A formal theory of organizations is developed from the requirement of supervision (in lieu of voluntary exchange). This leads to relationships of authority, chains of command, rank, span of control etc. and generates a metric of internal distance. Distance impinges on the frequency, accuracy and reliability of communication and diminishes the effectiveness of command and control. In principle, this phenomenon, known as loss of control can generate diminishing returns to organizational scale. Another area of contact between organization theory and spatial economics arises in territorially extended organizations. The spatial characteristics of the region administered rather than purely managerial considerations will then determine spans of control. Depending on how market (or supply) areas are joined, separate locations for different managerial ranks may be needed, or the higher ranks will be placed in office locations of their subordinates (as in a strictly hierarchical Central Place System). The objectives of the organization rather than spatial factors determine which system is preferable.
This paper considers the determinants of the optimal size of economic organizations and the benefits and costs of centralization and decentralization. After observing that this question arises with a broad class of organizations including regional and spacial ones, it focuses on an economic organization, the business firm. The paper first asks: why are factors of production, like managers, workers, and capital equipment, integrated into a firm for production? How is the boundary of the firm formed? In short, what is meant by the optimal size of the firm? It then proceeds to argue that the size of the firm is basically determined by the costs of operating it, and different costs of operating the firm are identified. New information technology affects the size of the firm by changing the relative magnitude of the costs. The paper attempts to assess the effects of new information technology on the degree of centralization and decentralization of the firm.
As for the pollution control in global enviroment, it is necessary to clarify in more detail the structural relationship among the climatic activities in atmosphere, the economic activities on land and the ecological activities in marine, and to investigate a number of paths which converge to the reference model (sustainable world) and the adaptation process of system and its stability by using Model Reference Adaptive Control System. In this paper, we therefore attempt to examine in more detail inter-field repercussion placing the emphasis mainly on the two-fiels case. More specifically, we are interested in gaining the insights into the balance of inter-field repercussion by Hermite Inverse Matrix Method which shows the total effects of inter-field propagation. Furthemore, for the achievement of model reference pollution reduction, we investigate a path converging to the reference model, the adaptive processes of system and its stability by making use of Model Reference Adaptive Input-Output Model and Model Reference Adaptive Ecological Model. These models are to make it clear how the actual world converges to the sustainable world once the reference world is established.
This paper deals with the economic analysis of international migration in a two-commodity and two-factor model where one commodity is non-traded good. In particular, price and welfare responses of a host country to an increase in immigration inflow is investigated. Also, we have studied the effect of remmitance and briefly argued the applicability of our analysis to the similar problems in the regional context.
In this paper, we characterize and compare the competitive and monopolistic equilibrium paths in an intertemporal economy where the electric power energy can be supplied by using an exhaustible resource such as petroleum or coal, a renewable resouce such as “water”, or a backstop technology such as nuclear fusion. It is shown that the size of the constant rainfall regenerated by nature significantly effects on these equilibrium paths and that the backstop technology is not always used forever. We also find that in all cases but for an exceptional case, monopolist is excessively conservative with respect to the renewable resource as well as the exhaustible, and that during the “final” interval in the exceptional case, the energy prices in competition and monopoly are both equal to the “demand” price at the constant rainfall.
Recently, considering the Harris-Todaro model (1970) where agricultural goods are used as industrial raw materials, Marjit (1991) showed that a wage subsidy in the urban industrial sector must increase urban as well as rural employment. But he assumed a production structure with fixed coefficients. In this note, we show that if factor substitution is allowed, a wage subsidy in the urban sector does not necessarily increase rural employment.