sur ces études, nous pouvons ouvrir de nouvelles possibilités du spiritualisme français.

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Cet article a pour objet de dévoiler deux idées différentes de la nature humaine, sur lesquelles les théologiens catholiques, tels que Suarez et Jansénius, ont construit leurs propres idées de la grâce et de la liberté humaine dans les controverses sur la grâce au début des temps modernes.
D’une part, en précisant son idée de la liberté d’indifférence, Suarez, théologien jésuite, insiste sur l’autonomie de la “interna et eminens potestas” qui est le principe de choix, à savoir celui qui réduit à un acte un pouvoir en état d’indifférence active. La nature humaine symbolisée par cette “potestas” est d’autant plus saine qu’elle garde sa propre autonomie même sous l’action de la grâce.
D’autre part, Jansénius, augustinien, attentif à la volonté spontanée donc libre, mais impuissante, la considère comme une volonté affectée par la détérioration fondamentale consécutive au péché originel. Ainsi, ayant perdu sa première liberté (celle d’indifférence), la volonté est devenue l’esclave de la délectation indélibérée. Viciée, la nature humaine devrait être proportionnée à la nature plus élevée.
Ces analyses mettent en lumière un autre enjeu de ces controverses, non moins fondamental, que celui de la grâce : il s’agit de celui de la nature humaine ; Suarez la voit comme une nature saine qui reste intacte après le péché originel, alors que Jansénius, comme profondément blessée et tombée dans un état inauthentique.

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Here we analyse the 《hierophany》 and symbols. They are Mircea Eliade’s main concepts. And then, we will try to elucidate, in his theory, his unique soteriology. He doesn’t define a religion a priori, but treats a religious phenomenon as it is. The nature of religion is intuited as the sacred, and every religious phenomenon is generalized as a hierophany. The sacred is a concept irreducible to the profane. This dichotomy of the sacred and the profane is regarded as a framework of his theory, and this framework has a presupposition that the human being is homo religiosus in its nature. The sacred reveals itself through natural objects in the profane. He explains this revelation as the 《dialectic of the sacred》. It means that a profane object is sacralized through becoming a hierophany. And symbols can substitute for, or prolong this hierophanic function of the dialectic. They maintain their religious structure or function, even in the context seeming as non-religious, and it is called as 《the coherence of symbols》. And methodologically he changes from a structural analysis mentioned above to a hermeneuitic one. He takes homo religiosus as homo symbolicum, and explains how homo religiosus exists in the profane, while having an intention for the sacred. In his terminology, Eliade differentiates the 《existence》 from the 《being》. And the existence has two modalities; one is within the reach of the being, of the sacred, of homo religiosus, and the other seems out of such a reach, of non-religious man. Nevertheless, we think that these strict differentiations have a relativity, while there is an absolute gap in quality between the sacred and the profane, between a religious man and a non-religious man. What brings such a relativity is a concept of symbols. Therefore, by elucidating what this relativity is, how it would be possible that his dichotomy and his concept of symbols could coexist, and how symbols could make even a non-religious man possible to experience the sacred and to be saved, we also make clear how Eliade thinks about the salvation.

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In this essay I attempt to show Tillich’s tendency towards the interreligious dialogue and its significance.
Tillich was aware of the significance of interreligious dialogue very early. On the assumption of a dialogue between representatives of two different religions, Tillich points out four presuppositions. ① Both should acknowledge the value of the other’s religious conviction. ② Each of them should be able to represent his own religious basis. ③ There should be a common ground which makes dialogue possible. ④ There should be the openness to criticism. The third and fourth presuppositions are derived from Tillich’s thought of revelation. Tillich thinks revelatory events as revelatory correlation. Revelation must be received and everyone can participate in revelatory correlation. This possibility of acceptance of revelation is a common ground of interreligious dialogue.
The significance of dialogue is derived from the truth of the knowledge of revelation. Its truth is to be judged by criteria within the dimension of revelatory knowledge. Tillich gives the criteria of revelation in the light of Jesus as the Christ, that is, uninterrupted unity with the ground of his being and the continuous sacrifice of Jesus to the Christ. This self-negation is criticism to idolatry. In a dialogue, mutual criticism is transformed into self-criticism. The significance of a dialogue consists in this criticism.
Tillich insists Christianity has openness and receptivity. He affirms the uniqueness and superiority of Christianity from the principle of criticism which is deprived from Jesus as the Christ. Tillich’s apologetic theology contains the tendency towards the interreligious dialogue.

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L’éthique de Levinas se fonde sur le primat de l’idée de l’infini par rapport à celle de la totalité. Selon lui, ces deux idées sont différentes par ce que la totalité est théorétique et l’infini est morale. Ce qui me semble important, c’est que ces deux idées non pas s’opposent mais se posent d’une manière différente. Tous les deux signifient ce qui transcende les donnés partiels. Pourtant l’idée de la totalité se pose par erreur comme Être, et celle de l’infini ne se pose que comme Idée. Ainsi ces deux idées ressemblent à l’idée transcendantale chez Kant. Cette idée transcendantale dans l’utilisation constructive qui suscite des apparences illusoires, équivaut à l’idée de la totalité chez Levinas. Et l’idée transcendantale dans l’utilisation régulatrice qui se montre non pas comme Être mais simplement comme Idée, équivaut à celle de l’infini levinassienne.
Cette distinction de l’idée et de l’Être s’inscrit dans les réflexions levinassiennes sur le temps. D’une part, Levinas réfléchit sur le temps comme relation à l’Être dans ses premières œuvres. C’est le temps immanent et Levinas le nomme〈le temps de l’économie〉. D’autre part, il réfléchit sur le temps comme relation à 1’Idée dans ses œuvres postérieures. C’est le temps transcendant et il le nomme 〈le temps du désir〉 ou 〈Diachronie〉.

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