Development of a region means an entity of both cultural and economic development, especially from the long term view point. But so called technical analysis for the regional development is usually confined to the economic phenomena. In this paper from the following proints of sense, I would like to consider the relation between regional development and regional culture. (1) The background of the most rapidly developing region in the world-Asian area contains many haterogeneons cultures, which influence very much in the development of each region. (2) We cna not neglect the natural as well as cultural environment, in order to consider the regional development from the view point of long term.
The purpose of this paper is threefold, i.e., i) to depict the influence of human relations between senders and recipients on the communication media choice, ii) to find the sailent factors which affect human relationships related to communication media choice, and iii) to estimate the probability of face to face media based upon the choice behavior model. The study first conducts a paired comparison questionnair survey for workers in Tokyo metropolitan branch offices, tele commuters and managers in head offices which locate outside of Tokyo metropolitan region in order to identify the media choice behavior. The study then formulates the choice behavior of media and descriminant analysys of the degree of human emotion and confidence by logit model. The study finds the importance of human relationship on choice of communication media, as well as the cost and time factors which are emphasized in existing, studies. The major findings are with in-house communication, when the emotion of the person with whom communication is intended is strong, face to face communication is selected, and the more often workers travel on business to their head office, the more they choose face to face communication.
Nowadays, dramatic improvement of interregional transports system, particularly high-speed train systems, are booming in Europe and other regions of the world. Naturally their impacts on restructuring of the regional economy are most interested. Interregional input/output model is one of the tools to analyze such a phenomenon, however, it cannot provide actual trade amount between the regions, because it is based on the deterministic theory. In this study, using random utility theory, we first develop a theoretical basis of the combined model of interregional imput/output model and spatial interaction model. So that we get the following three equations as the equilibrium conditions: productivity equation, price equation and coefficient equation of trade. Under the constraint that the solutions equal to the above equilibrium conditions, we can also specify a programing model, which provides a social welfare function. Then the Chenery-Moses model and Amano-Fujita model can be interpretted as a special case of our model. And Moses model and Wilson model in the form of entropy specification are interpretted as a simplified version of our programing model.
Japan has about 2.53 mil ha of forests, 70% of the total land area, and two thirds of them were afforested, especially after World War II. So it is very important to take care of them, in the two senses that we continue to enjoy various public utility functions of forests and that we sustain to increase the forest stock as one of the important renewable resources. But Japanese forestry policies have mainly aimed to encourage domestic forestry as one of the industrial sectors. Environmental points of view have been secondary, therefore they have not worked well for the maintenance of forests, when the forestry sector became structurally depressed. According to 50 small scale forest owners who were interviewed in Iwate prefecture, reported that almost all of their forests which they afforested after WWII, haven't been thinned to mature them. From the comparison of the macro statistical data of labor input for growing forests by Ministry of Agriculture and the standard growing manual produced by local governments, the actual input of labor is short of that required for growing healthy forests. Therefore it is now necessary to develop forestry policies primarily oriented to environmental purpose. To clarify the environmental viewpoint of forests, I explained following points using dynamic optimization model of forests. (1) There are two ways to realize the social optimization of forest stock decentrally among the three subjects, which means foresters, timber consumers, and the people who enjoy public utility of forests. These are taxation on the timber price which make the consumers pay the opportunity cost of the public utility of forests, and to directly tax the beneficiaries of it. (2) The former policy realize the optimization of the amount of trade flow of timbers, and the input of growing the forest stock at the same time, but the latter one has only the second effect. Therefore in the latter case, we must also introduce some policy to optimize the timber trade. It is difficult to control the amount of timber trade centrally, consequently anyway it is necessary to use the price policy. For this reason it is better to introduce the first policy. However, we have to spend a lot of time to achieve international consensus on environmental prices for the renewable resources. Therefore, until such consensus is reached, it is necessary to take measures to ensure sufficient inputs to grow the forest stock. I propose here the Wage Parity Deficiency Payment System of Foresters (WPDPSF). Currently, the bottleneck in forest management is the shortage of young foresters caused by low wage rates relative to the hard and dangerous work comparing with, for example, that of the outdoor workers of construction sector. In WPDPSF system, if the discounted calculated production cast of timber in which the wage rate of foresters is increased to the same level as the outdoor workers' of construction sector is more than the actual market price of timbers (discounted), then the government subsidizes the deficiency. The burden on the government from this system will be about 100bil yen per year.
In this study, a model for the dynamic optimization behavior of the landowner in the monopolistic land market under uncertainty is presented. The impacts affected by the land property tax on the reservation behavior will be analysed by the numerical simulation. We assume a land market in which there exists a monopolistic landowner who has all the tracts of vacant land having certain location characteristics. The district can only be developed for housing owing to the zoning act. He intends to dispose of all the tracts by sale over time. He is a discriminating monopolist of the first degree in Pigou's sense. The consumer demand price curve faced by him is indeterminate, but the probability density function of the demand price which each (potential) purchaser bids for unit tract of land is known. The probabilistic demand curve is obtained, e. g., by arranging purchasers by mean bidding-price. It is assumed that, for simplicity, disposal by the landowner is selling. The reserved land is used for, e. g., rural uses and the revenues are determinate and stable over time. Or, it is left vacant with no revenues. We also assume a system of transfer taxes which, in effect, completely or at least almost disposseses profits yielded by brokerage. The assumption implies no land broker since he needs to pay opportunity costs of the funds. Furthermore, we assume it to cost prohibitively to make a lot with no housing on it. The last two assumptions imply that land is economically non-transferable over time. Hence, any sale in the land market is made by the monopolistic landowner. The landowner must pay ad valorem transfer tax on the sale of land. He also pays revenue tax on rural uses of the reserved land. If it is left vacant, he must pay the tax rated by the standard rural use. The landowner search for a stream of sales, and maximizes the utility which depends on the mean (expected value) and variance of the present value of the stream of sales (and the revenues, if the reserved tracts are devoted to rural uses). We assume that the landowner is a risk averter. Simulation results will be shown, and the impacts of the land property tax are compared with the impacts under deterministic conditions (Higano ).
Since the end of world war II, migration in Japan has been a flow from rural area to urban area. This brought the opposite serious problems both in rural area and urban area, i.e., the depopulated problems and the overpopulated problems, respectively. Further concentration of population to Tokyo area has accelerated recently. The problem of uni-polarization is discussed from the viewpoint of various stands and aspects. The problem of uni-polarization is classified into three problems as follows: (1) Difference in several aspects between Tokyo and other areas; (2) Congestion in using overhead capitals such as traffic systems, residence and so on in Tokyo itself; (3) Need of dual system in economic-social systems in Japan. In this paper, uni-polarization problem of type (1) and (2) is considered from financial aspects especially in Tokyo. First the simple model that explains the mechanism of migration between rural and urban areas is shown. If there is no intervention of central government, one region may become overpopulated region and the other undepopulated region. In the framework of the model, it is suggested that the central government may be justified in using a system of tax and intergovernmental grants to overcome these problems. In addition to intergovernmental grants, introduction of congestion tax and grants on agglomeration economies are suggested in this model. In order to confirm the role of tax and intergovernmental grants, the financial structure of Tokyo Metropolitan Government itself and the comparison with other local governments such as Prefectures and cities are examined. From the comparison with other government, it is shown that the financial capability of Tokyo Metropolitan Government and especially of 23 Wards is not enough to overcome the problems. Further, population of daytime in 23 wards, especially in the central three wards is several times as population of residents. The revenue and expenditure per capita are not enough to provide public services. Taking into account the population of daytime, investment on social overhead capital in Tokyo by both central government and local government is not more than that of other areas. In the case of the unstable case of the model, migration from rural area to urban area will continue. So it is suggested that the need has arisen to change the allocation of revenue in both central government and local government, while attractiveness in rural area must be pushed up in other way except intergovernmental grants.
The main purpose of this paper is to make a game-theoretical formulation of model that can represent interactions among local governments (each of which will plan some project independently each other), firms (each of which will determine where and what to produce and his production-capacity, given projects of local governments) and consumers of firms' products. This game-theoretical formulation can help us to represent explicitly a situation where an information of a decision maker on others' decisions is significant for his decision and where his outcome is a result of not only his own decision but also others' decisions. If there are interactions among projects of local governments, it may be difficult for local governments to evaluate outcomes of their decisions, for their decisions may not result in a unique outocome. Adopting Nash equilibrium as solution of non-cooperative game, this difficulty corresponds to multiple Nash equilibria, but it is likely that a non-cooperative game has multiple Nash equilibria. Using hypothetical and simple examples, we analyze a 2 regions-1 potential entrant case, a 2 regions-competitive entrants case, and a 2 regions-2 potential entrants case and show that an option (any local government can withdraw his published project if there is no entrant in his region) can reduce his difficulty mentioned above. Game theory requires all players know completely the game in which they take part, but local governments not only take part in a given game, but also each of them can design some part of the game in which he can not avoid to take part in. If we can assume all local governments know all alternatives, then we can formulate their game in full. But the representation of the game in extensive form is too complex for us to deal with. So piece-meal modifications of their game can be justified if each of their modifications is acknowledged as reasonable by every participant. In this context, the above result is meaningful, though underlying assumptions are very restrictive.
Telecommunications markets in Japan was liberalized in 1985. Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Public Corporation (NTT) was privatized and three competitors entered into long-distance call markets. It is since 1990 that traffic data between message areas (MA, =local areas) are available from these companies. Using the data, this paper examines communication structure in Japan. Our analysis proceeds as follows. At first, applying the Q-analysis and the Cluster analysis to each of nine regions of Japan, four patterns of communication are identified. Secondly, a traditional gravity model approach is applied to inter-MA traffic data from a representative region of each of the four patterns. Although it is recognized that the scale of subscriber set gives positive external effects and the distance between caller and callee impedes communication, these effects differ with regions, which represent some regional characters. Finally, a communication demand function is estimated in which demand externalities are defined as a distinct feature.
People often call distribution the “Dark Continent” of the economy. Most conventional models have diffcultly of exploring the working and performance of distributors, i.e., a sequence of intermediaries which connect producers with consumers. We have yet to adopt a new approach to distributive intermediation. The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the informational role of intermediaries in the market economy, thus shedding new light on the Dark Continent. In the ideal world of certainty, producers and consumers may meet each other face to face, causing no frictions throughout trading. The presence of distributors would merely serve as a complication factor for the linkage between producers and consumers. Indeed, we can show that when distributors enter as middlemen, output decreases and consumer price rises, whence social welfare declines. The question to ask is how the presence of demand uncertainty changes the welfare results obtained for the world of certainty. In order to emphasize informational asymmetry, we assume that the distributor is fully informed about demand but the producer is not so informed. Then we can see that whenever the uncertainty is large, the entry of the informed distributor increases social welfare. However, the risk neutral distributor has no incentive to reveal private information to the producer. If the distributor displays risk aversion and maximizes the expected utility of profit rather than the expected profit per se, then the situation must change completely. It is due to fact that in the case of risk aversion, information sharing implies the sharing of risk-bearing as well through its effect on the variance of the profit. Consequently, if the uncertainty is large enough, the risk-averse distributor may wish to share the information with the producer. To sum up, whenever demand uncertainty is present and the distributor has a significant advantage over the producer in collecting the information, the economy with distribution channels is socially more desirable than the one without. Moreover, if the distributor exhibits strong risk aversion, then he wishes to share the information with the producer. Further research on this area should be awaited.
Mongolia is a country that has been forgotten by Koreans since the 14th century. Despite a close relation between Won and Koryo dynasties until that time, the Mongols were soon forgotten as soon as Min dynasty was established on the mainland China and Chosun dynasty came into being. on the Korean peninsula. However, mutual interests between Mongolia and Korea have been spurred and augmented these days since the formal relationship and diplomatic ties were restored a few years ago. This study aims at delving into how the methods of Saemaul Undong-regional and social development movement which the Koreans have cultivated and also experienced in the effort of its modernization process-can be translated into the heterogeneous milieu of Mongolia, and can be adjusted ingeniously to the mores and emotional attachments of Mongol people and its land. The living quarter of Mongols is called GER (蒙古包: Mongophao). The form of the GER's ceiling is first of all composed of triple circle lines, which seem to represent and depict the latitudinal lines of the globe, and secondly, its frames which radiates from the top to the ground seem to be in the fashion of longitudinal lines of the globe. These form and frame of the GER can be applied extensively to the planning the model of regional community; that is, an ideal town planning in Mongolia can be done based on the very pattern and form of the GER. In other words, a blueprint for the proto type of GER-Model Town has been derived from and patterned after the structure and form of the GER itself by paying close attention to GER's detailed fabric. In each component block of the GER-Model Town, there are central square, public facilities, green tracts of land, residential areas, agricultural facilities such as vinyl greenhouses, afforested areas: at the same time pastures and green fields are also added to it so, that its inhabitants will be helped to realize significantly the benefits of living in the GER-Model town as settled stock breeders rather than wandering nomads. At the beginning stage of implementing GER-Model Town planning, it would be desirable to demonstrate the advantage of GER-Model Town living so that people are induced to aspire for living in groups in town. Based on such recognition and aspiration, the GER-Model Town can be expanded further to the extent of the planner's expectation.
The purpose of this paper is to propose a new simple method to classify the structure of a regional economy from the perspective of its interregional trade balance. This method is designed to assist in the preliminary analysis of a regional economy's trade. Regional scientists hypothesize that interregional exports and imports, and the resulting balance of payments are caused by internal comparative advantages or an interregional market equilibrium existing in factor prices. However, when we translate the saving-investment approach into regional terms, the interregional balance of payments may be caused by the budget deficits of local government or excess transfers from a central government to a local government. In this paper, we propose a simple specification method to determine factors which influence the interregional trade balance and then to classify regional economies to two types. That is, first we calculate three correlation coefficients for each region: between the interregional balance of payments (IBP) and Gross Prefectural Expenditure, between the IBP and interregional exports, and between the IBP and interregional imports, using Japanese prefectural data. Second, we classify prefectures in Japan into two types according to the pattern of positive and negative signs of the above three correlation coefficients; we identify a pattern of + + + as the interregional market equilibrium type and other patterns as the government expenditure dependent type. We analyze Japanese prefectural data for the 1975-1989 fiscal years obtained from the Prefectural Accounts. The main results are as follows. First, based on prefectural data describing the total economic activity taking place in the prefectural territory, twelve prefectures are of the government expenditure dependent (GED) type: twelve prefectures are Hokkaido, Aomori, Akita, Chiba, Wakayama, Kagawa, Ehime, Kochi, Nagasaki, Miyazaki, Kagosgima and Okinawa. The others are the interregional market equilibrium (IME) type. Second, five of the above twelve GED prefectures, i.e., Akita, Chiba, Wakayama, Ehime and Kagoshima are classed as the IME type when the classifications are based on prefectural income data. Third, using a sign pattern comparison of two intervals, 1975-1984 and 1980-1989 fiscal years for each prefecture, we can observe structural changes. The structural shift seems to occur when the ratio of government expenditure to Gross Prefectural Expenditure falls below 25 percent as in the prefectures of North Tohoku, San-in and South Kyushu.
This research is part of an on-going project of the econometric analysis about the Tokyo Metropolitan Area (TMA: Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama and Chiba prefectures). The main purpose of the project has been to make several effective plans to eliminate NOx exhausted from automobiles in TMA, especially in Tokyo Metropolis (prefecture). In the last conference of the Japan section of RSAI, we reported empirical studies of four-regions model of TMA (TMA model). However, as NOx concentrates in only small parts of the Tokyo prefecture and pollution occurs in such areas, we need to construct another model for Tokyo prefecture. This research is a trial of Top-down projection by the multi-regional linkage model. Tokyo prefecture which consists of 23 wards, 26 cities, 6 towns and islands is divided into twelve districts excluding islands. This model is composed of five blocks (demographic variables, employment, production, income and finance) and 167 equations which are estimated by OLS. The observation period is 13 fiscal years from 1976 to 1988. We applied this model to analyze the effects of various impacts and changes in trends of five blocks by running simulations, and comparing them with the results of the standard type simulation or final test. And two cases of historical simulations under the same conditions as TMA model are reported in this research. In these cases, the results of the TMA model were used as the control total (that is, Top-down linkage projection).
This paper studies, within the framework of standard urban economics, the optimal spatial distribution of differentiated local public goods whose benefits exhibit distance-decay nature. So far, most of the related works have treated local public goods as pure local public goods, that is, those goods enjoyed equally by the city residents irrespective of their locations, or as extremely local public goods, that is, those goods enjoyed only by the residents at the supply sites. However, the intermediate case in which the benefit from local public goods exhibits a distance-decay nature has not been well analyzed in the literature. Moreover, when local public goods are differentiated, the benefit may be expressed by a spatially discounted sum of the distribution of the goods. Although the analysis in the earlier work of the author was limited to the case of two supply sites, a much wider class of distribution functions are permitted in this paper. Indeed, the model is formulated as an optimal control problem such that the city government maximizes the common utility level of the households in the city subject to several constraints. A special attention is given to the case in which exclusive provision of local public goods at the center will be optimal. It is shown in this paper that the more important the local public service is, the more likely the center is to be the optimal supply site.