In this paper, we considered the relationship between individual memories and collective memories by examining the acts of mourning the mobilized student-workers who were killed by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. More specifically, we considered the relationship between individual acts of mourning the deceased and collective memory of not only the level of Japanese society as a whole but also, returning to Halbwachs’ arguments, of small-scale social groups such as families and schools by looking at materials published by the classmates and bereaved family members of Hiroshima Prefectural Hiroshima Daiichi Junior High School, Hiroshima City Daiichi Women’s High School, and the Hiroshima Prefectural Association of the Victimized Mobilized Student-Workers. The differences in character between a group formed to conduct memorial services at the school level and a group lobbying for honoring by the state, and the differences in the relationship with the deceased between bereaved family members and classmates, are reflected in the shape of the acts of mourning. There is an interrelationship between collective memories and individual acts of mourning the dead in small-scale groups. At the same time, bearing in mind the commonality visible between groups in the shape of acts of mourning, we can conclude that the collective memory of Japanese society provide an even larger context to the shape of acts of mourning.

Through revisions to the law that define land as ‘dangerous and not suitable to live in’ due to disasters, the wealthy can legally deprive the poor of their land. In her 2007 book “Shock Doctrine”, Canadian journalist Naomi Klein names this phenomenon visible in the neo-liberal world ‘disaster capitalism’, and warns against reconstruction grounded in neo-liberalism. In particular, she refers to the deprivation of land in the wake of natural disasters such as tsunamis as a ‘second tsunami’.

Applying this concept to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011, interventions such as the establishment of disaster risk areas, fisheries industry revival special zones, and construction of enormous seawalls show typical examples of the ‘shock doctrine’ piggybacking on disasters.

However, from joint field work along the entire length of the Miyagi prefectural coastline that the author has been involved in, this paper finds that disaster recovery called the ‘inner shock doctrine’ is in practice. That is, rather than merely recovery from a disaster, efforts are being made in each locale under their distinctive circumstances to address the structural problems (such as of succession, fishing rights, over-intensive aquaculture, and tsunami vulnerability) in each community. Increasing wealth of productive means via emergencies is referred to as ‘creative destruction’, as it involves temporarily disrupting the normal daily order until that time. It is clear that the inner shock doctrine, as a consequence of this creative destruction, acts to prevent the emergence of neo-liberalism. This paper discusses regeneration in devastated communities and the possibilities therein.

The shift from a welfare state to a neo-liberalism state dovetailed with the shift from the Toshin period of “A Report of Dowa Measure Deliberation Council to Cabinet” to the Iken-gushin period of “A Report for Basic Policy about Early Solution to Dowa Problem”. During this process, the consciousness and sentiment of the general public toward burakumin definitely changed. However, this change never verges on a positive relation. Many scholars insist that buraku discrimination has become a minor problem from a serious one. On the contrary, buraku discrimination has become more serious and more invisible. The “self-responsibility method” is the conventional view under neo-liberalism in Japan, which is the intermediary to personalize buraku discrimination. As a result, burakumin receive new types of stigma and hostility from the general public. In addition, some workers subjectify burakumin as a target for public security.

On the other hand, some burakumin accept the ideology of neo-liberalism and subjectify it. Some burakumin never disclose themselves as burakumin, meticulously keeping their identity quiet. This shows the reality of governance toward burakumin and the general public. It also shows a lack of understanding by the traditional power method.

These changes are bringing the conditions of a restructuring of buraku and the reproduction of buraku discrimination. The optimistic scholars who insist upon the “disappearing process method” are deaf to the sounds of the reconstruction process.

Although no radical right party actually won a seat in Japanese national and local assemblies until 2012, radical right parties and movements have had a noteworthy place in postwar Japan. Moreover, new radical right movements have been growing in the last decade. While Japan’s old radical right is authoritarian, anti-communist, and nationalist, the new radical right is uniquely characterized by its xenophobia. Keeping the rise of the new radical right in mind, Japan seems to be opening a Pandora’s box of radical right politics—much the same as European countries. In this paper, we will examine the characteristics of Japan’s radical right, comparing the different support bases of the old and new radical right politicians. Analyzing survey data from research we conducted in 2007, we found that nationalism was their most strongly correlated characteristic, while xenophobia had no significant role in steering the politics of the old radical right. That xenophobia is such a prominent feature of Japan’s new radical right suggests that this political preference is aligning with its West European counterparts.

This paper aims at examining leadership within three forms of mobilization among Brazilian migrants in Japan in the 2000s: Brazilian schools, local organizations and workers unions. The multisited approach stresses the limits of the ethnic leadership approach generally used in the theory of social movements for analyzing the collective action of minorities. In contrast, the determinants and realities of leadership incarnation among Brazilian migrants in Japan highlight the intersectionality of the processes of race, gender and class. The concept of intersectionality helps to capture these processes among Brazilian leaders and also points out the various configurations in which these processes are related.

This study aims to examine François Dubet’s ‘sociology of experience’ as a new approach to analyse the experiences of people living in conditions called ‘social problems’, particularly ‘exclusion’. As a specific example of description and analysis, this study investigates a survey on marginalised youth in Melbourne. Traditional approaches unidimensionally reduce the multilayered and complex problem of exclusion; as such, these approaches are unable to adequately portray the individuals’ complex subjectivity. However, the ‘sociology of experience’ (1) conducts a multidimensional analysis based on the three logics, or perspectives, of integration, strategy and subjectivation and (2) places focus on the individuals’ complex work of uniting the individual logics. Furthermore, traditional approaches have legitimised the objectification of individuals and unilateral readings by researchers by overvaluing society and systems (as well as their oppression). The ‘sociology of experience’ (3) claims that the true problem of exclusion is the division of systems and that individuals are situated between autonomous logics, hence weakening the ability for ‘action’. Therefore, the work of articulating each logic independently becomes important. From the perspective of the individuals narrating and organizing settings themselves, the ‘sociology of experience’ (4) stresses sociological intervention that does not objectivise individuals. With these characteristics, the ‘sociology of experience’ has major significance as an ‘inclusive’ approach and is applicable to Japan by considering welfare regime types and paradigms of exclusion.

This paper is an ethnographic study of inhabitants who have been forcibly evicted from their homes and dispersed to resettlement areas as the result of gentrification initiatives that have occurred with some frequency in recent years in the central areas of Metro Manila. Sitio San Roque is an informal settlers’ neighborhood located in Quezon City. However, in January 2014, to prepare for the commercial development of the Quezon City’s Central Business District, inhabitants living in 250 households located in this neighborhood were forcibly evicted. Residents affected by the evictions were sent to relocation sites several kilometers away from San Roque. This paper constitutes a sociological account of the forced evictions and subsequent events based on participant observation conducted in San Roque and the relocation sites in January and September 2014. In particular, this paper argues that the forced evictions and subsequent move to relocation sites resulted in residents’ transplantation from a familiar neighborhood into a markedly different world and explains residents’ suffering from “the habitus without habitat.” While referencing the works of Pierre Bourdieu, the study theorizes the fact that forced evictions not only deprive residents of their houses but also bring about the forced restructuring of habitus as well as the emergence of class polarization among the residents of informal settler neighborhoods.

The city in developing countries has been transformed under economic globalization (hereinafter ‘globalization’). On the one hand, its transformation has been interpreted in the context and image of the over-urbanized city; on the other hand, it has been interpreted in the context and image of the Western global city. This article aims to criticize these interpretations, to supplement them, and to propose an alternative framework for understanding the transformation of the city in developing countries. This article will call this framework the new labor, new poverty, and urban bottom hypothesis. It is composed of four propositions. First, the global city has emerged in developing countries under globalization. Second, the working conditions in the formal sector have been informalized. Third, the informalization of labor has given forth the new labor and laborer, and as a consequence the latter has created the new poverty and poor. Fourth, the new laborer and the new poor constitute the urban bottom (people). This article will consider the four propositions, propose a new conceptual framework, and assert the realistic compatibility of the new labor, new poverty, and urban bottom hypothesis.